This week, I have two reports to share with you all. Their topics include:

• What is cognitive warfare and how can we build an ontology to understand it?

• What are the current challenges to the development of the US Space Force?

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

Cognitive Competition, Conflict, and War

An Ontological Approach

By Robert “Jake” Bebber

Hudson Institute

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: This report explores the emergence of cognitive warfare, which manipulates cognition to destabilize sociocultural, economic, political, and military systems. It aims to provide an ontological framework for understanding and operationalizing the cognitive space in the context of national security decision-making.

Analysis: The report relies on a comprehensive literature review, drawing from sources in neuroscience, technology, and social psychology to proposes use cases and tool dimensions to structure the ontology.

Argument: Cognitive warfare represents a significant and evolving threat to national security, which traditional defense mechanisms are ill-equipped to address. The report posits that an ontology of cognitive warfare is crucial for understanding and countering these threats effectively. It emphasizes the need for national security institutions to adapt to the cognitive domain by developing new strategies, tools, and collaborative frameworks.

Insights: 

Cognitive warfare leverages human cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias, to manipulate perceptions and behaviors.

Advances in neuroscience and biology are being utilized to develop neuroweapons and interventions that can influence cognitive and emotional states.

Social media and digital platforms are critical vectors for cognitive warfare, enabling the dissemination of targeted disinformation and propaganda.

Recommendations: National security agencies should continuously refine the cognitive warfare ontology provided to keep pace with evolving threats. Moreover, the ontology should be integrated into existing security protocols to enhance threat assessment and response capabilities.

This Hudson Institute report is a pivotal exploration into the realm of cognitive warfare. Highlighting the convergence of neuroscience, computational technologies, and algorithm-based models as significant drivers of this new warfare paradigm, the report emphasizes the urgent need for an ontological framework to systematically address and counter these cognitive threats.

“The United States’ precision-strike advantage has eroded, and disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and synthetic biology are reshaping warfare dynamics. China and Russia are contesting and, in some cases, achieving overmatch against the US military, with ambitions of reshaping the global order.

The emergence of cognitive warfare—which manipulates cognition to destabilize sociocultural, economic, political, and military systems—poses a unique threat to America and its allies. This type of warfare differs from information warfare in that it aims to influence how, not what, people think, feel, and act, altering the cognitive space from individual to population levels. Key components of cognitive warfare include its tactical and strategic use, manipulation of the way people think, reliance on brain science and data, and ability to employ multiple engagement modes. The use of algorithm-based computational propaganda and the ability to create self-sustaining feedback and amplification loops are significant features.”

Tool Dimension of Cognitive Warfare

To illustrate the multifaceted nature of cognitive warfare, the report categorizes it into five distinct tool dimensions:

• Tools exploiting cognitive biases and perception: These tools manipulate individuals' inherent cognitive biases and perceptual vulnerabilities to shape opinions and behaviors. Example: Using confirmation bias to reinforce false narratives in disinformation campaigns.

• Tools involving neuroscience and biology: These involve leveraging advances in neuroscience and biology to influence and control cognitive processes. Example: Developing neuromodulating substances that can alter emotional and cognitive states.

• Tools exploiting social psychology and group dynamics: These tools manipulate group behavior and decision-making through social psychology principles. Example: Creating polarization and discord within groups by exploiting social identity theory.

• Tools employing techno-social applications: These use information technology to disseminate narratives and conduct social engineering. Example: Using social media platforms to spread propaganda and influence public opinion.

• Tools related to information technology: These encompass cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and critical infrastructure disruption. Example: Launching cyberattacks to compromise and manipulate essential information systems.

Forces Shaping Global Power Competition

Transitioning from these tool dimensions, the report then examines the broader forces shaping global power competition, emphasizing how technological and scientific advancements are influencing the gravity of cognitive warfare.

Firstly, emerging trends in neuroscience are enabling the development of both soft and hard weapons, as state actors invest heavily in neuroweapons and synthetic biology to manipulate cognitive and emotional states, creating new threats in the cognitive domain. Concurrently, the proliferation of data, ubiquitous sensors, and powerful computational technologies is driving the growth of cognitive warfare capabilities, with AI and machine learning algorithms automating the generation of targeted content, deepfakes, and personalized disinformation, while autonomous systems execute covert offensive operations in cyberspace.

Moreover, the attention economy, driven by algorithm-based business and marketing models, is shaping consumer preferences and behavior, often at the expense of individuals' well-being. Neuroscience insights inform the design of persuasive content and interfaces, contributing to the manipulation of human behavior in the cognitive domain. The convergence of these forces is leading to cognitive campaigns that are potentially achieving system-destructive effects, particularly in the United States. The American polity is exhibiting signs of these campaigns, such as increased political polarization, public health challenges, social media addiction, hesitancy to use force, and the influence of foreign-controlled platforms like TikTok.

Need for an Ontology

An ontology is essential for cognitive warfare as it organizes the diverse aspects of this complex field into a structured framework. Importantly, this systematic categorization enables the development of comprehensive strategies and epidemiological approaches to address the intricacies of cognitive threats. By defining classes, attributes, and relationships, an ontology aids in identifying vulnerabilities, formulating countermeasures, and enhancing national security resilience against cognitive manipulation.

The Ontology

The report categorizes the cognitive warfare space into six top-level classes, providing a comprehensive framework for understanding and countering cognitive threats:

• Actor: Entities involved in cognitive warfare, such as individuals, groups, or state actors. Example: Influencers on social media platforms spreading disinformation.

• Process: Methods and strategies used in cognitive warfare. Example: Psychological operations targeting group dynamics.

• Space: The digital and physical realms where cognitive warfare occurs. Example: Social media platforms as battlegrounds for influence operations.

• Event: Specific incidents or campaigns designed to manipulate cognition. Example: A coordinated disinformation campaign during an election.

• Tangible: Physical tools and technologies used in cognitive warfare. Example: Neuromodulating devices that affect brain activity.

• Intangible: Non-physical elements, such as narratives and cultural influences, used to manipulate cognition. Example: Spreading ideological content to create social division.

Recommendations

The report concludes with several recommendations for operationalizing the cognitive space for national security:

• Refine and expand the ontology to accommodate evolving cognitive threats.

• Integrate the ontology into existing security protocols and practices to make it indispensable for threat assessment and response.

• Foster collaboration among experts from various fields, including psychology, technology, and security studies, to refine the ontology and enhance its capabilities.

• Develop decision visualization models based on the ontology for effective threat detection and identification of opportunities for employment.

To better understand the importance of an ontology for cognitive warfare, I highly recommend reading the full report.

PDF

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Space to Grow

Foundational Opportunities and Challenges for the U.S. Space Force

By Hannah Dennis

Center for a New American Security

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report provides an in-depth analysis of the Space Force's establishment, progress, and ongoing challenges since its inception. Specifically, the report examines the service’s efforts to define its strategic concept, develop an organizational structure, and foster a cohesive service culture amidst external skepticism and internal challenges.

Analysis: The author analyzed official Space Force documents, public statements, and doctrine, and conducted interviews with Space Force servicemembers (guardians) ranging from junior enlisted to senior leadership. The research was completed by the end of 2022.

Argument: To succeed, the Space Force needs a well-articulated strategic concept, an organizational plan that institutionalizes that concept, and a vision for a distinct service culture. So far, the Space Force has not yet fully achieved these goals, facing challenges in defining its role, fostering cultural cohesion, and communicating its purpose to the public and partners.

Insights: 

Space is crucial for US daily life and military operations, but the Space Force struggles to convey its importance due to the domain's complexity and classification. 

The service's small size enables agility but creates challenges when interacting with larger bureaucracies and partners.

Public perception of the Space Force is influenced by science fiction, hindering understanding of its real-world mission.

Recommendations: See below for the full list of recommendations.

Historical Context and Strategic Importance

The creation of the US Space Force in December 2019 marked a significant shift in the nation's approach to space as a critical domain for national security. During the Cold War, space played a vital role in providing early warning systems and supporting nuclear command, control, and communications, thereby contributing to strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War era, space capabilities became increasingly integrated into US conventional warfare, enabling advancements in surveillance, precision strike, and overall military effectiveness. However, as potential adversaries like China and Russia developed capabilities to neutralize US space assets, it became clear that space was no longer a sanctuary but a contested domain.

The establishment of the US Space Command (SPACECOM) in August 2019 was an initial step to address the growing threats in space, but it became evident that a separate military service was necessary to organize, train, and equip forces specifically for space operations. As such, SPACECOM focuses on employing space forces in military operations while the Space Force is responsible for presenting ready forces and developing the doctrine, capabilities, and expertise needed to secure US interests in space.

Importance of a Unifying Narrative

A cohesive strategic concept, organizational plan, and service culture are crucial for the Space Force's success, enabling the service to justify its existence, motivate its members, and effectively accomplish its purpose. The Space Force has struggled to clearly define its strategic concept both internally and externally. Internally, the Space Force has done a better job of explaining the problem it was created to address than the solution it offers. The Space Capstone Publication outlines three aspects of the Space Force's role: (1) to preserve freedom of action in the space domain; (2) to enable joint lethality and effectiveness; and (3) to provide independent options to US national leadership, supporting operations in, to, and from space, as a domain in itself. However, externally, the Space Force has failed to effectively communicate both the problem and the solution to the public.

The Space Force is attempting to embody three core values—agility, innovation, and warfighting spirit—to align and distinguish itself from other services. Efforts to promote agility include maintaining a small size, implementing mission command, and adopting a relatively flat hierarchy. Innovation is fostered through an emphasis on technological fluency, partnerships with the commercial space sector, and efforts to reform acquisition practices. The warfighting spirit is intended to highlight similarities between the Space Force and other services, but inconsistent rhetoric and a lack of well-developed theory have hindered the effectiveness of this value. Despite efforts to institutionalize these values through organizational decisions and culture-building initiatives, shortcomings remain in each area.

Challenges Faced by the Space Force

The report identifies three major challenges the Space Force faced in its initial years:

1. The Partnering Challenge: The Space Force must establish itself as an individual service and compete for resources while figuring out how to integrate with other services. Its unique features, such as its small size, larger contractor population, and close commercial relationships, can make it difficult for other services to understand and work with the Space Force effectively. The Space Force's relationship with the Air Force is particularly important, as it relies on the Air Force for many essential services and personnel.

2. The Public Understanding Challenge: Generating public understanding is part of the Space Force's duty to the American people, but several factors have impeded this understanding. The association with science fiction in popular culture has made it difficult for some to take the Space Force seriously. The distant, intangible, and technical nature of the space domain makes it challenging for the public to grasp the importance of space operations. Additionally, the high level of classification surrounding space operations and capabilities hinders public understanding of the Space Force's activities and contributions to national defense.

“The Space Force has been challenged in creating public buy-in because of the science fiction aspect of current public perception of the service. Pop culture and familiar sci-fi concepts filled the early vacuum of information when the service was created. The Space Force tried to forge a unique brand, conceiving original cultural artifacts including its motto, Semper Supra (‘always above’) and song by the same name. Unfortunately, what began as a joke from the public was reinforced by certain official branding and organizational decisions, and public response has likely not been what many hoped. The service named its members “guardians” and created a seal reminiscent of the Star Trek emblem. It named one of its components Space Operations Command (SpOC), and it developed unique uniforms with baggy pants. The perceived close relation between many of these choices and popular science fiction made it hard for some to take the Space Force seriously.”

3. The Warfighter Question: The Space Force has grappled with defining the role and identity of its members as "warfighters," given the unique characteristics of space operations and the limited direct physical risk to most personnel. The service has sought to emphasize the warfighting spirit and the importance of space as a contested domain. But inconsistencies in the use and emphasis of the warfighter label have contributed to confusion and debate both from the public and within the ranks, with some viewing a warfighter designation as essential to the service's purpose while others see it as misaligned with the predominantly supportive nature of its operations.

If these challenges remain unresolved, the Space Force risks failing to secure necessary resources, losing public and governmental support, and ultimately struggling to fulfill its mandate. Addressing these issues is crucial for the service to establish its legitimacy, operational effectiveness, and long-term viability.

Recommendations

The report offers the following key recommendations for the Space Force:

• Clarify the service's position on the warfighter label: The Space Force should engage in an internal dialogue to reach a clear, consistent understanding of what it means to be a warfighter in the context of space operations. Once a consensus is reached, the Space Force should communicate this position consistently to its members, partners, and the public to resolve ambiguity and present a unified identity.

• Lower classification barriers, where feasible: While acknowledging the need to protect sensitive information, the Space Force should strive to reduce classification levels on space activities and capabilities wherever possible. Increasing transparency will enable the service to more effectively communicate its contributions, successes, and challenges to the public, bolstering understanding and support for its mission.

• Leverage history and current events to educate the public: The Space Force should develop a proactive public engagement strategy that draws on historical examples and current events to illustrate the critical role of space in everyday life and national security. By highlighting instances where space capabilities have made a tangible difference, such as in disaster response, scientific discovery, or military operations, the service can help bridge the gap between the abstract nature of space and its real-world impact.

• Avoid science fiction distractions and focus on substance: While acknowledging the influence of pop culture and science fiction on public perceptions of space, the Space Force should be cautious about leaning too heavily on these associations in its branding and communication efforts. Instead, the service should focus on conveying the serious, real-world nature of its mission and activities.

I urge you to read the full report to better understand the Space Force's importance and how it can grow in the coming years.

PDF

Report Page

This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following sources: Hudson Institute and Center for a New American Security.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

Again, please share, subscribe, and stay tuned for next week’s installment!

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I return this week with two compelling reports to share with you all. Their topics include:

• Over two years into the war, how is Russia’s military-industrial base faring in the face of Western sanctions?

• What is a framework to measure the defense-related science and technology (S&T) innovation of potential adversaries?

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

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The State of Russia’s Defense Industry after Two Years of the War

By Maria Snegovaya, Max Bergmann, Tina Dolbaia, Nick Fenton, and Samuel Bendett

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report analyzes the current state of Russia's defense industry in the context of its ongoing war with Ukraine. It assesses Russia's evolving weapons production, import diversification efforts, and military-industrial vulnerabilities.

Analysis: The report leverages global supply chain data, import-export records, and satellite imagery. Additionally, the report employs expert interviews, on-the-ground observations, and open-source intelligence to provide a comprehensive assessment of Russia's defense capabilities and limitations.

Argument: Despite significant challenges posed by Western sanctions and the ongoing war, Russia has managed to adapt and sustain its defense industry. Through import diversification, leveraging pre-existing stockpiles, and ramping up domestic production, Russia has mitigated some of the impacts of sanctions. However, it remains heavily reliant on foreign components and faces several unresolved issues that could impact its long-term military effectiveness. 

Insights: 

- Russia has shifted to lower-cost, lower-quality weapons effective for a war of attrition.

- Russia has diversified its import sources, including increased reliance on countries like China, Iran, and North Korea for critical military components.

- Corruption and labor shortages have been particularly straining on Russia's military-industrial complex.

Recommendations: See below for the full list of recommendations.

The State of Russian Weapons Systems in 2023

In 2023, Russia has notably shifted from high-end, costly weapon systems to more economical, mass-producible alternatives.

“This high-intensity war of attrition has prioritized certain lower-cost and lower-quality weapons like less advanced tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, small drones, and kamikaze UAVs that Russia continues to field in large numbers and that are proving effective. By contrast, more high-tech Russian weapons, such as advanced aircraft and helicopters, have proved vulnerable to Ukrainian countermeasures, leading the Russian military to withhold deploying these systems on the battlefield. Similarly, advanced Russian missiles have fallen prey to Ukrainian interceptors and are in short supply due to a high rate of usage.”

And despite the crushing weight of Western sanctions, Russia has demonstrated remarkable resilience, ramping up domestic arms production to unprecedented levels. Rostec, a state-owned defense conglomerate, stated it increased overall production of tanks by a staggering 700%, light armored vehicles by 450%, and artillery and multiple launch rocket systems by 250% in 2023.

• Tanks: Throughout 2023, the Russian military received over 1,500 tanks, experiencing losses between 600-874. Remarkably, approximately 86% of these tanks were refurbished older models such as T-62 and T-55, some equipped with modern upgrades like new radios and reactive armor, indicating a reliance on older stockpiles.

“As the overall quantity of old Soviet tanks in Russian storage likely remains in the several thousands, the Russian MOD can field such vehicles over the course of many months in 2024, assuming they can be refurbished and are not awaiting dismantlement. Public analysis of the Ukrainian battlefield shows that some of these Russian tanks received upgrades such as new radios, modern optics, and additional layers of reactive armor, with the most common upgrade to both newer and older Russian tanks being the anti-drone metal cages and slat armor, often referred to as ‘cope cages.’ According to CSIS’s Mick Ryan, ‘These cages have helped either crush the fuses of Ukrainian antitank weapons before they hit a vehicle’s main armor or forced antitank weapons to detonate before they can penetrate the vehicle.’ The cages have provided an additional layer of physical protection to Russian tanks, thus giving the Russian soldiers more confidence to operate in places with a high risk of Ukrainian drone attacks.”

• Artillery: Russian artillery production was robust, with the manufacture of 152-mm rounds quadrupling to one million rounds in 2023. The Russian military fields an estimated 4,700 barrel artillery systems and 1,100 multiple-launch rocket systems. The new Koalitsiya-SV self-propelled artillery system is currently under testing and production, promising enhanced artillery capabilities.

• Drones: In a remarkable display of adaptability, Russia has rapidly scaled up its loitering munitions kill chain, deploying a diverse array of short-range tactical FPV drones, mid-range Lancet and Kub drones, and long-range Geran-2 drones. The Russian MOD proudly claimed to have sent an astounding 22,000 drones to the battlefield in 2023 alone.

• Missiles: By the end of 2023, Russia had launched approximately 7,400 missiles into Ukraine. And over the past year, domestic missile production surged, with companies doubling or even quintupling their output. Moreover, Russian stockpiles include around 200 Iskander missiles and other variants.

• Electronic Warfare (EW) Systems: Russia has deployed numerous EW systems across the front lines, ranging from large stationary complexes to highly mobile, portable systems. In a strategic shift, Russia has prioritized smaller, more easily deployable EW assets to counter the ever-evolving threats posed by Ukrainian forces.

Russia’s Evolving Import Diversification Efforts

In response to sanctions, Russia has increasingly relied on dual-use and civilian technology. Moreover, by continuously modifying its purchasing patterns, Russia has successfully bypassed sanctions and secured crucial support from a diverse array of partners. Notably, electric machinery and microelectronics comprise a third of Russia’s military imports, highlighting the role of electronics in Russia’s warfare strategy.

• China: China has become Russia's most significant trade partner, replacing Western imports. Chinese exports to Russia have surged, particularly in semiconductors, machine tool parts, and ball bearings. The total trade between the two nations reached a record $240 billion in 2023, underscoring China's pivotal role in sustaining Russia's defense industry.

• Turkey: Turkey, while diplomatically supporting Ukraine, has not joined the Western sanctions regime. Instead, it has become a key supplier of dual-use goods to Russia. Despite recent US sanctions impacting this trade, Turkey exported $158 million in high-priority items to Russia and neighboring countries in the first nine months of 2023.

• North Korea: North Korea has significantly bolstered Russia's military supplies, providing over 1,000 containers of defense equipment and munitions, including artillery shells and short-range ballistic missiles. In exchange, Russia is likely to share advanced space technologies with North Korea.

• Iran: Iran has supplied Russia with at least 3,700 Shahed drones, crucial for targeting Ukrainian infrastructure. Plans to co-produce these drones in Russia are underway, with a goal of manufacturing up to 10,000 drones by 2025. Additionally, Iran has delivered at least 400 Fateh-110 ballistic missiles to Russia since January 2024.

• UAE and India: The UAE has become a hub for dual-use goods entering Russia, although it recently agreed to restrict re-exports. India's exports of engineering items to Russia increased by 130% between 2022 and 2023, despite potential risks of secondary sanctions.

Existing Russian Military Industrial Drawbacks

Despite its adaptations, Russia's military-industrial base faces several significant challenges exacerbated by the prolonged war and sanctions:

• Reconstitution Rate: Russia is rapidly depleting its reserve stockpiles, particularly its tank force, relying on older, partially modernized models, posing a significant challenge to its long-term military capabilities.

• Ammunition Shortages: While production has increased, maintaining sufficient ammunition supplies remains a challenge, especially for high-intensity conflicts.

• Labor Shortages: War-induced migration and attrition have led to critical labor shortages within the defense industry.

• Inflationary Pressures: Sanctions and economic instability have driven inflation, impacting the cost and availability of essential materials.

• Stretched Arms Exports: Russia's ability to meet arms export commitments is compromised by the need to prioritize its domestic military needs.

• Failing Import Substitution: Efforts to replace imported components with domestic alternatives have largely failed, hampering production.

• Overreliance on China: Increasing dependence on Chinese imports makes Russia vulnerable to shifts in Chinese policy or international pressure.

• Corruption: Pervasive corruption within the defense sector undermines efficient production and procurement processes.

Recommendations

Despite Russia's adaptations, the authors argue the West must continue to apply pressure throughout 2024. The report offers the following recommendations:

• Sustain and enhance the supply of higher-end military equipment to Ukraine, outpacing Russia's production rate and prioritizing weapon systems that offer Kyiv a decisive strategic advantage.

• Target Russia's oil revenues, which serve as the primary source of income for the government's budget. Proactive measures to suppress the price of Russian oil and the completion of the EU embargo on Russian hydrocarbons are essential steps in undermining Russia's financial capacity to wage war.

• Close sanctions loopholes and strengthen the enforcement of existing export controls. This can be achieved through the introduction of more severe penalties for sanctions violations, targeting third-country intermediaries, publicly exposing sanctions violators, and enhancing corporate responsibility for supply chain control.

• Engage in collaborative efforts with countries of the Global South that have adopted neutral stances on Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

• Commence planning for a strengthened and empowered European defense industry, potentially in partnership with Ukraine.

To more fully engage with the report and the analysis therein, I highly recommend reading the full report.

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Measuring China's Science and Technology Progress

A Framework for Assessing Advances Affecting Military Capability

By David A. Shlapak, Chad J. R. Ohlandt, and Jon Schmid

RAND Corporation

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

As the United States faces increasing strategic competition from China, this report introduces the Military Advances in Science & Technology (MAST) framework, designed to provide early warning of China's critical S&T programs and aid DoD decision-making. The main findings highlight the framework’s ability to identify strategic goals, screen relevant S&T activities, baseline progress, and support informed decision-making.

Why a framework is important?

“The basic research and applied research and development (R&D) phases—and, to some extent, the prototyping phase—represent periods in capability development in which measurable indicators of a competitor’s S&T interests might be relatively weak with a poor signal-to-noise ratio. What’s more, advanced countries, such as China and the United States, might have so many R&D activities underway that it might be difficult to find the needle in the R&D haystack. The United States might get very little early warning of the specific S&T programs that China intends to use to create important new military capabilities—capabilities that U.S. soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and guardians might confront in the future. For this reason, a tool that could identify China’s R&D that is fundamental to the PLA, fielding some of these capabilities early in the pipeline, is of immense interest to the military and intelligence communities.”

Put simply, China's increasingly sophisticated S&T base is directly competing with the DoD in advanced technology areas such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum sciences, and thus requires close monitoring of China's progress in these fields. In this way, the framework can help:

1. Focus US R&D objectives and shape modernization priorities by identifying areas where China is making significant progress.

2. Point the intelligence community toward investigating important new areas of China's S&T activity and assist in allocating intelligence assets and resources effectively based on the framework's findings.

3. Help combatant commands and Pentagon planners look ahead to assess the potential results of China's S&T undertakings and prepare for future capabilities.

4. Help DoD inform its whole-of-government and academic and industrial partners, such as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), about S&T areas in which caution should be exercised both in permitting Chinese investment in US firms and in collaborating with Chinese researchers.

The MAST Framework and How It Works

The MAST framework consists of four essential phases:

1. Identify military requirements: This phase assesses China's future strategic goals and derives critical future PLA capabilities from those goals, identifying new or improved capabilities necessary to execute future missions.

2. Screen S&T activity: This phase involves iterative, automated scans of patent and publication databases using technical search terms to identify indications of China's outsized interest in technologies related to relevant S&T activity.

3. Baseline technology area history: This phase assesses the output, capacity, and leadership interest in the technical areas specified by the screening phase, using several metrics across these three categories to create a report card for each S&T area.

   

4. Support decision-making: The final phase refines the results from the previous phases into a digestible form for DoD leaders, using dashboards to condense the information and capture the metrics and their trends over a defined period.

Test Cases

The authors applied the MAST framework to two historical test cases: hypersonics and high-power microwave (HPM) weapons.

• In the hypersonics case, using only open-source data, researchers assessed that China's interest and effort in this area would have been evident no later than 2007, as indicated by the red flags for S&T capacity in 2005 and output in 2007. This early warning could have prompted further intelligence collection and informed US R&D priorities and defense planning.

  

• In the HPM weapons case, the framework revealed that China had been very active in related S&T domains, with Chinese researchers and organizations responsible for 90% of the world's new HPM-related patents. The analysis showed that China's HPM research had a heavily military flavor, embracing both offensive and defensive aspects. By 2030, China might be able to deploy weaponized technologies analogous to those developed in the US Counter-Electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP). The framework also identified specific research organizations and individuals deeply involved in China's HPM research, providing valuable information for further intelligence collection.

  

I urge you to read the full report to better understand the importance of the MAST framework and how it operates.

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This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following sources: Center for Strategic and International Studies and RAND Corporation.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

Again, please share, subscribe, and stay tuned for next week’s installment!

Share Quick Tanks

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This week, I have two timely reports to share with you all. Their topics include:

• How can the US Intelligence Community modernize in an era of rapid technological change and increasing geopolitical tensions?

• How should the UK design the command and control structure for ground-based air defenses in the face of current and emerging threats?

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

Intelligence Innovation

Repositioning for Future Technology Competition

By William Usher, Katherin Kurata, Meaghan Waff, Tara McLaughlin, Ylber Bajraktari, Michael Mederios, and Elijah Boles

Special Competitive Studies Project

Link to PDF

Focus: The report focuses on how the US IC should adapt to the rapid advancements in AI and other emerging technologies to maintain a competitive edge, particularly against China. 

Analysis: The report combines qualitative analysis with some quantitative data. Notable data sources include surveys of policymakers on IC performance, projections on global data growth, and statistics on private AI investments. The report also draws insights from historical examples and case studies of foreign adversaries' tactics.

Argument: The IC must urgently transform to navigate the challenges posed by the nexus of technological change and intensifying geostrategic competition. Key pillars of this transformation include rapidly scaling AI use, reimagining intelligence partnerships, accelerating open-source intelligence adoption, and extending IC support for strategic communications.

Insights: 
1. AI will profoundly impact every stage of the intelligence cycle, necessitating a shift to human-machine teaming. 
2. The hub-and-spoke model of intelligence partnerships should evolve into a distributed network architecture. 
3. A public-private partnership could help bridge the IC's open-source capabilities gap in the short term.

Recommendations: The report offers numerous recommendations, primarily directed at the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and IC leaders. See below for the full list.

This SCSP report underscores the necessity for the IC to adapt swiftly to maintain national security and extend its competitive edge, anchoring its transformation in the advancement and integration of AI within intelligence processes, redefinition of intelligence partnerships, and a strategic embrace of both domestic and foreign collaborative efforts.

The Need for Change

The rapid pace of technological advancement, explosive growth of digital data, and intensifying rivalry with the PRC have created an urgent need for the IC to undergo significant transformation. Failure to adapt risks rendering the IC irrelevant and ineffective in the face of evolving threats. Consequently, the report outlines three key "Organizing Principles" to guide this transformation:

1. Broaden the focus from "national security" to "national competitiveness": the IC should recognize the expanding scope of national security in the face of techno-economic rivalry with the PRC.

2. Prioritize providing actionable "insight" over mere collection of "intelligence": the Community must leverage vast amounts of open-source information and advanced analytic tools and deliver timely and relevant knowledge to decision-makers.

3. "Lean in" on digital transformation: the IC should embrace human-machine teaming and AI-enabled capabilities and maximize the IC's potential in the digital age and maintain a competitive edge over adversaries.

Seizing AI as an Intelligence Advantage

The report emphasizes the clear and compelling advantages of leveraging AI in the IC, particularly the emerging field of generative AI (GenAI), which has the potential to revolutionize the way intelligence is collected, analyzed, and disseminated. For example, an intelligence analyst equipped with GenAI tools could rapidly sift through vast troves of open-source information, identify patterns and insights that might otherwise go unnoticed, and generate comprehensive reports in a fraction of the time required by traditional methods.

To capture the advantages of AI, the authors recommend:

Revamping Intelligence Partnerships

Foreign Intelligence Liaison Relationships

The report argues that the current hub-and-spoke model for foreign intelligence liaison relationships is ill-suited for the modern era, as it fosters transactional relationships and overemphasizes secrecy at the expense of strategic influence. To address these limitations, the report advocates for a shift towards a more distributed network architecture, in which intelligence partnerships are characterized by a greater degree of multilateral collaboration and information sharing. Moreover, the report emphasizes the importance of building stronger relations with unaligned or hedging states, particularly in regions of strategic importance such as the Near East, Africa, and South East and Central Asia.

Domestic Partnerships

The report identifies several limitations in the IC's current approach to domestic partnerships, which can hinder its ability to fully leverage the expertise and capabilities of the private sector, academia, and other non-governmental entities. For one, classification restrictions can obstruct the prompt exchange of vital information. Legal boundaries constrain what intelligence agencies are permitted to disclose to partners, especially if it jeopardizes privacy or national security. Finite resources compel the IC to rank partnerships, possibly missing out on useful intelligence sources and expertise. Lastly, the IC's duty to safeguard sensitive sources and methods can conflict with the imperative to build trust and cooperation with US partners.

Despite these challenges, the report emphasizes the critical importance of private-sector relationships, as the IC must find ways to harness the entrepreneurial, market-driven capabilities of the private sector to stay ahead of the curve. This will require a fundamental rethinking of the IC's approach to acquiring and integrating cutting-edge technologies, as well as a willingness to embrace new models of public-private collaboration that prioritize speed, agility, and innovation.

To develop and revamp these intelligence partnerships, the authors recommend:

Os-N-Tel: An Interim Approach

“At the heart of this transformation should be open-source intelligence. Unlocking the power of OSINT should up-end traditional models for intelligence collection and analysis that focused almost exclusively on the IC’s unique, exquisite, and highly-classified intelligence sources and methods. Unlocking secrets will always be an important IC task, but what will matter more in a future high-speed, data-driven tech competition with the PRC will be speed-to-insight, obtained from whatever sources are available. Most of those sources will be openly or commercially available, and the new AI tools to exploit this data will already be trained on much of it. The IC should emphasize greater use of OSINT, making it the INT of first recourse rather than the last. Adopting and normalizing this mindset would put the IC in a better position to keep pace with what industry vendors and academic institutions will be providing U.S. policymakers, and allow it to husband its resources and fragile sensitive capabilities and target them against only the most difficult of targets.”

Recognizing the importance of harnessing openly- and commercially available data for decision advantages, the report recommends the creation of an entity focused on this mission. As a bridge to the establishment of a dedicated Open Source Agency, the report proposes the creation of a non-profit organization called Open Source Intel (Os-N-Tel). Os-N-Tel could serve a crucial role in:

1. Sharing tradecraft standards between the IC and the private sector, expanding the interconnectivity of insights to benefit both.

2. Leveraging more bulk open data at scale, using several AI/ML tools.

3. Standardizing IC approaches to data rights, pricing, and data pedigree.

4. Serving as an additional mechanism for sharing information with private-sector national security decision-makers.

A More Proactive US Strategic Communications Posture

The report highlights how the US Government's approach to strategic communications has not kept pace with the rapidly evolving information landscape. Notably, the United States' principal adversaries – China and Russia – have developed sophisticated and multifaceted strategies for shaping the global information environment to their advantage. In contrast, US efforts are often balkanized, reactive, and lack a clear purpose.

“Compared to its adversaries, the United States has largely disaggregated its information efforts. The U.S. Government currently has at least seven departments and agencies assigned to handle various subsets of the information mission, though some have argued that U.S. strategic communications and public diplomacy are fragmented among 14 agencies and 48 commissions. These entities also tend to have relatively narrow mandates. They might be focused on a specific objective rather than being a resource for their department or the broader US Government.”

Thus, the report outlines five lines of effort for the US IC to adopt a more proactive strategic communications posture:

• Understand emerging platforms and mediums of communications by establishing and updating a baseline understanding of primary foreign platforms, leveraging functional specialists to exploit or disrupt them and regional experts to identify local platforms and inform content development.

• Map the adversarial information order of battle by tracking the organizations, individuals, resources, messaging, exchange programs, and people-to-people engagement used by the PRC, Russia, and other adversaries at home and abroad, with regional analytic offices leading this effort.

• Disrupt adversary information operations by tracking foreign adversaries' activities, identifying vulnerabilities for US policymakers to direct disruptive efforts, and leveraging regional specialists and functional experts to analyze technological vulnerabilities and develop tech-enabled disruption options.

• Modernize covert influence tools to support US policy by continuously updating and refining the IC's infrastructure and approach while avoiding involvement in disinformation.

• Assist policy agencies in measuring the effectiveness of strategic communications by helping decision-makers understand foreign audiences' and rivals' responses to US initiatives and policies, tracking visible signs of success or failure, financial transactions, audience surveys, and local actors' actions, and leveraging modern software and connectivity for targeted, continuous global surveys.

The authors’ specific recommendations are as follows:

To fully understand how the IC must change in the modern era, I highly recommend reading the full report.

PDF

Requirements for the Command and Control of the UK's Ground-Based Air Defence

By Dr Jack Watling and Dr Sidharth Kaushal

Royal United Services Institute

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report focuses on identifying requirements for the command and control (C2) of the British Army's ground-based air defenses (GBAD) in the context of the UK's evolving integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) strategy.

Analysis: The analysis combines technical examinations of Russian and Iranian air defense threats, observations of Ukrainian air defense operations, field observations of British and NATO air defense capabilities, and interviews with scientific, industry, and military personnel.

Argument: The current UK GBAD C2 capabilities are insufficient to meet the demands of modern air threats characterized by their speed, stealth, and multi-vector approaches. This requires a shift from optimizing individual defensive systems to maximizing the efficiency of the integrated air defense enterprise through effective C2. UK GBAD C2 must enable the fusion and integration of sensor data across the force, support interoperability with joint and allied assets, and adapt to incorporate new capabilities as threats evolve.

Insights: 
1. Air defense effectiveness is increasingly determined by C2 efficiency in allocating appropriate effectors against diverse, simultaneous threats. 
2. Essential to this end, GBAD C2 must be able to fuse and integrate multi-source track data of varying quality to counter complex threats. 3. The C2 architecture must be modular, distributed, and adaptable to avoid single points of failure.

Recommendations: 

1. The British Army should ensure its Land GBAD program delivers a C2 architecture that can integrate diverse sensors, manage heterogeneous data relationships, and adapt to incorporate new capabilities.

2. Strategic Command should influence the Land GBAD program to ensure compatibility with joint and allied systems and address potential fratricide risks.

3. The British Army should expand 7 Air Defense Group's personnel and establish a career structure to develop GBAD C2 expertise and liaison capabilities.

As the UK Ministry of Defence is developing an integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) strategy and the army is beginning work on its Land GBAD program, this RUSI paper outlines the trajectory of the future air threat environment and derives requirements for the UK's GBAD C2.

Current and Emerging Threats to Air Defense

• Weapons are emerging that straddle traditional categorizations of high-speed and high-altitude versus slower low-altitude threats, complicating defenses optimized against specific profiles. These include supersonic and hypersonic cruise missiles that fly at lower altitudes than ballistic missiles but at extreme speeds, hypersonic glide vehicles with unpredictable trajectories, and quasi-ballistic missiles that blend ballistic and aerodynamic flight.

• The risk of having defenses suppressed or destroyed has increased. GBAD systems face a dilemma - they must emit and thus unmask themselves to engage targets, but this enables adversaries to locate and attack them. As shown by Ukraine’s success, even opponents without air superiority can now use UAVs to cue for long-range surface-to-surface strikes to attack GBAD. Put simply, emitting in an era of ubiquitous ISR is increasingly risky.

• Advances in precision are enabling mass delivery of effects that were previously only achievable with small numbers of exquisite munitions. Modifications like laser or GPS guidance kits can improve the accuracy of 'dumb' rockets and bombs by an order of magnitude. Specifically, a $30,000 guidance kit can make a $3,000 rocket strike within meters of its intended aimpoint. Precision is no longer determined primarily by cost, so adversaries can field large salvos of sufficiently accurate weapons rather than a handful of exquisite ones.

• Very-low-observable (VLO) or 'stealth' aircraft and drones are proliferating. Their reduced radar and infrared signatures allow them to penetrate much further into defended airspace before being detected and engaged compared to traditional aircraft. This compresses the time available for defensive systems to react.

• Timely acquisition, identification, and engagement of threats is becoming exponentially harder as more agile and elusive weaponry converges with advanced electronic warfare capabilities. Hypersonic weapons compress reaction times to seconds. Stealthy cruise missiles use terrain masking and erratic flight paths to remain undetected until the last possible moment. Swarms of drones use sheer numbers and electronic warfare to confuse and overwhelm defenses. This makes rapidly detecting, tracking, and assigning the optimal interceptor to each threat exceptionally complex and time-critical.

Implications for Tactical Air Defense

• Tactical formations are now far more likely to face sophisticated weapons that would previously have been reserved for striking operational or strategic targets. An adversary's inventory of affordable precision weapons can now be used more flexibly across multiple echelons.

• The growing number of threats are significantly less expensive than the interceptors intended to neutralize them:

  “The cost of defensive systems aimed at optimising Pk [Probability of Kill] against high-end threats necessarily reduces the diversity of systems that can be afforded and deployed. For example, a hit-to-kill missile with an infrared (IR) seeker optimised for ballistic missile defence (BMD) in the upper atmosphere is not an ideal means of intercepting air-breathing and quasi-ballistic threats at altitudes where IR seekers do not work well at the high speeds achieved by BMD interceptors. Radar-equipped missiles with blast fragmentation warheads work well against air-breathing threats, but are a sub-optimal tool for BMD: each type of missile has a price in the millions of US dollars and is fired from a bespoke system. As high-end threats diversify, the characteristics of systems optimised for detecting and engaging them diverge, driving a tendency towards holding multiple missile types that are industrially expensive to develop and retain. For example, it has been estimated that a point defence of Guam with the layered defensive systems needed to counter the full spectrum of likely threats would cost $5 billion.”

• Thirdly, iterative adaptations to circumvent or degrade defensive systems are becoming quicker and easier to develop than enhancements to the Pk of exquisite interceptors. Thus, relying primarily on a small number of high-performance defensive systems risks the defensive enterprise rapidly becoming outmatched.

Implications for Operational and Strategic Air Defense

In a conflict with Russia, UK forces must anticipate a formidable and layered air and missile threat throughout all stages of operations, as Russian doctrine emphasizes striking critical targets in the operational rear and strategic depth using a combination of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, aircraft, UAVs, and artillery. Especially early in a conflict, Russia could attempt complex and integrated strikes on key Western enablers before they disperse. Although Russian long-range assets would need to penetrate NATO airspace to reach many UK targets, reducing their survivability, Russia's Northern Fleet could pose a significant threat to the UK from its defensive bastions with limited warning.

The authors argue factors imply two priority missions for UK GBAD:

1. Providing a responsive last line of point defense for critical UK infrastructure and strategic enablers in the earliest stages of a peer conflict, before they can disperse or benefit from NATO-wide IAMD coverage.

2. Contributing to allied defenses of key staging areas, marshaling points, HQs and other vital operational targets on the continent for the duration of a conflict.

Tactical Requirements for GBAD C2:

“Since the army will not immediately own the range of effectors needed to intercept the full spectrum of threats, it must be able to contribute to a joint and allied defensive counter-air effort by reinforcing system-level effectiveness. It can do so by optimising against converging lower-tier threats, thus allowing other platforms to optimise against elements of the threat spectrum that still require bespoke solutions (such as ballistic missiles or HGVs). It can also accomplish this by reinforcing the resilience and agility of the overall C2 architecture.”

Low-level Threat Countermeasures:

• Develop a layered sensor architecture incorporating early warning, elevated sensors, passive tactical sensors, and fire control radars to detect and track low-altitude threats

• Field a mix of affordable short-range and high-performance medium-range interceptors to engage diverse low-level threats cost-effectively

Mid-level and High-level Threat Management:

• Leverage offboard sensors from higher echelons and the joint force to detect and track high-speed, high-altitude targets like ballistic missiles and VLO aircraft

• Coordinate with allied long-range interceptors and develop tactics to force adversary aircraft into sub-optimal engagements

Operational and Strategic Requirements for GBAD C2

Data Fusion and C2 Coordination:

• Establish a resilient, distributed C2 network capable of rapidly fusing multi-source sensor data and coordinating complex joint and allied engagements

• Enhance interoperability and data sharing with allies through common standards, exercises, and liaisons to build proficiency in coalition operations

Threat Spectrum Management:

• Develop comprehensive threat assessments and optimize defensive resource allocation to prioritize the most critical and vulnerable elements of the expected threat array

“For the UK, the central point is that Strategic Command must exercise influence over C2 for the Land GBAD programme to ensure that it is compatible with developments within the army and across the other services, and critically that the UK’s Multi-Domain Integrated Systems programme addresses the problem of blue-force tracking in the context of expanded UAS and C-UAS coverage across the battlefield. The risk of fratricide in an environment saturated with aerial objects is real, and is amplified as air defence elements become required to operate in isolation. During the invasion of Iraq in 2003, for example, isolated Patriot batteries – lacking wider situational awareness – were responsible for shootdowns of friendly aircraft. Brokering situational awareness to minimise the risk of misclassification of targets will be a major task for air defenders.”

Technical Requirements for GBAD C2:

To act as the backbone for this complex web of GBAD C2 relationships, the report argues the GBAD architecture must:

• Rapidly translate data between a wide array of formats to utilize heterogenous allied, joint, and commercial sensors

• Allow data to be piped between security domains and networks of differing classifications

• Ingest data from partners without requiring access to the source code of their systems

• Leverage non-bespoke, readily available tactical datalinks to share information with assets outside integral GBAD channels

• Ensure high-priority data can burst through congested lower-priority traffic to enable time-sensitive engagements

To better understand the threats faced by and the corresponding requirements of effective GBAD, I encourage you to read the full report.

PDF

Report Page

This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following sources: Special Competitive Studies Project and Royal United Services Institute

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

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This week, I have two compelling reports to share with you all. The topics are:

• What does a Mass Precision Strike Complex of UAVs look like?

• What progress has been made for AUKUS Pillar I and what challenges remain?

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

Mass Precision Strike

Designing UAV Complexes for Land Forces

By Professor Justin Bronk and Dr. Jack Watling

Royal United Services Institute

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report comprehensively examines the design and employment of UAV complexes for land forces. It outlines the components necessary for a mass precision strike complex, the trade-offs in UAV design, and the enabling capabilities required to field such systems effectively.

Analysis: The authors conducted extensive fieldwork, including examination of Russian and Iranian UAVs, observation of UAV employment in Ukraine, and interviews with manufacturers, operators, and counter-UAV personnel.

Argument: UAVs enable land forces to deliver precision effects at an unprecedented scale. However, designing an effective mass precision strike complex involves significant trade-offs and costs. UAVs must be ruthlessly optimized for specific tasks to balance capability and affordability, and rapid adaptation of software, tactics, and payloads is crucial to continuously counter adversary countermeasures.

Insights: Government regulation is currently a major constraint on UAV design, procurement, and employment, impacting battlefield effectiveness. Moreover, swarming capabilities can improve UAV effectiveness against air defenses, but due to the complexity and cost required, swarming techniques are unlikely to be sustainable past “Night One” scenarios.

Recommendations: NATO members should adapt regulatory structures to enable rapid UAV capability updates. As for defense planners, land forces should 1) establish specialist UAV formations with organic software development and intelligence support, 2) investment in mass precision strike complexes should be balanced against the opportunity costs for other capabilities, and 3) counter-UAV capabilities must be developed and fielded at scale to mitigate threats from adversary UAV complexes. 

This RUSI report provides a comprehensive analysis of the potential and limitations of UAVs in delivering precision effects at scale for land forces. The report underscores the importance of understanding the design trade-offs, mission sets, dependencies, and scaling effects involved in fielding a mass precision strike complex.

“UAVs' primary offer is their ability to deliver effect at either a cost or a scale that cannot be matched by other means. This means that UAV designs should be ruthlessly simplified and optimized for defined tasks. However, there are also limits to the extent to which costs can be driven down if a system is to be reliable and resilient. There are, in fact, very particular intersections between price and capability where UAVs are optimally effective.”

Design Trade-offs

• Airframe: The airframe configuration is a key determinant of a UAV's aerodynamic parameters, performance, and payload capacity. The choice between rotary and fixed-wing designs is a significant trade-off, as rotary configurations like multi-copter UAVs offer greater flexibility and vertical take-off and landing capabilities, while fixed-wing designs provide better efficiency in terms of range and endurance for a given size and power. Moreover, the airframe size and weight have substantial implications for propulsion, power, and cost, with small increases in mission payload or range driving significant increases in overall airframe size, weight, and cost.

• Propulsion and Power: UAVs can be powered by either electric motors or internal combustion engines. While electric power provides quieter operation and simpler installation, it has significantly lower energy density compared to gasoline, with batteries storing around 260 times less power for a given weight. This battery weight penalty increases non-linearly with the required range/endurance, making electric propulsion more suitable for light payloads over short ranges. On the other hand, combustion engines offer greater potential thrust and range but with increased noise, complexity, and logistical requirements.

• Navigation: Accurate navigation is crucial for precision strikes, and UAVs rely on various methods such as global navigation satellite systems (GNSS), inertial navigation, terrain recognition, and emissions seekers. However, GNSS is vulnerable to jamming and spoofing, necessitating UAVs to incorporate multiple frequencies, antennae diversity, and reversionary modes like inertial navigation with periodic updates from terrain recognition or external sources. But again, these advanced navigation techniques, such as combining inertial navigation with high-fidelity terrain maps and slant range calculations, come with increased cost and complexity.

• Datalinks: Radio frequency command links enable real-time control and data transmission between a UAV and its operator, but they are susceptible to jamming and have limited range without relays. Frequency-hopping radios, dual-frequency receivers, directional beam riding, and collaborative relay systems can enhance the resilience of datalinks against hostile electronic warfare (EW) but come with increased complexity and skill requirements. For instance, a group of UAVs passing authenticated data to one another on different frequency regimes can help overcome jamming attempts.

• Sensors: UAVs also employ a wide range of sensors, including electro-optical (EO), infrared (IR), radar, and electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems, each with their own strengths and limitations. EO/IR cameras are passive, lightweight, and cost-effective but are vulnerable to weather conditions and camouflage. For example, EO cameras combined with image-intensifying capabilities can extend a UAV's utility into low-light conditions but struggle in minimal ambient light. Conversely, radars provide all-weather capability but are more expensive, power-hungry, and detectable, with the power and aperture size required for long-range sensing limiting their use to larger, more complex, and expensive airframes.

• Effectors: Kinetic effectors for UAVs include general-purpose warheads (e.g., HE-FRAG), shaped-charge warheads (e.g., explosively formed penetrators), and multirole warheads, with varying levels of effectiveness against different target types. For example, small multi-copter UAVs equipped with HE-FRAG payloads roughly the size of a hand grenade can have a lethal radius of several meters against soft targets but offer little destructive effect against buildings. In contrast, non-kinetic effectors, such as EW payloads, can degrade hostile sensors but are more complex, expensive, and reliant on up-to-date mission data files compared to kinetic options.

Mass Precision Strike Mission Sets

• Close ISR: UAVs optimized for tactical reconnaissance require low cost, simplicity, and attrition tolerance to provide persistent coverage in contested airspace. Key design considerations for these systems include lightweight EO/IR sensors, hands-off control, and the ability to operate without GPS. For instance, the report suggests a target price point below $2,500 per airframe, a weight below 2 kg, 40 minutes of endurance, and an operating range of approximately 10 km to enable sustainable expenditure in support of platoon-level operations.

• Close Strike: UAVs designed for precision strikes in the close fight must be capable of engaging armored vehicles and other high-value targets within a range of 20-30 km. Shaped-charge warheads (e.g., modified RPG-7 grenades) and robust guidance systems are essential for effectiveness, while the unit cost should be kept below $40,000 to allow for mass employment. A prime example is the Russian Lancet-3M loitering munition, which features a 5 kg shaped-charge warhead, a 35 km range, and an estimated unit cost of $30,000. This system has demonstrated the ability to reliably disable armored vehicles in Ukraine when launched in groups of 2-3 per target.

• Deep ISR: UAVs tasked with over-the-horizon reconnaissance require longer range, endurance, and more advanced sensors and datalinks compared to close ISR systems. Fixed-wing designs with a wingspan of approximately 4 m, a target airspeed of 125 km/h, and an endurance of 2.5 hours (including 30 minutes of loiter time) are optimal for this mission set, allowing for a maximum depth of 70 km. The ability to precisely locate targets using laser rangefinders or advanced terrain matching algorithms and operate in GPS-denied environments using inertial navigation and pre-loaded maps is essential, driving up the unit cost to around $200,000 per airframe.

• Deep Strike: Long-range precision strike UAVs offer the potential to disrupt enemy logistics and command and control elements at operational depths of up to 500 km. These systems must carry significant fuel reserves, robust navigation systems, and sizable warheads, resulting in unit costs upwards of $30,000, as seen with the Iranian Shahed-136. The effectiveness of deep strike UAVs depends on their ability to penetrate hostile airspace, adapt to evolving defenses (e.g., through iterative updates to navigation and terminal behavior), and coordinate with other joint force assets. For example, Shahed-136s have been used in combination with cruise and ballistic missiles to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.

• Enabling Effects: UAVs can also serve as communications relays, EW platforms, and decoys to enable other elements of the mass precision strike complex. These systems require sophisticated electronics payloads, power generation, and cooling capabilities, making them larger and more expensive than strike UAVs. For example, EW payloads designed for stand-in jamming of key hostile systems, such as surveillance and air defense radars, must be carried deep into enemy airspace, necessitating more complex and expensive airframes compared to kinetic effectors with similar range and propulsion. The effectiveness of enabling UAVs depends on their endurance, signal transmission range, and ability to adapt to hostile countermeasures while minimizing interference with friendly force elements.

Dependencies and Scaling Effects

The report emphasizes the importance of treating UAVs as systems rather than individual platforms, as their effectiveness is contingent upon continuous updates to software, behavioral logic, sensors, and radios every six to 12 weeks. This modular approach to UAV design and procurement is crucial for staying ahead of adversary countermeasures and ensuring the long-term viability of the mass precision strike complex. For example, the average period of peak effectiveness for a newly deployed UAV navigation and/or control system on the Ukrainian battlefield was around two weeks, with degrading effectiveness over four more weeks, and near-complete adversary adaptation within six to 12 weeks. The authors highlight the regulatory challenges associated with this rapid iteration process, as current certification and safety requirements in NATO countries can significantly slow down development and increase costs, preventing NATO states from employing UAVs as effectively as potential adversaries.

To maximize the impact of UAVs, the report recommends the establishment of specialized UAV formations that can employ different types of UAVs in combination and have the in-house capacity to update and reconfigure their systems. These formations would be responsible for mission planning, crew training, and the integration of UAV capabilities with other force elements such as artillery, electronic warfare, and air defense. For example, with tactical ISR already encompassed in most combat formations, a hypothetical, specialized UAV battalion could consist of a deep ISR company, a close strike company, a deep strike company, an intelligence and headquarters company, and a support company.

The effectiveness of these formations would depend on their access to enabling infrastructure including high-quality orbital EMS surveillance systems, appropriate downlink facilities and ground stations, along with a processing and distribution framework designed to analyze collected data and swiftly deliver it to operational units at or close to the front lines. Indeed, the ability to map, interpret, and respond to hostile and friendly EW effects and EMS usage in near-real-time across the area of operations is a prerequisite for effective mission planning and command and control of a mass precision strike complex.

I highly recommend reading the full report to engage with many more insights contained therein.

PDF

Report Page

Foundations for AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines

Perspectives from AUKUS partners

By Professor Peter J. Dean, Alice Nason, Dr. Philip Shetler-Jones, and Dr. Charles Edel

United States Studies Centre

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: This report examines the progress, challenges, and opportunities in implementing the AUKUS partnership's Pillar I on nuclear-powered submarines, drawing on insights from a Track 1.5 dialogue with experts and officials from Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Analysis: The report is based on qualitative analysis, leveraging insights from a multi-stakeholder dialogue involving over 50 experts and officials. Notable data sources include government announcements, strategic documents, and public opinion polls from the three AUKUS countries.

Argument: While significant progress has been made in establishing governance structures, adapting policy settings, and initiating workforce training, critical challenges remain in aligning national strategies, building public support, and addressing workforce shortages. Overcoming these hurdles will require concerted efforts from all three governments to ensure the long-term success of the AUKUS partnership.

Insights: AUKUS must improve its public communication strategy to gain broader public support and address skepticism, particularly regarding its strategic intentions and benefits. Moreover, there's a critical need for more inclusive stakeholder engagement within each country, involving unions, industry groups, and educational institutions to support workforce development.

Recommendations: The report recommends various avenues to address the strategy alignment, public support, and workforce concerns of AUKUS. See below for the full list.

Drawing upon insights from a dialogue with experts and officials from Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, this USSC report assesses the progress made in implementing the AUKUS Pillar I and highlights the challenges that lie ahead. The report emphasizes the urgent need for the three nations to align their strategies, cultivate public understanding and support, and develop a skilled workforce to ensure the long-term success of the partnership over the next three decades.

Progress Thus Far: Governance, Policy, and Industry Preparedness

Embedding AUKUS into the Bureaucratic Fabric: The three countries have taken significant steps to integrate AUKUS into their bureaucratic structures. The United States has distributed responsibility for both AUKUS Pillars among officials in the Pentagon, White House, and US Navy, while the United Kingdom has established a dedicated role, Director General – AUKUS, within the Ministry of Defence. Australia has formed the Australian Submarine Agency (ASA) to spearhead Pillar I, and advocacy groups have emerged in the legislatures of all three countries to advance AUKUS efforts at the political level. Notably, the unwavering commitment of the heads of state has been the driving force behind the rapid progress of AUKUS cooperation.

Paving the Way for Collaboration: The passage of the US 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provided crucial authorizations to facilitate AUKUS cooperation. These include a "powerful national exemption" to streamline export license controls for Australia, provisions for transferring Virginia-class submarines to Australia, and approval for Australian contractors to train in US shipyards. Similarly, Australia introduced the Defence Trade Controls Amendment Bill 2023 to address US concerns about information security, effectively creating a military free trade zone with its AUKUS partners and imposing strict penalties for unauthorized technology sharing.

Forging a Skilled Workforce: A range of national and trilateral initiatives are converging to equip US, UK, and Australian companies and workers for the challenges ahead. Since July 2023, six Australian Navy officers have graduated from the US Naval Nuclear Power Training Command and Nuclear Power School. Meanwhile, five Australian military personnel have been embedded into the UK military, and thirteen Australian industrial personnel have completed a seven-week training and familiarization program in the United Kingdom working with UK defense industry partners. In addition, the Australian Government and its state-level counterparts have launched initiatives to accelerate worker recruitment and training, such as the South Australian Government's Defence Industry Workforce and Skills Report, which aims to engage 27,000 students and 1,500 teachers in STEM education pathways.

Navigating the Challenges: Strategy Alignment, Public Support, and Workforce Development

Aligning Strategies in an Evolving Landscape: While the three countries concur that AUKUS serves as a robust deterrent against potential adversaries' advanced submarine capabilities, their strategic perspectives diverge in other areas. For the United Kingdom, AUKUS is not solely about China, and there are concerns about focusing resources on an Indo-Pacific-centric capability at the expense of its near region. In Australia, political leaders and the public are not fully aligned on the strategic rationale behind AUKUS, with apprehensions about the country's role in potential future conflicts. Thirdly, the US faces the critical question of whether deterrence is best achieved through expanding its national capabilities or empowering its allies.

Recommendations for Aligning Strategies:

• Increase the frequency of leader-level statements to effectively communicate the rationale for AUKUS capabilities to the public and bureaucracy in each country, considering both national and trilateral strategic interests.

• Develop strategic thinking that accounts for the evolving regional and global strategic environment over the coming decades to justify investments in a capability with a long-term horizon.

• Emphasize AUKUS as a technology-sharing agreement with theater and threat-agnostic capabilities to foster a deeper understanding of the cooperation's rationale within the UK and Australian systems.

Cultivating Public Support: Public support for nuclear-powered submarine cooperation is either stagnant or declining in each country. In Australia, only 33% of young people believe it is a good idea for the nation to possess nuclear-powered submarines, a decrease from 43% in 2022. The level of public awareness about the AUKUS partnership in the United Kingdom and the United States does not reflect the significance of the undertaking, with less than a quarter of those surveyed in both countries being familiar with the agreement. Furthermore, experts noted that universities and think tanks in the United Kingdom and the United States have not yet fully grasped the opportunities presented by AUKUS cooperation.

Recommendations for Growing Public Support:

• Foster trilateral coordination among senior officials on domestic strategic communications to avoid contradictions that may raise concerns for other partners, such as Australia's emphasis on sovereignty and the United States' perception of its participation, especially in Pillar II, as altruistic.

• As the three countries brace for potential government changes, encourage trilateral engagement through bipartisan political friendship groups in each country – the AUKUS Caucus in Washington, the Parliamentary Friends of AUKUS in Canberra, and the All-Party Parliamentary Group on AUKUS – to solidify political-level support for the future.

• Address the lack of dedicated funding avenues for think tanks and universities to conduct Track 1.5 dialogues and other forms of research and public engagement, which are crucial for increasing public awareness, promoting dialogue, and developing policy options for the enterprise at the national and trilateral levels. For instance, consider placing AUKUS fellows at think tanks and universities in the three countries and designing AUKUS programs of study that offer international exposure to enhance public engagement.

Overcoming Workforce Challenges - The Achilles' Heel of AUKUS: Identifying, training, and retaining the workforce required to sustain AUKUS cooperation is the most formidable challenge to realizing the agreement’s full potential. Indeed, the scale of the requirements is likely to exacerbate existing shortages in the public services, militaries, and industrial workforces of the three countries. AUKUS projects in Australia are expected to require 8,500 industrial workers, while the US submarine industrial base will need an additional 100,000 trained workers and 17,000 supply chain workers over the next decade. In addition, the UK shipyard workforce must grow from 10,000 to 17,000 by the end of the decade. Australia faces a particularly acute workforce problem, as it must develop a sovereign enterprise without an established major shipbuilding or manufacturing industry to rely upon, further complicating the challenge of attracting workers to the shipbuilding sector.

Recommendations for Tackling Workforce Challenges:

• Promote greater public understanding of the diverse roles and opportunities within the nuclear supply chain, which is essential for all three countries as they expand their nuclear industries, particularly in Australia, where there is no pre-existing acceptance of nuclear technology within the workforce.

• Engage Australian and UK unions and industry representatives as partners in assisting governments to gain a clear understanding of labor shortages and share best practices for designing training and recruitment strategies.

• Pursue trilateral cooperation on technologies aimed at enhancing productivity at shipbuilding sites to mitigate the impact of worker shortages in the future.

For those interested in better understanding the path forward for AUKUS, I urge you to read the full report.

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This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following sources: Royal United Services Institute and United States Studies Centre.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

Again, please share, subscribe, and stay tuned for next week’s installment!

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This week, I have two compelling reports to share with you all. Their topics include:

• The importance of software adaptability in modern defense strategy and its implementation by the DoD

• How the US should pursue Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) for autonomous systems in the Indo-Pacific

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

Compiling Advantage

Unlocking the Competitive Power of Software Adaptability

By Ellen Lord and Dan Patt

Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: This policy memo focuses on the critical importance of software adaptability in enabling the DoD to outpace competitors. It examines the challenges and roadblocks hindering the DoD's ability to achieve this vision and offers actionable recommendations for reform.

Analysis: The memo draws insights from the authors' testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Cyber, IT, and Innovation and their extensive interactions with the technology and broader defense communities. It also references various DoD programs, initiatives, and case studies to support its arguments.

Argument: The DoD must prioritize software adaptability to maintain its military advantage in an era of strategic competition. By embracing modern development practices, fostering collaboration with industry, and empowering software teams, the DoD can deliver capabilities at a faster pace and respond effectively to evolving threats.

Insights: Units with the ability to adapt their software rapidly exhibit significantly higher operational efficiency compared to those relying on external updates. However, significant obstacles such as bureaucratic ATO (Authority to Operate) processes, lack of in-house technical expertise, and inflexible funding mechanisms hinder rapid software development and deployment within the DoD.

Recommendations: See below for the full list of recommendations.

This policy memo from Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology addresses a critical issue in the era of strategic competition among technologically advanced powers. The memo argues that the ability to rapidly develop, deploy, and update software is not merely an enabler of military capabilities but an emerging foundation of military advantage in the digital age.

“Once a conflict begins, adaptability and scaling drive outcomes. The Pentagon needs to seize the current moment to prepare. For an example of how conflict drives adaptation, consider that the lifecycle of a radio in Ukraine is only about three months. By then, radios typically need to be reprogrammed or swapped out as the Russians have optimized their electronic warfare against them. A new weapons system reaches peak efficiency about two weeks before countermeasures emerge.

For an example of a superior weapons system handicapped by unadaptable software, consider that Excalibur precision artillery rounds initially had a 70 percent efficiency rate when Ukraine first used them. After six weeks, Excalibur’s efficiency declined to only 6 percent as the Russians adapted their electronic warfare to counter the system. This shows how quickly adversaries can adjust to new technologies.

This lack of adaptability is not an inherent property of software; rather, it is a consequence of how we choose to manage software. Ukrainian units with organic programming capability that can rapidly adapt their unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) software have about 50 percent efficiency, while units reliant on longer supply chains where feedback must be lowed back to an original manufacturer to make changes struggle to hit 20 percent efficiency. Keeping software in a pliant, fluid state is the only way to maintain tactical innovation.”

Challenges and Roadblocks to Software Adaptability within the DoD

1. Granting Software Authority to Operate: The current ATO process treats software as a boxed product, leading to lengthy reviews and documentation requirements that slow down the deployment of new capabilities and stifle innovation. This process has also created a new form of vendor lock-in, hindering the DoD's ability to tap into the latest innovations from across the commercial sector.

2. Resourcing: The DoD's budgeting and acquisition processes are largely geared toward traditional hardware programs with rigid requirements and long lead times, making it difficult for software development teams to secure the funding and support they need to iterate rapidly and deliver capabilities in a timely manner. Additionally, the inability to use a single appropriation to fund software improvements creates significant management challenges.

3. Talent Gaps: The DoD faces challenges in attracting and retaining top digital talent due to competition with the private sector for a limited pool of skilled professionals and the slow and complex nature of government hiring processes. Furthermore, acquisition personnel lack sufficient training in software acquisition pathways, various contracting methods, and the distinctions between software and hardware requirements.

4. Data: There is a lack of clarity within the DoD around key software concepts such as data rights, interface rights, and the appropriate role of industry in the software innovation process. Importantly, to train mission-oriented AI models effectively, software developers need both one-time and ongoing access to libraries of mission-relevant data.

Promising Developments and Best Practices

The introduction of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework (AAF) marks a significant transformation in the DoD’s procurement strategy. This new direction shifts from a universal approach to one that is more adaptable and bespoke, acknowledging the distinct needs of each acquisition project.

Additionally, the Navy's Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) has taken several groundbreaking steps. It has initiated a software factory, embarked on a continuous Authority to Operate (cATO) process, made systems interfaces accessible, adopted Modular Open Systems Architecture (MOSA) procurement methods, and spearheaded a portfolio management strategy for its extensive range of over 140 programs.

Moreover, the recent creation of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer (CDAO) position aims to dismantle data barriers, promote widespread access to system interfaces among program offices, and foster collaboration between government and industry partners to harness data for the development of powerful applications. However, while these initiatives indicate forward momentum, broad-based enhancements are necessary across the DoD to reach the intended level of software flexibility.

Recommendations

1. Enable personnel to rapidly deploy and update software: The DoD must focus on optimizing the software deployment workflow and overhauling the ATO procedure. This necessitates a transition from a rigid, compliance-oriented system to a dynamic, risk-managed strategy. It also involves promoting responsibility among authorizing officials, creating a uniform continuous ATO structure across the DoD, and advocating for ATO mutual acceptance across various DoD programs, services, and agencies.

2. Attract and empower top technical talent and foster a culture of doers: The DoD must enhance its appeal to and retention of premier technical professionals through an overhaul of its recruitment practices. This entails ensuring that new recruits enjoy autonomy in their positions, forging more adaptable career trajectories, and granting staff access to ongoing educational and development opportunities. The department ought to broaden the scope of current policies to facilitate temporary assignment programs, revamp the performance review process, and allocate resources toward the training and professional growth of acquisition personnel.

3. Prioritize APIs and data accessibility: The DoD needs to focus on making the APIs and interfaces of its current systems accessible and mandate that creators of forthcoming systems disclose their APIs and interfaces. This approach will enhance software flexibility, foster the creation of innovative strategies and operational methodologies, unleash data potential, and expedite the advancement of artificial intelligence technologies. The department should formulate explicit instructions and leading practices for API creation and oversight, release extensive data directories, inform the procurement and contracting personnel about MOSA, and collaborate with industrial allies to guarantee that essential interfaces are thoroughly documented, secure, and capable of expansion.

4. Embrace a diverse, software-centric industrial base: The DoD must strive to cultivate a broader, more software-focused industrial network capable of meeting its demands for flexible, creative software solutions. In situations where requirements are still too ambiguous for precise definition, the DoD should avoid overly detailed specifications. Instead, it should collaborate closely with its industry partners to progressively identify the balance between what is technically possible and what is needed for the mission, aiming to create valuable solutions.

5. Adopt recommended resourcing reforms: The DoD should enhance its existing resources and introduce novel procurement and financial mechanisms that reduce the timeframe required to initiate and green-light software endeavors, incorporating automated processes for reporting and scrutiny to improve supervisory practices. For instance, the concluding submission from the PPBE commission offers several suggestions conducive to more rapid software deployment. These include the flexibility to employ procurement, RDT&E, or O&M funds across the entire spectrum of software development, procurement, and maintenance stages.

I highly recommend reading the full policy memo to better understand the importance of software adaptability for the DoD and how the DoD can implement it.

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Autonomy and International Stability

Confidence-Building Measures for Uncrewed Systems in the Indo-Pacific

By Tom Shugart

Center for a New American Security

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: This report examines confidence-building measures (CBMs) for uncrewed air, surface, and undersea vehicles as a means to reduce risks of inadvertent escalation between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific.

Analysis: The report uses qualitative analysis drawing on historical CBM case studies, existing US-China CBMs, international maritime/aviation agreements, and a tabletop exercise to test proposed CBMs.

Argument: The proliferation of autonomous and uncrewed systems, coupled with the lack of experience in their operational use, necessitates the development of new CBMs to prevent accidental or inadvertent military escalations. The report posits that while CBMs have historically been challenging to implement effectively, they remain a critical tool for maintaining international stability, especially given the rapid technological advancements and the strategic rivalry in the Indo-Pacific region.

Insights: CBMs allowing uncrewed systems as "half-rung" escalation tools could paradoxically enhance stability. Secondly, CBMs are more effective if focused on externally verifiable aspects of uncrewed systems. Moreover, unilateral US CBMs may have benefits even absent China's participation.

Recommendations: US policymakers should make a unilateral declaration of CBMs for uncrewed systems, coordinated with allies and partners. It also calls for US and Chinese policymakers to negotiate "minimalist" bilateral CBMs. See below for more details.

In the current strategic landscape, militaries worldwide are increasingly turning to autonomous and uncrewed systems to enhance capabilities, expedite deployment, and mitigate risks to personnel. However, the novelty of these technologies brings with it unprecedented risks. Within this context, this CNAS report presents a comprehensive examination of the necessity for CBMs, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.

Confidence-Building Measures and Their Importance

CBMs are actions taken by states to reduce the risk of conflict and increase trust between parties. CBMs typically fall into four categories: exchanging information between parties, exchanging observers and/or conducting inspections, establishing "rules of the road" for military operations, and applying restraints on the operations and readiness of military forces. For example, the US-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) of 1972 established a set of rules for safe navigation and communication between the two nations' naval forces, reducing the risk of accidents and misunderstandings at sea.

CBMs are particularly important in the context of autonomous systems, as these systems pose unique challenges such as the brittleness of algorithms, the potential for arms racing and threats to nuclear stability, and the risk that militaries might put too much trust in AI-driven systems. By establishing clear guidelines and protocols for the use of autonomous systems, CBMs can help mitigate these risks and promote international stability.

Building CBMs on Existing Agreements and Addressing Gaps

The report emphasizes the importance of building CBMs on existing agreements, such as the 2014 US-China MOU for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters, the 2015 US-China MOU Supplement, the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), and the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS). However, the report also identifies several gaps in these agreements that need to be addressed to ensure their effectiveness in the context of uncrewed systems.

Avenues for Establishing CBMs

The report proposes three possible avenues for establishing CBMs for autonomous systems:

1. Unilateral Declaration: The US could make a unilateral declaration extending the coverage of existing US-China agreements and CUES to US uncrewed vessels and aircraft. This approach would allow the US to establish new norms and pressure China, but it might also make China more suspicious of US intentions.

2. Minimalist Negotiated Approach: The US and China could negotiate minor additions or revisions to current agreements to explicitly extend coverage to uncrewed vessels and aircraft. This approach would be less controversial but may not address all the necessary gaps in the existing agreements.

3. Proactive Negotiated Approach: The US and China could negotiate more comprehensive additions and revisions to current agreements, including explicit clarifications for the expected behavior of uncrewed platforms. This approach would be the most thorough but may also be the most challenging to achieve given the current state of US-China relations.

As part of the report’s analysis, the author conducted a tabletop exercise in which teams played out scenarios with various levels of CBMs in place. Some important insights include:

“A potential stability-instability paradox exists for uncrewed systems, which could make them useful in a crisis. The proposed CBMs in the exercise were designed primarily to curb the chance of an accident or inadvertent escalation resulting from uncrewed system operations causing open conflict between the United States and PRC. However, as groups discussed the utility of the CBMs in the scenario, they stressed that uncrewed systems also might be useful to help defuse a crisis from escalating into violence. In particular, the reduced emotional impact of losing an uncrewed system versus human lives could act as a pressure-release valve for the countries looking to coerce the other side during a crisis without escalating to war. Participants stressed that uncrewed systems were special and different than crewed assets precisely because they allowed decision-makers to mitigate risk in otherwise dangerous scenarios. This created a stability-instability paradox where there might be significant contestation—and even bloodless violence—because of the increase in uncrewed systems, but that the use of machines over human platforms also may create a kind of stability when it comes to violent escalation, allowing states to de-escalate even with the loss of valuable uncrewed systems.

Uncrewed system CBMs are potentially most useful before and after a crisis, but not in the midst of one. Most of the groups believed that the crisis was both too heightened and at the same time not significant enough for CBMs to play a large role in the outcome of the crisis. This led players to debate when CBMs might have the largest role in avoiding accidents or inadvertent conflict. The group concluded that there are potentially two times when CBMs are most effective: (1) During normal, but perhaps slightly heightened tensions; for example, during a U.S. freedom of navigation operation or an isolated show of force or resolve; and (2) post-crisis, if a failure of crisis control leads both sides to conclude CBMs are in their best interests.”

Recommendations for Establishing CBMs

Ultimately, the report recommends a three-step process for establishing CBMs for uncrewed systems in the Indo-Pacific:

“First, adopt a unilateral declaration of uncrewed CBMs, announced in coordination with plurilateral CUES-specific measures by other like-minded allied and partner CUES signatories (recommended focus: Australia, Canada, France, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and South Korea). Such an announcement would include a statement of the right, at any time, to suspend these measures and revert to the existing CBM framework.

Next, negotiate through existing U.S.-China maritime consultative mechanisms “minimalist” measures, including the right of both sides to suspend such measures.

Finally, pursue more comprehensive measures including:

1. Providing working frequencies for uncrewed aircraft and vessels allowing for communication with crewed platforms, as feasible

2. Avoiding blinding uncrewed platforms’ navigation and collision-avoidance sensors, and control and communication systems

3. Agreeing that both sides’ uncrewed aircraft should operate in a manner that minimizes hazards to other aircraft

4. Agreeing that neither side will use uncrewed ships, aircraft, or undersea vessels to carry, deploy, or employ nuclear weapons

5. Agreeing that either or both sides, at any time, may declare an exemption of uncrewed systems from these measures for as long as required—except for measures related to nuclear weapons.”

To better understand how CBMs could play a role in the Indo-Pacific, I urge you to read the full report.

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This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following sources: Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology and Center for a New American Security.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

Again, please share, subscribe, and stay tuned for next week’s installment!

Share Quick Tanks

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This week, I have two compelling reports to share with you all. The topics include:

• How does AI transform information warfare and how can the US counter China’s AI-driven disinformation campaigns in the Indo-Pacific?

• How should we analyze AI in the context of international relations?

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

The Future of Indo-Pacific Information Warfare

Challenges and Prospects from the Rise of AI

By Russell Hanson, Adam R. Grissom, and Christopher A. Mouton

RAND Corporation

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report addresses the transformative impact of AI in the domain of information warfare, particularly in the context of the PRC's ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. It focuses on understanding the implications of AI-driven disinformation campaigns and devising strategies for effective mitigation to safeguard national security and regional stability.

Analysis: Utilizing a mix of case studies, the report analyzes instances of PRC's opportunistic subversion and its long-term strategic investment in AI to dominate the information sphere. The authors also analyze the cognitive factors at play between Large Language Models (LLMs) and disinformation.

Argument: The advent of AI technologies, especially LLMs, has exponentially expanded the capabilities for conducting sophisticated disinformation campaigns, significantly impacting the strategic information warfare landscape. The PRC's concerted efforts in this domain aim to weaken US alliances, expand its influence, and integrate the region into a China-centric order. This evolving battleground necessitates urgent and adaptive countermeasures by the US and its allies to protect the integrity of information and maintain strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific.

Insights: The use of AI in crafting convincing narratives leverages cognitive biases, such as cognitive fluency bias — when individuals confuse refined presentation with genuine authenticity —, making disinformation more effective. However, AI technologies also hold the potential to automate the detection and counteraction of disinformation efforts.

Recommendations: The authors recommend that the US enhance its counter-disinformation efforts through continuous monitoring of the information environment with advanced AI tools, the issuance of timely warnings to the public to foster resilience against misinformation, and bolstering international partnerships to share intelligence and strategies.

In an era where AI and digital interconnectivity redefine global interactions, this RAND report underscores the transformative impact of AI on information warfare. Especially in the context of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region, the report highlights the urgent need for comprehensive strategies to navigate the evolving threats to national security.

China’s Pursuit of Information Dominance

The authors emphasize the PRC's strategic endeavors to achieve information dominance, framing it as a cornerstone of modern warfare alongside air and sea dominance. The report delineates how the PRC, through a blend of psychological warfare, public opinion manipulation, and legal warfare (collectively known as the Three Warfares), seeks to undermine US influence while expanding its own geopolitical reach. Particularly concerning is China’s manipulation of social media platforms, exemplified by covert operations to promote pro-PRC content through influencers and media outlets.

“There have been numerous recent examples that highlight China’s application of opportunistic subversion in the information environment. The Chinese consulate in New York is accused of discretely paying influencers on social media to promote the Beijing Winter Olympics. Similarly, Chinese state-run news and media companies have paid influencers and creators—both monetarily and with lucrative views—to run pro-PRC stories on their channels. The blurred lines between the PRC and Chinese social media companies potentially gives China access to troves of data on the U.S. public as well as influences what content the U.S. public does and does not see. Members of the PRC Ministry of Public Security were recently charged with operating troll farms to target and attack dissidents whose views were unfavorable to the PRC. In 2020, Twitter disclosed ‘23,750 accounts that comprise . . . [a] highly engaged core network’ and ‘approximately 150,000 accounts that were designed to boost this content, e.g. the amplifiers.”

Such operations not only exploit digital ecosystems for narrative control but also signal a sophisticated approach to information warfare aimed at weakening US alliances and embedding a Chinese-centric world order. The PRC's tactical opportunism, as evidenced by its activities in Southeast Asia and beyond, represents a concerted effort to disrupt and dislocate the US-led coalition in the Indo-Pacific, posing a formidable challenge to maintaining regional stability and balance.

AI-Driven Disinformation Leverages Cognitive Biases

From a psychological perspective, the report explains how certain cognitive biases make AI-driven disinformation particularly dangerous. Specifically, cognitive fluency bias is when people mistakenly attribute authenticity to content that is presented articulately. In other words, the mere existence of statistics, visuals, or a well-organized format — a simple task for generative AI — can make completely fabricated content appear compelling. Moreover, the “illusory-truth effect” occurs when the repetition of information makes the information appear genuine. In this way, a state-run botnet along with AI-generated content on social media platforms is especially threatening.

A Three-Pronged Strategy to Counter Disinformation Warfare

Continuous Monitoring of the Information Environment

The authors advocate for a three-pronged strategy to combat AI-driven disinformation, beginning with persistent supervision of the information environment. This strategy emphasizes the critical importance of early detection and analysis of disinformation campaigns, leveraging the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop for strategic advantage. However, the effectiveness of existing disinformation detection mechanisms, like Europe’s Rapid Alert System and the US State Department’s Global Engagement Center, are hampered by challenges such as a lack of trust and inadequate political support.

“The advent of new AI and machine learning technologies offer an opportunity to enhance observation capabilities by monitoring and analyzing vast amounts of data to help detect patterns and anomalies that could signal a subversion attempt or disinformation campaign. In practice, the development of specialized units within the military or intelligence communities dedicated to information warfare can also provide the expertise needed to interpret and act on this data.

The existing network of joint, intergovernmental, and interagency relationships supporting information operations in the Indo-Pacific region is a product of past strategic priorities, which significantly differ from current needs. The authorities and permissions governing these relationships—including Title 10 and Title 50, along with the support systems that sustain them—are not fully aligned in the region. This misalignment creates operational challenges and underscores the necessity for new types of collaborations with interagency partners. Recognizing this, the National Security Strategy specifically calls for an integrated approach and a pivot from the existing structures to those that can effectively synchronize the myriad tools at the nation’s disposal.”

Issuance of Warnings

The second strategic pillar, "Issuance of Advanced Warnings," focuses on the preemptive debunking of false narratives and the promotion of factual information. This pillar aims to build societal resilience against disinformation, mitigating the influence of malign operations by fostering a skeptical and discerning public. The authors emphasize that the issuance of warnings necessitates not only the refutation of misinformation but also the affirmation of credible narratives. Moreover, a warning’s effectiveness depends on the credibility of the entity issuing it. Thus, the report emphasizes that fostering public trust and maintaining the issuing authorities’ integrity are paramount. As with monitoring, the dynamic nature of the information environment demands agility and the integration of AI tools to enhance the timely dissemination of warnings.

Partner Information Operations

The third component of the strategy highlights the indispensability of international cooperation and capacity-building among allies to fortify defenses against information warfare. The strategy advocates for empowering partner nations to independently counter disinformation, equipping these forces with the knowledge, strategies, and tools to operate effectively. More concretely, the report recommends the creation of a shared database to document and analyze the PRC’s information manipulation efforts. Such a resource would serve as a foundation for developing targeted and effective countermeasures. In this way, a collaborative approach can leverage local insights and collective expertise to thwart disinformation in the Indo-Pacific.

I highly recommend reading the full report to better understand how AI is transforming the scope of information warfare and the best ways to counter disinformation.

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AI, Geopolitics and the Need for a New Analytical Framework?

RUSI Disruptive Technologies Workshop Report

By Dr. Pia Hüsch

Royal United Services Institute

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

This RUSI report encapsulates the collective insights from a 10-person workshop, aimed at discussing the major questions that AI poses to the international community and the analysis thereof within the context of international relations (IR). The report underscores the importance of developing a nuanced understanding of AI's implications for geopolitics, highlighting that despite the rapid advancements in technology, significant ambiguities regarding its impact and the methodologies for its analysis within the IR paradigm persist.

AI's Impact on Geopolitics and International Relations

The report discusses the spectrum of perspectives regarding AI's potential to reshape global dynamics. Specifically, the discourse highlights a pivotal contention: whether AI will merely augment the existing power structures, bolstering the capabilities of current geopolitical actors, or whether it will act as a revolutionary force, fundamentally altering the balance of power and introducing novel paradigms of dominance and dependency.

The workshop participants also emphasized the importance of analyzing AI not only in the short term but in the long term as well. Indeed, much AI discourse is often tied to narratives on US-China competition and other major contemporary trends that can hamper forward-looking perspectives. This section robustly argues for a recalibration of IR analytical lenses, advocating for a more nuanced and forward-thinking engagement with AI, mindful of its capacity to both reinforce and disrupt traditional geopolitical hierarchies.

Learning from Other Technologies

The second chapter of the report delves into the comparative analysis between AI and historical technological innovations, illuminating the debate over AI's distinctiveness and disruptive potential. This nuanced discussion reveals a dichotomy of opinions: while some participants lean on historical analogies to predict AI's trajectory, positing that lessons from past technological upheavals can inform our understanding of AI's future impact, others assert the unparalleled nature of AI.

“Some participants found that the impact of AI is already groundbreaking. They stressed its ability to replace human factors as - unlike other technologies - it is a decision-making technology with a 'degree of agency’. AI's ability to not just replace motor skills - as was the case with previous technologies - but also 'chiefly cognitive skills' was perceived as a decisive difference. As such, AI has the ability to change the quality of decision-making, with implications for the nature of international society and relations.”

This section adeptly contrasts AI with transformative technologies in the nuclear and space contexts, drawing parallels and distinctions that enrich the discourse on AI's potential to reshape societal, economic, and geopolitical fabrics. A noteworthy distinction from nuclear technology is that instead of states owning the emerging technology, private corporations hold the reins in the case of AI. Furthermore, a participant noted that in space technology, a lesson learned is to ignore the hype of advanced, futuristic applications and instead focus on areas with significant investments and adoption, suggesting a similar approach could help navigate practical AI policymaking.

Applying Existing Theories and Frameworks to AI and the Need for a New Concept

The third chapter of the report presents a spectrum of views on the suitability of current IR theories to encompass the complexities introduced by AI. There was agreement among the participants that traditional IR theories—Realism, Constructivism, and Institutionalism— are not completely sufficient in the age of AI, such that either the existing theories needed updates or a new analytical framework is necessitated entirely. However, there remains little clarity as to what that framework or theory should be.

“One scholar argued that 'no single theory, concept or framework can comprehensively and adequately describe, analyze and reflect on the various impacts of AI. Each theory in International Relations can, however, illuminate certain aspects, risks and opportunities of AI, but none can on its own discuss, analyze and reflect on it in a comprehensive manner'. Others agreed, stating that they did not think 'that one single theory, concept or framework can fully capture the impact of Al technologies as they all have their own comparative strengths and weaknesses. For this reason, a multiple theory, concept or framework is the most analytically productive.”

Ultimately, the report encourages a forward-thinking approach to the development of analytical frameworks that can adeptly address the emerging challenges and opportunities posed by AI in the international arena.

To better learn the perspectives and insights shared in the workshop, I urge you to read the full report.

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This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following sources: RAND Corporation and Royal United Services Institute.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

Again, please share, subscribe, and stay tuned for next week’s installment!

Share Quick Tanks

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This week, I have two insightful reports to share with you all. Their topics include:

• How can US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) play a critical role in an era of great power competition?

• How does the US defense industrial base compare to China’s?

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

Stealth, speed, and adaptability

The role of special operations forces in strategic competition

By Clementine G. Starling and Alyxandra Marine

Atlantic Council

Link to Report Page

Focus: The report examines the evolving role of USSOF in the context of strategic competition, particularly against near-peer adversaries like China and Russia.

Analysis: Pulling from consultations with and peer review from experts across the national security community, the report analyzes USSOF's distinct abilities in areas such as cyber, space, and undersea warfare, as well as its global engagement with allies and partners.

Argument: USSOF, with its specialized skills and global footprint, is critically positioned to address the multi-domain threats posed by strategic competitors. By shifting the mindset towards strategic competition and prioritizing the development of non-kinetic and irregular warfare capabilities, USSOF can significantly contribute to deterring adversaries and shaping favorable outcomes for the US This requires not only a reevaluation of USSOF’s traditional roles but also a recognition of its potential to operate effectively across the entire spectrum of competition, from peacetime engagements to conflict scenarios.

Insights: Expanding USSOF’s role in non-kinetic operations, including information warfare and civil affairs, can disrupt adversaries’ strategies without escalating to open conflict. Moreover, USSOF's ability to build and maintain deep relationships with allies and partners provides the US with strategic advantages in key regions, enabling operations that counter adversaries' influence and activities.

Recommendations: See below for the full list of recommendations.

This Atlantic Council report illuminates the crucial role of USSOF amidst the evolving national security landscape, where strategic competition with major powers like China and Russia intensifies across various global domains. Despite their critical capabilities in navigating these complex strategic competitions, USSOF's potential remains underutilized and misunderstood, often pigeonholed within the narrow confines of their counterterrorism achievements during the Global War on Terror. The report advocates a paradigm shift, urging a broader recognition of USSOF's capabilities across the full spectrum of strategic competition, highlighting their indispensable role in promoting US global interests and addressing vulnerabilities across the competition continuum.

“Globally positioned and readily deployed, USSOF provides decision-makers with low-visibility, small-footprint, and often low-cost options to secure US interests. It does this either by directly addressing threats or by indirectly engaging by, with, and through international allies and partners, thus allowing the United States to leverage partners’ capabilities and geographical familiarity and providing unique placement and access to partners that might be otherwise unavailable across the interagency. Accounting for just 3 percent of the US DOD’s budget, USSOF expands the response options available to the United States and its allies and partners, buying decision space for US and allied leaders. This is especially important in enabling US forces to shape the environment and conditions of competition well before conflict arises.”

Range of USSOF Missions

The report notes how USSOF’s versatility spans across a broad spectrum of operations critical to strategic competition, embodying twelve core activities:

1. “Direct Action: Executing short-duration strikes and small-scale offensive actions to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets.

2. Special Reconnaissance: Actions conducted in sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance.

3. Unconventional Warfare: Executing actions to enable a resistance movement or insurgency that is aiming to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power.

4. Foreign Internal Defense (FID): Activities geared toward supporting the host nation’s internal defense and development, including safeguarding against subversion, terrorism, insurgency, or other threats to stability and internal security.

5. Civil Affairs Operations (CAO): Enhancing the relationship between US and allied and partner military forces and civilian authorities in areas where military forces are present.

6. Counterterrorism (CT): Actions taken directly against terrorist networks, as well as actions to influence or render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.

7. Military Information Support Operations (MISO): Planned activities aimed at conveying specific, pre-selected information to foreign audiences. Such information is often aimed at influencing the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, or behavior of foreign audiences, groups, individuals, or sometimes governments in a manner favorable to US or host-nation objectives.

8. Counter-proliferation of WMD: Activities to support US government efforts to curtain the development, possession, proliferation, and use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons by governments and non-state actors.

9. Security Force Assistance: Organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, or advising various components of foreign security forces.

10. Counterinsurgency (COIN): The amalgamation of civilian and military efforts designed to end insurgent violence and facilitate a return to peaceful political processes.

11. Hostage Rescue and Recovery: Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to hostage incidents, which may include the recapture of US facilities, installations, sensitive materials, or personnel in areas hostile to the United States.

12. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: A range of Department of Defense humanitarian activities conducted outside the United States and its territories, and alongside other humanitarian entities, to relieve and reduce human suffering.”

These activities underscore USSOF's ability to address a multitude of challenges across the strategic competition landscape, demonstrating their critical importance beyond traditional counterterrorism roles.

Role of USSOF in Strategic Competition

The authors argue USSOF's contributions to US strategic competition are multifaceted, providing unique advantages in:

• Global and persistent engagement with allies and partners: USSOF's extensive global network and enduring partnerships enable the US to counter adversaries' influence and support allies and partners effectively, strengthening collective security.

• Gaining placement and access across the globe: The strategic positioning of USSOF across the globe offers the US a significant advantage in projecting power and conducting operations in response to emerging threats. Their ability to operate discretely in politically sensitive or denied areas provides the US with eyes and ears on the ground, offering critical insights into adversary actions and intentions. This global presence, characterized by agility and a low-profile approach, enables USSOF to conduct operations that deter adversaries and reassure allies without escalating tensions unnecessarily, maintaining a balance crucial for strategic stability.

• Achieving Effects Across the Competition Continuum: USSOF's expertise in operating in the gray zone — the ambiguous space below the threshold of open conflict — allows the US to counter adversaries' actions effectively without triggering wider conflicts. Their proficiency in information operations, unconventional warfare, and influence campaigns disrupt adversaries' plans and spreads discord within their ranks. This capacity to operate effectively across the competition continuum ensures the US can respond flexibly to threats, utilizing a full range of non-kinetic and kinetic tools to achieve strategic objectives and shape the operational environment in favor of US interests.

• Cutting-Edge Use of Technology: The forward-leaning posture of USSOF in adopting and integrating emerging technologies into their operations sets them apart as a force multiplier within the US military arsenal. Their willingness to experiment with and operationalize new technologies, from artificial intelligence and cyber capabilities to advanced reconnaissance and surveillance tools, ensures that USSOF maintains a technological edge over adversaries. This technological adeptness enhances their operational effectiveness, enabling them to conduct missions with greater precision, stealth, and impact, thereby solidifying their role as a key component of the US's strategic competition efforts.

Recommendations

1. Adapt Mindset for Strategic Competition: USSOF should expand their role in strategic competition by embracing non-kinetic activities and irregular-warfare concepts to counteract the sophisticated capabilities of near-peer adversaries like China and Russia.

2. Synchronize Efforts Across Agencies and Allies: To address the complexities of strategic competition effectively, USSOF must enhance collaboration with interagency partners, allied and partner militaries, and the Joint Force, leveraging their capabilities in pre-conflict roles.

3. Enhance Capabilities in Emerging Domains: USSOF must bolster their expertise in cyber, space, undersea warfare, and other areas like the Arctic, and invest in technologies such as artificial intelligence to ensure dominance in complex environments.

4. Define and Measure Success: USSOF needs to establish clear strategic competition objectives and develop mechanisms to track progress, allowing for a better understanding of their contributions and impact.

5. Improve Integration with US Military Services: Enhanced understanding, communication, and global campaign planning between USSOF and the broader US military are crucial for leveraging strategic advantages effectively across various domains and partners.

6. Identify and Leverage Innovations: USSOF should continue to lead in scouting, testing, and adopting cutting-edge technologies from nontraditional defense-industrial partners, enhancing their operational capabilities and maintaining a technological edge.

7. Maintain and Enhance International Cooperation: USSOF must ensure continuous and effective collaboration with allied special operations forces, sharing plans, focus areas, and best practices to build a unified approach against common strategic threats.

I highly recommend reading the full report to better understand the role of USSOF in US strategic competition.

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China Outpacing U.S. Defense Industrial Base

The U.S. and Chinese Defense Industrial Bases in an Era of Great Power Competition

By Seth G. Jones and Alexander Palmer

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report examines the defense industrial capacities of the US and China within the context of their strategic competition.

Analysis: The authors leverage a wide array of data sources including government reports, defense spending figures, production rates of military assets, and expert interviews to comprehensively compare the US and Chinese industrial bases.

Argument: The US defense industrial base, while formidable, is currently ill-equipped to meet the surging demands of global military commitments and the strategic challenge posed by China's rapidly advancing defense sector. This inadequacy is attributed to issues like underinvestment, bureaucratic inertia, supply chain vulnerabilities, and a lack of a cohesive strategy to foster innovation and production efficiency within the defense industry.

Insights: China has become the world's largest shipbuilder, significantly outpacing the US in both capacity and output, posing strategic challenges in naval dominance. But despite advancements, China's defense industry still relies on critical foreign technologies, especially in aerospace engines and semiconductor manufacturing. Meanwhile, the US has not fully leveraged its alliances to strengthen its defense industrial base, in contrast to China's more isolated position.

Recommendations: See below for the full list of recommendations.

This CSIS report underscores the critical juncture at which the US finds itself in the realm of national security. With China's defense industrial base rapidly advancing in capability and output, the US confronts the stark reality of its own industrial base's stagnation. The report's central thesis posits that the US risks ceding strategic ground to China unless significant and urgent reforms are undertaken to revitalize its defense industrial base, thereby ensuring readiness and deterrence in an increasingly contested global landscape.

China’s Industrial Base

The authors detail China's strategic investments in its defense industrial base, highlighting a concerted effort to eclipse US capabilities in key sectors such as shipbuilding and missile technology.

“The main beneficiary of China’s defense industrial growth has been the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), especially through a growth in China’s shipbuilding capabilities. China’s ability to rapidly build large numbers of ships represents a possible advantage in a protracted war in the Indo-Pacific. China is now the world’s largest shipbuilder by a significant margin. It has a shipbuilding capacity that is more than 230 times larger than that of the United States and sufficient to build 23 million tons of vessels compared to less than 100,000 tons in the United States. According to U.S. Navy estimates, a single Chinese shipyard currently has more capacity than all U.S. shipyards combined. The PLAN’s growth has made it the largest navy in the world. But the U.S. Navy likely remains more capable by most measures, including physical indicators like tonnage or Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells and operational competencies such as anti-submarine warfare, joint operations, and long-range targeting.”

China's defense budget has seen consistent year-on-year increases, with a notable 7.2 percent hike in 2024 alone. Compared to the defense spending of other Indo-Pacific nations, China’s rising investment is particularly pronounced.

As for missile technology, China has positioned itself as a leading global power in the production and deployment of a wide range of missile systems, from short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles. Moreover, the induction of the J-20 stealth fighter into the PLA Air Force, alongside investments in unmanned aerial systems and space warfare technologies, underscores China's ambition to achieve superiority in the air and beyond.

Despite its formidable advancements, the CSIS report also identifies critical vulnerabilities within China's defense apparatus. Notably, China's heavy reliance on foreign technology and the persistent challenge of integrating cutting-edge innovations into its military capabilities present significant obstacles. Moreover, issues such as lack of combat experience and potential operational inefficiencies further compound the challenges faced by China, offering the United States strategic opportunities to leverage in maintaining a competitive edge.

US Defense Industrial Base

Conversely, the US defense industrial base confronts a multitude of challenges that hinder its ability to keep pace with China's military-industrial expansion. The US defense industrial ecosystem is mired in a quagmire of regulatory complexities and bureaucratic inertia that stifles innovation and delays the fielding of new technologies. The procurement process is encumbered by protracted timelines and a risk-averse culture that prioritizes procedural adherence over operational urgency. This environment has deterred new entrants and stifled the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises, which are often the source of transformative innovations.

Furthermore, while the US enjoys a broad network of allies and partners, the current frameworks for defense collaboration and technology sharing are inadequate to leverage this strategic advantage fully. The mechanisms for international defense cooperation, such as the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and technology transfer programs, are often criticized for their sluggish pace and the bureaucratic hurdles that impede the timely transfer of critical defense capabilities to allies. This situation limits the collective defense posture and interoperability essential for deterring aggressive actions by adversaries.

“The entire [Foreign Military Sales] process—from initial discussions to [Letter of Request], [Letter of Acceptance], production, and modifications—is too long. It takes an average of 18 months to get FMS cases on contract. There is also no real accountability in the FMS system. The Department of State statutorily owns it, but execution largely falls to the Department of Defense and is split among the military services and several Department of Defense agencies. No one is held accountable for strategic success or failure. Partner and ally requests for U.S. systems can go unanswered for months or even years. FMS programs are executed under a U.S. government contract negotiated and awarded by a U.S. military service contracting officer on behalf of the FMS partner. The Department of Defense contracting community is understaffed. FMS contracts are sometimes given a low priority by contracting officers, who look first to support U.S. service personnel, then to contracts to support innovation for next-generation capabilities for U.S. service personnel, then to FMS. In addition, staffing constraints, technological limitations, and the increasing complexity of systems could slow the rate at which transactions are approved if there is a major increase in FMS.

Even for close allies, there are notable delays, confusion, and unpredictability with the U.S. technology transfer process—a sign of a peacetime, not a wartime, process. The U.S. Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure (TSFD) process often causes delays for close allies, which prevent them from doing technical assessments before they even get to the LOR stage. The TSFD process is also far too opaque and unpredictable. These challenges can significantly impact time-sensitive actions, such as refitting ships during fixed docking periods. With the United Kingdom, for example, U.S. delays held up a routine upgrade on sonar systems for UK Royal Navy submarines for several months, while another UK submarine had to wait months to be serviced by a cleared contractor until the U.S. Department of State authorized an export-controlled component. As one analysis concluded, ‘months went by waiting for a license that just added cost and risk to an ally’s military capability.’ More broadly, the United Kingdom spends a shocking $500 million each year—almost 1 percent of its defense budget—complying with ITAR regulations. As another assessment concluded: ‘When close U.S. allies—or their defense firms—wish to develop technology or acquire capability from the United States, they have to navigate a byzantine system of regulation. This costs time and money, undermines allies’ sovereignty, stifles innovation, and blunts the United States’ edge in the strategic competition with China.”

To remedy the current inefficiencies in the US defense industrial base, the authors prescribe the following series of recommendations:

White House-led Effort:

• Establish a Presidential Defense Industrial Task Force: Create a high-level task force, led by the White House, to provide strategic oversight, coordinate interagency efforts, and streamline decision-making processes related to defense industrial policies and initiatives.

• Implement Strategic Guidance and Oversight Mechanism: This body should be vested with the authority to implement strategic guidance, resolve interagency conflicts, and oversee the execution of national defense industrial strategies, ensuring alignment with national security objectives.

Defense Production:

• Increase Budgetary Allocations: Advocate for and secure increased budgetary allocations for defense spending, targeting a percentage of GDP that reflects the strategic imperatives of countering near-peer adversaries and sustaining global military leadership.

• Expand Multiyear Procurement Contracts: Incentivize and facilitate the adoption of multiyear procurement contracts to stabilize demand, encourage industrial investment in capacity expansion, and enhance the predictability of defense procurement.

• Augment and Diversify Strategic Stockpiles: Invest in the expansion and diversification of strategic stockpiles, including munitions, critical minerals, and components essential for the rapid scaling of production in times of crisis.

• Cultivate STEM Talent and Skilled Trades: Launch comprehensive initiatives to attract, train, and retain a skilled workforce capable of supporting advanced defense manufacturing and innovation.

• Enhance Supply Chain Resilience: Implement policies to strengthen and secure supply chains for critical materials and components, fostering domestic production capabilities and reducing dependence on adversarial sources.

Allies and Partners:

• Deepen Defense Industrial Cooperation: Establish frameworks for deeper defense industrial cooperation with allies and partners, focusing on joint research and development, co-production agreements, and interoperability standards to bolster collective defense capabilities.

• Streamline Technology Transfer and Export Controls: Reform and streamline technology transfer and export control processes to facilitate the rapid and secure sharing of defense technologies and capabilities with trusted allies and partners, enhancing the global defense posture against common threats.

To engage with the analysis and recommendations further, I recommend reading the full report.

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Editorial Note: While this report highlights the glaring issues with the US defense industrial base, especially compared to its Chinese counterpart, the report’s recommendations remain rather conventional. Increasing spending, working with allies, enhancing public-private cooperation, etc. are well-known directions but they are broad and are easier said than done. As such, there persists a need for novel and actionable guidance that can more practically translate to political, operational, or institutional initiatives.

This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following sourcea: Atlantic Council and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

Again, please share, subscribe, and stay tuned for next week’s installment!

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Once again, I have two incisive reports to share with you all. Their topics are:

• What are the challenges in the US Navy’s supply chains and how can DoD mitigate them?

• What private sector innovations could play a role in defeating a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan?

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

Naval Logistics in Contested Environments

Examination of Stockpiles and Industrial Base Issues

By Joslyn Fleming, Bradley Martin, Fabian Villalobos and Emily Yoder

RAND Corporation

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report aims to address the logistics and supply chain challenges faced by the US Navy under the Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept, with a focus on critical munitions and naval aviation repair parts.

Analysis: The analysis involved reviewing DoD and Navy supply chain policies, military case studies, stakeholder interviews, and academic research. It aims to understand the challenges and limitations of current supply chains, examining production rates, inventory levels, and the defense industrial base's capacity to meet demands for major combat operations.

Argument: Current Navy supply chain processes and logistics planning are inadequately structured to meet the demands of DMO in contested environments. Challenges span across acquisition, storage, transportation, and distribution, with a particular focus on the front end of the acquisition process.

Insights: Shared production lines and sole-source suppliers create bottlenecks and vulnerabilities, especially for critical components shared across missile platforms. Moreover, existing models fail to accurately predict the munitions demand for DMO, necessitating the development of better forecasting methods and operational planning tools.

Recommendations: See below for the full list of recommendations.

The Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept necessitates that the US Navy orchestrates operations that are swift, far-reaching, and integrated to effectively neutralize opposing forces. In the context of a prospective confrontation with China, the vast expanse of the Western Pacific coupled with the formidable capabilities of a near-peer adversary significantly intensifies the sustainability of this strategy. Crucially, this report by RAND delves into the logistical and supply chain challenges confronting the US Navy within the DMO framework. Concentrating on critical munitions and naval aviation spare parts, the authors uncover and articulate a series of conspicuous deficiencies.

Critical Munitions

Considering the current budgeting and recertification rates of critical munitions like the Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) and long-range anti-ship missile (LRASM), the US Navy will be vastly undersupplied for a conflict in the Western Pacific during the coming years.

“If current budgeted quantities remain consistent, it is likely that the USN will only have 116 [Maritime Strike Tomahawks] in its inventory by 2025 and will not reach the estimated demand for a Western Pacific scenario (800 munitions)…

The total US Air Force demand for standoff munitions is 3,166. Based on our assumption of 1,200 LRASMs needed by the USN for anti-ship targeting and fires, and with 147 currently in the USN’s inventory, the total demand from both services is 4,219 munitions. Given the current production rates, it could take 5.4 years to 12.3 years to produce USAF precision-guided missiles (PGMs) alone, and 7.2 years to 16.4 years to produce all 4,219 munitions demanded by the two services. Given current budgeted quantities for LRASMs for the USN for FY 2022 to FY 2025, and the 147 LRASMs in the current inventory, the USN will only be able to inventory 309 LRASMs by 2025, well short of the estimated 1,200 needed for a Western Pacific scenario.”

However, bolstering the production of these munitions is difficult due to numerous manufacturing constraints.

Critically, because the LRASM and joint air-ship standoff missile extended range (JASSM-ER)—an essential munition for the US Air Force in a Taiwan scenario—are designed to have the same rocket body, they share components, production lines, and suppliers. This means it will be extremely difficult to produce enough munitions for both the Navy and Air Force, as they rely on the same parts and facilities.

Naval Aviation Repair Parts

The authors’ examination of current naval aviation Class IX (repair parts) supply chain dynamics reveals a predisposition towards enhancing short-term operational readiness, often at the detriment of long-term preparedness for high-intensity conflicts.

This inclination is evident in the Navy's forecasting for naval aviation repair parts which relies heavily on historical usage rates and peacetime operations data. For example, the reliance on past demand patterns to predict future needs does not accurately reflect the surge in demand for specific parts like engine components or avionics that would occur in a high-tempo conflict with a near-peer adversary.

Similarly, the incentive mechanisms in place for key stakeholders, such as contractors and suppliers, prioritize short-term gains and operational readiness. As a result, they overlook the strategic value of developing surge capabilities for large-scale conflicts and the strategic stockpiling of less frequently used, but mission-critical, parts.

Furthermore, the funding models adopted by the Navy to acquire repair parts, like working capital funds, are predominantly structured to support ongoing operations rather than to build a reserve for future conflicts. This short-sighted approach to budgeting and procurement undermines the Navy's ability to swiftly transition to a wartime footing in the event of a conflict with a near-peer adversary, as the current procurement does not align with the anticipated needs of such a scenario.

Recommendations

To rectify the obstacles present in the supply chains of critical munitions and naval aviation repair parts, the authors propose a series of mitigation strategies organized by time horizon:

I highly recommend reading the full report to better understand the US Navy’s supply chain challenges and how they can be mitigated.

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Harnessing the Power of Private Sector Innovation to Defeat a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan

Relighting Vulcan's Forge

By James Ryseff, Chia-Hsi Jessica Lin, D. Sean Barnett, Michael Bohnert, Caleb Lucas, Barry Wilson and Jim Mitre

RAND Corporation

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report aims to identify technological solutions that could significantly enhance the United States and Taiwan's ability to thwart a Chinese invasion by leveraging American private-sector innovation.

Analysis: The study employed a blend of table-top exercises, involving defense experts and private sector technologists, and unclassified war games to simulate a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2027. These methods underscored the feasibility and strategic impact of the proposed technological solutions, highlighting their potential to significantly alter the dynamics of military engagement through enhanced communication, command and control, intelligence, logistics, and unmanned systems.

Argument: Leveraging private sector innovation is crucial for revitalizing America's technological supremacy in defense. By aligning defense needs with the agility and innovative capacity of the private sector, the US and its allies can significantly improve their defense posture against a sophisticated adversary like China, particularly in the context of protecting Taiwan.

Insights: Optimal technological solutions emerge when technologists can thoroughly grasp the issues they aim to address from the viewpoint of the ultimate users. Accordingly, it is better to frame defense challenges as problems needing innovative solutions rather than prescribing pre-determined requirements.

Recommendations: DoD should deeply engage with the private sector through immersive, problem-focused collaborations that spur technological innovations, alongside urging the rapid adoption and development of identified solutions to enhance defense capabilities. These efforts should emphasize seamlessly integrating these technological solutions into existing defense operations, prioritizing user feedback and iterative improvements to ensure effectiveness and adaptability.

This RAND report examines the critical importance of leveraging private-sector technological innovations to enhance the defense capabilities of the United States and Taiwan. Through a series of wargames, the authors describe 17 technologies that could be fielded and operationally impactful in a Taiwan scenario.

1. Space/Ground Laser Communication: This technology confronts the operational challenge of maintaining resilient communications in the face of sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities posed by the PRC. By integrating a network of satellites across various orbits and establishing mesh networks, it ensures robust, resistant communication links for command and control purposes. Currently at a mature stage of development, it requires further efforts towards seamless integration into existing defense frameworks. Its successful deployment is expected to significantly enhance communication efficacy and resilience on the battlefield, providing a strategic advantage in electronic warfare scenarios.

2. Integrated Warfighter Network (IWN): The IWN addresses the fragmentation of communication systems by proposing a unified, interoperable network framework that enhances connectivity and reliability across different systems. Although the technology is ready for deployment, the challenge lies in its integration into the diverse existing communication infrastructures. Upon successful integration, the IWN is anticipated to streamline command and control processes, facilitating efficient and effective operational coordination.

3. Edge Integration/Computing: This solution aims to solve the operational challenge of ensuring real-time data fusion and analysis at the forward edge of battle areas. Utilizing edge computing capabilities allows for immediate processing and decision-making support for frontline units. Despite its commercial viability, integrating this technology with military data standards remains a critical step. The anticipated impact includes improved situational awareness and accelerated decision-making processes, crucial for maintaining operational tempo in dynamic battlefield environments.

4. Joint Cross-domain Common Operating Picture (COP): This technology aims to overcome the lack of a shared battlespace view between the US and Taiwanese forces by facilitating an interoperable COP. While technically feasible, it faces significant policy and cultural integration challenges. Its successful implementation is vital for enhanced operational synchronization, offering a unified real-time view of the battlefield that supports informed decision-making and effective coordination.

5. Document/Voice Translation: Designed to bridge the language barriers for effective communication, this technology utilizes real-time translation tools for documents and voice communications, enhancing collaboration between the US and Taiwanese forces. While adaptation for military jargon remains a moderate development challenge, it presents low integration hurdles. The expected outcome is a significant enhancement in tactical and operational collaboration, fostering unity of effort among allied forces.

6. ‘Uncommon’ Operating Picture: This innovative solution offers a mechanism for selective data-sharing to protect sensitive operational information. Although it involves complex development and integration, the strategic significance lies in its potential to safeguard critical strategic information, balancing operational utility with information security.

7. Blue-green Single System Aggregation: By achieving seamless system integration and information sharing through a unified computing architecture, this solution addresses the challenge of disparate information systems. Despite demanding significant integration efforts, its successful deployment would markedly improve operational coordination and decision-making processes across allied forces.

8. Secure Mobile Devices: This approach ensures the maintenance of secure and adaptable communication channels through robust mobile devices, addressing the need for mobile and secure command and control capabilities. Overcoming cybersecurity challenges is paramount for its success, which promises to significantly enhance command agility and operational responsiveness.

9. Situational Awareness Model: Utilizing AI to integrate and analyze multi-intelligence (multi-INT) data, this solution aims to enhance the understanding of PRC military operations and intentions. It requires complex development and thoughtful integration but offers strategic advantages in terms of enhanced foresight and preparation, aiding in the formulation of informed defense strategies.

10. Identifying AI-Generated Adversarial Disinformation: By employing AI to detect and mitigate disinformation campaigns orchestrated by the PRC, this technology addresses the challenge of information warfare. Developmental and integration challenges notwithstanding, it is deemed critical for maintaining morale and countering psychological operations, ensuring the integrity of operational intelligence.

11. Multidomain Drone Mimics: This solution leverages diverse, cost-effective drones to deceive enemy ISR efforts, necessitating convincing mimics for efficacy. It promises to significantly disrupt enemy operations and conserve allied resources by presenting false targets and confusing enemy surveillance and targeting systems.

12. Advanced Mines: Introducing smart, repositionable mines with AI capabilities to enhance minefield effectiveness against amphibious assaults, this solution requires breakthroughs in development for optimal effectiveness. It has the potential to drastically improve defensive measures, shaping enemy movement and increasing the cost of aggression.

13. Short-range Strike UAVs: Utilizing versatile UAVs prepositioned for the defense of key locations, this solution combats the threat of amphibious assaults and air incursions. While straightforward in development, logistical challenges in prepositioning these UAVs are anticipated. Upon overcoming these, the technology is expected to significantly bolster deterrence and defensive postures at critical points.

14. Medium-range ISR UAVs: Deploying adaptable UAVs for comprehensive ISR coverage, this solution addresses the need for continuous intelligence gathering. Manufacturing and software development challenges are noted, with the promise of providing persistent surveillance capabilities that enhance situational awareness and operational planning.

15. Commercial Combat Suite: Leveraging commercial software for operational efficiency, this solution integrates civilian elements into defense efforts, requiring cultural adaptation for maximum utility. It offers a potential boost to reserve force capabilities through the use of familiar and widely adopted technologies, enhancing the operational readiness and effectiveness of auxiliary forces.

16. Optimize Decoy Deployment and Deception Employment: Developing software to guide the optimal use of decoys and deception techniques, this solution faces complex integration challenges but could significantly impact operational dynamics by confusing adversary perceptions and plans, potentially decreasing enemy effectiveness and conserving allied resources.

17. Predictive and Prescriptive Logistics: Enhancing logistical efficiency through a data mesh that forecasts and optimizes supply chain operations, this technology confronts integration and cultural challenges within defense logistics frameworks. Its successful implementation promises to improve resource allocation, distribution efficiency, and operational readiness, supporting sustained combat operations and strategic flexibility.

By comparing the baseline wargame results with the wargame where the US and Taiwan players utilized these technologies, the authors determined certain technologies to be especially beneficial.

• Synergized multi-domain drone mimics and optimized decoy and deception employment halved the US’s 5th generation fighter aircraft losses and increased Chinese fighter losses by 70% within the first five days of the conflict.

• Additionally, these technologies, combined with smart mines and improved situational awareness, reduced the Chinese amphibious forces landing on Taiwan to about one-third of the forces in the baseline version, presenting unprecedented challenges to such operations.

• Loitering munitions deployed by Taiwan's reservists also significantly reduced the Chinese helicopter assault force, potentially eliminating up to one hundred helicopters or nearly one-tenth of the invasion's allocated helicopters, further weakening their air mobility capabilities.

Despite the significant quantitative impact of these specific technologies in the wargame, the authors emphasize that technologies with less quantifiable effects remain crucial and worthy of further research.

To learn more about each of the mentioned technologies and their role in a potential Taiwan conflict, I highly suggest reading the full report.

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Editorial note: To a significant extent, relevant commercial companies are aware of and have begun developing solutions for many of DoD’s operational problems. However, as these companies are pursuing their niche technological solutions (look no further than the wide variety of unmanned and uncrewed systems being developed), the question of how to address DoD’s operational and institutional problems remains. Indeed, unless DoD can develop an approach to solve these issues, DoD will struggle to sustain private-sector innovation and deploy the solutions that emerge from it. If you missed it, I urge you to look into this report on the concept of a “hedge force” which describes an overall approach for the DoD.

This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following source: RAND Corporation.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

Again, please share, subscribe, and stay tuned for next week’s installment!

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This week, I have a compelling report to share with you all. The topic is:

• How is Russia using unconventional warfare to expand its influence outside of Ukraine?

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

The Threat from Russia’s Unconventional Warfare Beyond Ukraine, 2022–24

By Dr. Jack Watling, Oleksandr V. Danylyuk, and Nick Reynolds

Royal United Services Institute

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report analyzes Russia's unconventional military activities beyond Ukraine during 2022-2024, including efforts in European destabilization, expeditionary operations in Africa for resource control, and influence operations in the Middle East.

Analysis: The analysis employs a combination of primary documents from Russian special services, human intelligence reporting on activities in Moldova, Mali, Sudan, and beyond, and interviews with officials in Ukraine and some European states.

Argument: Russia's unconventional warfare strategy is characterized by a sophisticated blend of information warfare, human intelligence operations, and, when advantageous, violence to instigate political instability across states. This strategy, consistent over decades, aims to polarize populations, capture elites, and undermine the governance structures of targeted states. Despite Russia's operational failures and the crude nature of its tactics, there is serious potential for these efforts to become increasingly coherent and mutually supportive if left unchecked.

Insights: There has been an aggressive expansion of the GRU's partnerships in Africa, aimed at supplanting Western influence in the region. Moreover, the Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, has been utilized to construct influence networks among Chechen and Muslim populations in Europe and the Middle East. 

Recommendations: The report advises NATO members and European states to enhance counterintelligence and vigilance against Russian unconventional tactics. It suggests a focus on disrupting Russia's support networks and countering disinformation, alongside preparing for potential crises instigated by Russia to divert attention from Ukraine.

This RUSI report on Russia's unconventional warfare tactics provides a critical examination of the evolving nature of Russian military activities beyond the conventional battlefield. Focusing on the period post-2022 Ukraine invasion, it highlights the strategic adaptation of the GRU, the integration of Wagner Group functions, and the exploitation of traditional values for influence operations. This analysis is pivotal for understanding the multifaceted threats posed by Russia, emphasizing the importance of a comprehensive response from NATO and Western allies.

Following significant operational exposures and the expulsion of its intelligence officers from Western Europe due to the invasion of Ukraine, the GRU has embarked on a strategic overhaul of its special forces' recruitment, training, and infiltration tactics. There has been a significant shift towards employing non-military recruits for operations to ensure they maintain a low profile. In the same fashion, training for special operations now occurs in distributed safe houses rather than a centralized facility. Also, Russia is targeting foreign students at Russian universities — its special forces training center has allocated some of its budget to providing stipends to students, specifically to students from the Balkans and Africa. These changes reflect a broader strategy to maintain Russian intelligence capabilities in Europe, despite increased Western vigilance and counterintelligence measures.

“Another important vector in the regeneration of a support apparatus is the Russian exile community. Some of those who led Russian mobilisation in September 2022 oppose the war in Ukraine. However, many others are loyal to the Russian state, albeit not to the extent that they were willing to be mobilised, and the low of people provided cover for special service personnel to enter third countries. Participation in Russian opposition media and other activities provides surface-level ‘ethical washing’ and thereafter creates a pathway to legalisation, since these individuals can then claim asylum. At the same time, it becomes possible for them to collect on other elements of the diaspora. More importantly, these individuals can be financed to gain influence within the community and to acquire assets that become useful for supporting unconventional operations. The usual method is for these individuals to receive money for selling a property – fictitious or otherwise – in a third country and then to use the money from the sale to engage in business interactions with other Russian entities where the costs are inflated in order to move money to the individual. Once they have established properties or other assets, this becomes a self-sustaining financial structure to keep the agent in place while drawing only from legally acquired funds, reducing the risk of detection through financial irregularities.”

In addition, the formal absorption of the Wagner Group’s functions — now the Expeditionary Corps — by the GRU marks a pivotal shift in Russia’s strategy to extend its influence in Africa. This strategic move is characterized by an aggressive push to establish military and economic partnerships with African nations, offering a counter-narrative to Western influence. In its special operations strategy, Russia places a high emphasis on the strategic importance of influencing or controlling high-value individuals (termed elite capture), preferring this approach over a broader effort of manipulating general public opinion, to effect change within states. Specifically, Russia deploys what the authors refer to as the "regime survival package”:

“The logic of this offer is that Russia will provide elites in target countries with military support, economic and political protection from backlash via the UN or other international mechanisms, and the support of political technologists to sell their popularity domestically. A critical component of the package is the isolation of a target country’s leadership. For example, in Mali, the Expeditionary Corps – as occurred in the CAR – now provides presidential protection, since this proximity ensures sustained understanding and influence within Malian decision-making. Wagner has a long history of establishing domestic propaganda structures. One of the first successful examples was the creation of the Lengo Songo radio station, which quickly became one of the mouthpieces of Russian propaganda in the CAR and is consistently among the three most popular radio stations in the country. It is worth noting that the Russian political technologist and media manager Igor Mangushev (formerly a Russian navy officer who organised Russian paramilitary groups in the war against Ukraine in Crimea and Donbas in 2014) was heavily involved in establishing the programming.

However, the effect of this offer is to close off the relationships that a country has with the West. Very often, the conduct of massacres and other violations of international law will prevent Western partners from maintaining links with a partner military, the long-term effects of which may not be fully appreciated when cooperation is first agreed. Furthermore, in the medium term, the violent approach used by the Expeditionary Corps may secure a government and fulfill perceived short-term needs, but is unlikely to bring peace to the hinterlands of the recipient country. It is worth noting that the Russian approach is consistent with the tenets of Soviet anti-partisan warfare, involving the use of collective punishment, hostage-taking of local political figures and aggressive raids to kill insurgents. The effect is often the defeat of an insurgent group but an absence of stability or human security. The result is that Russian security partners initially gain a sovereign capability through Russia’s mercenaries and medium-term personal security. However, they also become dependent and begin to lose access to alternative security providers. In the medium to long term, the economic concessions Russia demands risk creating an extremely unequal relationship, in which Moscow extracts much more than it offers.”

The third chapter of the report meticulously examines the role of the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov in advancing Russia’s unconventional warfare strategy. It details Kadyrov’s efforts to cultivate a network of influence among Chechen and Muslim populations in Europe and the Middle East, aiming to subvert Western interests and promote Russia’s geopolitical agenda. This strategy involves leveraging ethno-religious solidarity to foster discord and destabilize regions, thereby complicating Western efforts to counter Russian influence.

“The combination of social status and access to a range of constituencies – both secular and religious – makes Kadyrov a valuable proxy diplomat of the Russian Federation; a unique capability for a regional governor in Russia that occasionally generates comment. In recent years, he has managed to establish effective working relationships with many leaders in the Middle East, including the president of the UAE, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, representatives of the royal family of Bahrain, and leaders of Jordan. It is indicative, for example, that during his visit to Russia in 2017, the king of Saudi Arabia spent more time with Kadyrov than with Putin. The refusal of several states to join the anti-Russian sanctions associated with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine is partly shaped by Kadyrov’s diplomatic efforts. It is not surprising that in July 2023, Putin appointed Kadyrov’s adviser Turko Daudov as a permanent representative to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Daudov was previously a key representative of Chechnya in Arab and Muslim countries. It is arguable that Russia places more importance on Kadyrov as a diplomat than his interlocutors, who are pursuing relationships with Russia for a range of reasons. Nevertheless, personal relationships matter in diplomacy, and Kadyrov has become the intermediary for a range of Russian efforts.”

Overall, Russia's unconventional warfare tactics present a persistent and evolving threat to NATO and the West, necessitating a multifaceted and sustained counter-strategy. The interplay of GRU operations, the Wagner Group's activities in Africa, and influence operations via the Kadyrovtsy underscores a coordinated effort to undermine Western security and interests. This complex threat landscape demands a comprehensive and proactive response from NATO and Western allies to mitigate Russia's unconventional warfare advances and safeguard international stability.

I highly recommend reading the full report to understand better how Russia’s unconventional warfare strategy is transforming.

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This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following source: Royal United Services Institute.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

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This week, I am excited to share two incisive reports with you all. The topics include:

• How a “Hedge Force” provides the strategic utility to defend against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

• Of the US tech companies supporting Ukraine, what are their financial ties to China?

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

Hedging Bets

Rethinking Force Design for a Post-Dominance Era

By Bryan Clark and Dan Patt

Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report focuses on developing and implementing hedge forces to maintain US military effectiveness, especially in scenarios like a potential invasion of Taiwan by China.

Analysis: Utilizing a mix of historical analysis, case studies, and simulation modeling, the report examines past US defense strategies, the current geopolitical landscape, and potential future conflicts. It leverages data and insights from recent military engagements and evolving military technologies, especially in the context of the PRC's military advancements.

Argument: The era of unquestioned US military dominance is ending, necessitating a shift in force design to include specialized hedge forces. These forces would enable the US to effectively deter adversaries in high-consequence, low-probability scenarios like a sudden invasion of Taiwan by China, without compromising the flexibility and capability of the general-purpose forces across a broader range of military engagements.

Insights: Adopting a hedge force strategy promises not only to amplify the risk for China while diminishing that for the United States, but it also stands out as a more cost-effective approach. Importantly, uncrewed systems play a crucial role in the proposed hedge force structure, offering cost-effectiveness and operational flexibility.

Recommendations: See below for the full list of recommendations.

As US military dominance is increasingly challenged by near-peer adversaries, a nuanced approach to deterrence and readiness is necessary. Consequently, this report from Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology posits “Hedge Forces” as a critical component in the US defense strategy against emerging threats from China, particularly against the backdrop of a potential invasion of Taiwan.

By investing heavily in hypersonic weapons, anti-ship missiles, space technologies, and electromagnetic capabilities, China has specifically designed its military to counter US and allied freedom of action in a Taiwan scenario. Meanwhile, the US tailors its forces to be general-purpose. Thus, while they are prepared for a wide spectrum of threats, US forces are relatively unequipped to defend against a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan, at least without suffering an unacceptable level of losses.

To address this capability gap, hedge forces act as specialized military units designed to operate in scenarios where conventional forces may not suffice. These forces are designed to address specific high-consequence, low-probability scenarios, such as a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

For such a scenario, the authors conceive of the Taiwan Bulwark Activation Force (TBAF), comprised of various uncrewed and unmanned vehicles that can overwhelm and disrupt the PLA’s air, missile, and electromagnetic defenses.

“The TBAF is likely to be most effective operating in small teams that execute preprogrammed plays and rely on minimal in situ coordination using line-of-sight radios that will be difficult for the PLA to jam. To reduce the complexity of TBAF C3, each system would have one primary function—such as kinetic attack, decoy, or sensing—that would predetermine its role in teams. To enable these teaming approaches, TBAF systems will need to be preprogrammed with aimpoints, jamming frequencies and techniques, or recognition features for the variety of likely targets. And to ensure the TBAF extracts maximum value from each force element, every vehicle would incorporate a warhead and be programmed to attack a target after completing its primary function.”

“Digital integration will be the most difficult technical challenge associated with fielding the TBAF. Orchestration of many assets across domains, especially with complex support relationships, is an open technical problem. As a result, the TBAF adopts a simple C2 architecture that divides the theater into engagement zones and pre-assigns TBAF teams to zones with objectives to search for and engage specific types of targets. This allows for TBAF C2 tools to use a simple application programming interface (API) between operators and uncrewed systems and terse descriptors of objectives for each system. Operators can obtain more complex behaviors using the C2 tool by combining TBAF systems into self-organizing teams.”

To evaluate the utility of the TBAF, the authors employed an engagement model to simulate how US forces would fare against an amphibious invasion in Baseline (general-purpose forces), Baseline + Reinforcements (double general-purpose forces) and Baseline + Hedge Force cases.

As the results show below, the Baseline + Hedge Force performed significantly better than its counterparts in defeating the invasion force.

“More important, reinforcing with the TBAF instead of general-purpose forces reduces Blue losses. Because hedge force units engage Red preferentially by design and because of their proximity, most of the Blue units lost or damaged come from the TBAF. For example, the baseline force includes 56 units, and the TBAF contains 240 units. Although more than 95 percent of the Blue force suffers a mission kill on average, that translates into all the hedge force systems and only 43 general-purpose units. This is lower than the mean of 53 general-purpose units suffering at least a mission kill in the baseline simulation.”

In addition to its tactical benefits, the TBAF would be highly affordable, given the technical simplicity and specific role of each TBAF unit. The authors estimate general-purpose reinforcements would cost around $28.5 billion while the TBAF would cost approximately $6.5 billion.

To be sure, the development and deployment of hedge forces face several hurdles, including technological innovation, congressional support, and geopolitical considerations. The unique nature of these forces, devoid of traditional service structures and requiring innovative acquisition and development approaches, necessitates focused leadership and strategic foresight. Considering these challenges, the authors prescribe the following recommendations:

1. Assign OUSD(R&E) responsibility for obtaining and integrating TBAF systems

2. Stand up a named JTF to lead TBAF experimentation and employment

3. Fund the TBAF as part of existing congressionally directed deterrence initiatives

4. Assess hedge forces as an enduring element of US defense strategy

To fully understand the strategic utility of a hedge force and how it can be implemented, I highly recommend reading the full report.

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Which Ties Will Bind?

Big Tech, Lessons from Ukraine, and Implications for Taiwan

By Sam Bresnick, Ngor Luong and Kathleen Curlee

Center for Security and Emerging Technology

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report focuses on the US tech companies that are supporting Ukraine and explores their complex financial and economic ties to China.

Analysis: The analysis utilizes data from fDi Markets, Crunchbase, and various reputable sources to estimate the economic and financial linkages of 18 companies to China. Key indicators include overall revenue from China, greenfield FDI projects, supply chains, data and cloud computing centers, and R&D centers. 

Argument: The report argues that while US tech companies played significant roles in supporting Ukraine, their involvement in a Taiwan contingency would be more complex due to deeper economic ties with China. Of the 18 companies analyzed, Tesla and Apple, followed by Amazon and Microsoft, have the most extensive linkages to China.

Insights: Apple and Tesla are particularly dependent on China for manufacturing and sales revenue, making them highly vulnerable to Chinese economic coercion. Moreover, the manner in which China engages Taiwan will likely factor into companies’ decisions to support Taiwan.

Recommendations: US defense planners and policymakers should temper expectations regarding uniform support from tech companies in a Taiwan crisis. US officials should engage in closer coordination with these companies to gain insights into their stances and inform strategic planning.

While numerous US tech companies have supported Ukraine in their war effort against Russia, many question whether the same companies would similarly support Taiwan in a conflict against China. To address this question, this CSET report studies the intricate economic and financial linkages that US tech companies have with China, which could influence their responses to a Taiwan scenario. Highlighting the varied depth of these companies' involvements in China—from manufacturing and revenue generation to R&D activities—the report reveals a complex web of dependencies that could have significant implications for national security and international diplomacy.

Tesla

Tesla's strategic investments in China, epitomized by its Shanghai Gigafactory, underscore its deep manufacturing and market penetration in the country. With nearly $6.8 billion allocated across 18 projects, Tesla's commitment represents approximately 32% of its total FDI expenditure and about 20% of its global greenfield FDI projects. The Shanghai facility is pivotal, accounting for over 50% of Tesla's global production in 2022, highlighting Tesla's reliance on Chinese suppliers for critical components, including those with government ties. Moreover, Tesla's substantial revenue from China, nearly $18.2 billion in 2022, further underscores the importance of the Chinese market to Tesla's financial health and global strategy. An important nuance of Tesla’s ties to China is that its CEO, Elon Musk, is also the CEO of SpaceX, whose satellite communications services may be critical in a Taiwan scenario.

Apple

Apple's dependency on China is multifaceted, encompassing assembly, supplier networks, and revenue. Over 95% of Apple's core products are assembled in China, with around 80% of its suppliers operating within the country. This extensive network underscores Apple's reliance on Chinese manufacturing capabilities. Financially, China is a crucial market for Apple, contributing $74.2 billion or 19% of its total revenue in 2022, primarily fueled by iPhone sales and services. Apple's greenfield FDI in China, though not as extensive as Tesla's in manufacturing, still signifies a significant investment, particularly in R&D, enhancing the proximity between innovation and production

Amazon and Microsoft

Amazon and Microsoft, while not as deeply entwined with China as Tesla and Apple, maintain substantial ties through supply chains, R&D labs, and data centers. Amazon's presence is marked by a large network of suppliers, with 32% of its total located in China, alongside strategic R&D centers in Beijing and Shanghai focusing on advanced computing technologies. Microsoft's engagement, although drawing a modest share of its global revenue from China, is notable for its R&D activities, particularly through its Microsoft Research Asia center, contributing significantly to the company's AI research output. These activities reflect both companies' strategic interests in China's innovation ecosystem and the potential vulnerabilities associated with their operations in the country.

Other Companies

Companies like Cloudflare, Google, Cisco, and Oracle maintain less intensive but still significant connections to China, through revenue generation, investments, and the establishment of data and cloud computing centers. These linkages, while not as pronounced as those of Tesla or Apple, illustrate a spectrum of engagement levels among US tech companies in China, reflecting a diversity of strategies to navigate the complex Chinese market and regulatory environment.

The authors underline how these ties also expose a vulnerability for China. If US companies reduce operations or completely divest their infrastructure in China, thousands or, potentially, millions of employees could face job losses and Chinese suppliers could lose significant portions of their revenue streams. In addition, should these US companies wind down their local R&D operations, it could hinder China's ability to access these vital networks, potentially damaging its future innovation capacity.

I highly recommend delving into the full report to better understand each company’s ties to China.

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This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following sources: Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology and the Center for Security and Emerging Technology.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

Again, please share, subscribe, and stay tuned for next week’s installment!

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This week, I have three fascinating articles to share with you all. The topics are:

• The urgent need to employ Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs) and how to do so.

• How can NATO impose disproportionate costs on Russia through its maritime forces?

• How does the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine War and US policy toward Russia shape post-war dynamics?

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

The Need for Collaborative Combat Aircraft for Disruptive Air Warfare

By Col. Mark Gunzinger, Maj. Gen Lawrence Stutzriem, and Bill Sweetman

Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report evaluates the potential of uncrewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) to enhance US Air Force air superiority.

Analysis: The methodology involves expert panels from the Air Force and defense industry and analysis of current air superiority challenges. Key data sources include insights from a 2023 Mitchell Institute wargame, historical air combat operations, and assessments of Chinese military advancements.

Argument: The current US Air Force air superiority force structure is inadequate to counter the rapid modernization and expansion of China's air forces and anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. CCAs, by operating collaboratively with crewed fighters, offer a strategic advantage through increased lethality, survivability, and force multiplication, essential for deterring or defeating peer-level threats in the Pacific.

Insights: CCAs can significantly enhance the combat effectiveness of existing air superiority forces by acting as lead forces, decoys, sensors, and weapon platforms. Moreover, the relatively lower cost of CCAs allows for their extensive deployment as expendable or attritable assets, enhancing the Air Force's numerical strength.

Recommendations: The Air Force should expedite the development, testing, and deployment of CCAs to enhance near-term air superiority capabilities. Furthermore, it should conduct analyses to determine the optimal mix of CCAs within the force structure, balancing cost, capability, and operational requirements. Thirdly, the Air Force should prioritize advancements in autonomy and artificial intelligence to increase the operational effectiveness and decision-making speed of CCAs.

This Mitchell Institute report on Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) underscores the pivotal role CCAs play in the contemporary national security environment, where maintaining air superiority is crucial. It articulates that the US Air Force must adopt CCAs to retain its competitive edge, especially given the evolving threat landscape. CCAs, as described, are uncrewed aerial vehicles designed to operate in conjunction with crewed aircraft, offering a cost-effective and versatile addition to the air combat arsenal.

The report starkly illustrates the challenges facing the US Air Force, marked by an aging fleet contrasted against China's rapidly advancing capabilities. It highlights the US reliance on older platforms such as the 44-year-old E-3 AWACS and the F-15C, designed in the 1970s, underscoring the fleet's diminishing lethality and survivability. Moreover, the Air Force's F-22s, capped at 187 units, fall significantly short of operational requirements. In a potential defense scenario of Taiwan against Chinese aggression, experts predict a shortfall in F-15C and F-22 inventories by at least half. Meanwhile, China has comprehensively enhanced its capabilities to challenge US air superiority. For instance, as part of its systems destruction warfare strategy, China has developed the PL-17 — an air-to-air missile with a range of 215nm — to target high-value US aircraft.

Considering this vulnerability, the report elaborates on the strategic advantages of deploying CCAs, detailing their potential to transform air warfare dynamics significantly. CCAs, as outlined, offer the US Air Force the ability to project air superiority "mass" at range, acting as force multipliers by enhancing the lethality and survivability of manned aircraft in contested spaces.

Moreover, CCAs expand the Air Force's counterair operating concepts by offering diverse, less homogeneous force packages that complicate adversary targeting and countermeasures. This flexibility allows for innovative deployment strategies, including the use of expendable CCAs in high-risk initial assaults to degrade enemy air defenses, followed by more survivable systems to maintain pressure.

Importantly, CCAs capable of utilizing short runways or operating independently of runways would facilitate a more distributed and robust forward posture. CCAs can also form interconnected kill webs, enhancing the range of sensing, communication, and weapon nodes around manned stealth aircraft.

“Developing this affordable, uncrewed force will require balancing the ranges, survivability, degree of autonomy, and other attributes of CCA with the missions they must perform. And “affordable” means designing CCA to perform their intended missions for a low enough cost that they can be expended to reduce risks to crewed aircraft if necessary. It does not mean the Air Force can afford to buy combat-credible CCA without additional resources. The service cannot continue to cannibalize its existing capabilities to acquire new systems. hat path would further expand the gap that already exists between the forces the Air Force can provide and its global operational requirements. The need is too great, and the risk is too high to forego taking full advantage of these and other game-changing capabilities.”

To further explore this analysis of CCAs and understand their implications, I highly recommend reading the full report.

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An Asymmetric Approach to the Use of NATO’s Maritime Forces in Competing with Russia

By Dr. Sidharth Kaushal and René Balletta

Royal United Services Institute

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report examines the strategic utilization of Allied maritime power against Russia, emphasizing the maritime domain as a critical yet underexplored vector for deterring Russian aggression.

Analysis: The analysis incorporates desk research on NATO and Russian naval capabilities, alongside a review of Russian military literature to identify perceived vulnerabilities within the maritime domain.

Argument: The report suggests that by leveraging its maritime superiority, NATO can strategically compel Russia to commit resources to its naval defense, thereby constraining its power projection capabilities and ensuring a strategic advantage for the Alliance.

Insights: Russia's maritime strategy heavily relies on deterring adversary strikes and protecting its strategic assets, with less emphasis on traditional naval dominance. However, the Russian navy faces substantial challenges in anti-submarine warfare and long-range precision strike defense, presenting opportunities for NATO.

Recommendations: NATO should prioritize investments in maritime capabilities that exploit Russia's vulnerabilities, such as anti-submarine warfare and long-range precision strikes. It should also develop a cohesive maritime strategy focused on deterring Russian aggression and enhancing the Alliance's ability to project power and protect critical sea lines of communication. Additionally, the report calls for greater integration of naval assets among NATO members to ensure a unified and robust maritime posture capable of countering Russian threats effectively.

This RUSI report provides an essential analysis of NATO's maritime forces in the context of competing with Russia, emphasizing the pivotal role of the maritime domain in shaping strategic balances and deterrence capabilities. It argues that Allied maritime power, through strategic employment and investment, can force Russia to divert resources into maritime defense capabilities, thereby creating a competitive advantage for NATO. This strategic approach not only seeks to counter but also shape adversary investments in the domain.

Russia's strategic calculus within the maritime domain is significantly influenced by a trio of perceived threats that underscore the geopolitical stakes in naval power and deterrence. First, Russia is wary of maritime avenues for long-range precision strikes, a concern rooted in the reach and versatility of naval platforms like the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) and in how precision strike capabilities have effectively paralyzed opponents' military responses in past conflicts. Secondly, as the polar ice caps melt, changes in salinity and increased merchant traffic can obscure Allied military movements and allow for Russia’s SSBN bastions to be penetrated. Finally, the specter of a distant blockade poses a third significant threat, given Russia's heavy reliance on maritime trade.

While these threats warrant substantial allocation of Russia’s defense budget, Russia faces significant conundrums when it comes to countering these maritime threats:

• Substantial Investment Requirements: As its naval platforms are nearing obsolescence, Russia will have to invest in developing new systems. However, advanced maritime platforms for blue-water operations are capital-intensive.

• Technological Weaknesses and Personnel Shortages from Emigration: Russia faces notable weaknesses in critical technological areas, coupled with a shortage of skilled personnel necessary for the operation and maintenance of sophisticated maritime platforms.

• Dependency on Foreign Technologies: Russia requires many foreign inputs for machine tooling and microelectronics, which are essential to building advanced detection systems and long-range effectors.

Given these strategic threats and challenges in the maritime domain, the authors argue NATO has an asymmetric advantage in how it can invest in and employ new technologies and tactics to disproportionately burden Russian planning and budget allocation. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) presents one such opportunity for NATO. Indeed, while Russia possesses a significant number of both conventional and nuclear attack submarines, its defensive ASW capacity remains notably limited. For NATO, then, uncrewed solutions, including uncrewed underwater vehicles for mine emplacement in forward positions and forward surveillance, offer a promising avenue to circumvent traditional ASW constraints. Moreover, leveraging machine learning tools to enhance the efficacy of low-frequency active sonar — a technology once deemed impractical due to its propensity for false positives — could facilitate the use of distant platforms for detection. In addition to developing new tactics and capabilities, NATO could also impel a Russian response by holding training exercises near Russian sea zones that focus specifically on strike operations or increasing the forward activity of SSNs.

“Crucially, however, the question in each instance will be whether the capabilities developed can impose more costs than those required to develop them in the first place. In this, the Alliance will have the advantage of knowing that Russia will have to develop mitigations premised on a worst-case scenario. As illustrated by Russian literature that consistently overemphasizes the scale at which the Alliance can generate long-range strikes, and by both Russian and Soviet responses to prior changes in Alliance posture, it is conceivable that even marginal investments in the areas described will impose disproportionately costly adaptations on Russia.”

In this way, NATO can leverage Russia’s maritime vulnerabilities and invest accordingly to shift the strategic balance in its favor by influencing Russian leaders' pre-conflict perceptions, redirecting scarce resources toward expensive defenses, and shaping war termination conditions should deterrence falter.

I highly recommend reading the full report to dive deeper into the analysis.

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Planning for the Aftermath

Assessing Options for U.S. Strategy Toward Russia After the Ukraine War

By Samuel Charap and Miranda Priebe

RAND Corporation

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report aims to guide US policymakers in considering long-term strategic options toward Russia post-Ukraine war.

Analysis: Utilizing an alternative futures analysis method, the report examines possible post-war scenarios by creating two ideal-type postwar worlds based on the outcome of the Ukraine war and the broader international environment.

Argument: The US must start planning for its post-war strategy toward Russia, considering the potentially significant and lasting impact of its decisions. It suggests that strategic choices made in the aftermath of the Ukraine war will have profound consequences on the future US-Russia relationship, the stability of Europe, and the broader international order. The necessity of a nuanced approach that considers both hardline and less hardline strategies in different post-war contexts is emphasized.

Insights: Hardline US strategies in post-war Europe could inadvertently increase the likelihood of conflict with Russia. Moreover, divisions within NATO over post-war strategy toward Russia could impact the alliance's cohesion and effectiveness.

Recommendations: US policymakers should adopt a strategy that encompasses both deterrence and diplomatic engagement with Russia, with an emphasis on bolstering NATO unity and addressing divisions within the alliance regarding Russia. The report stresses the importance of proactive diplomacy to navigate the Russia-China relationship and mitigate its influence on American strategic interests. Additionally, the report advocates for supporting Ukraine's recovery and defense, urging a pragmatic stance on territorial conflicts with Russia.

This RAND report underscores the imperative for US policymakers to proactively consider the long-term strategy toward Russia amidst the ongoing Ukraine conflict. Recognizing the enduring impact of great powers' post-war decisions, the report aims to guide strategic considerations by presenting a framework to evaluate different postwar scenarios. This effort is critical for navigating the complex post-war landscape, where choices made will significantly influence US national security interests.

The report delineates between less favorable and more favorable war outcomes, focusing on the duration of the war, China's support for Russia, the nature of the war's cessation, and territorial control. A less favorable outcome includes a prolonged conflict with significant support from China to Russia, culminating in a weak ceasefire, whereas a more favorable outcome envisages a near-term conflict resolution with minimal Chinese support to Russia and a robust ceasefire. Next, the report contrasts hardline and less hardline US strategies towards post-war Russia, reflecting on the spectrum of strategic options from confrontational to cooperative stances, tailored to the war's resolution and the broader international context.

Depending on the combination of the war’s outcome and US policy toward Russia, four potential futures are identified:

Future 1: Pervasive Instability

• Context and Strategy: This future is characterized by a less favorable war outcome for Ukraine, leading the US to adopt a hardline approach towards Russia. The aim is to weaken Russia and deter future aggression by imposing sanctions and enhancing NATO's military capabilities.

• Key Dynamics: The risk of NATO-Russia conflict and a nuclear standoff increases. Ukraine focuses on unconventional warfare and military rebuilding, aiming for NATO integration, which remains elusive. Russia responds with its imperialist agenda, increasing its military and informational operations to destabilize Ukraine and challenge US and NATO positions.

• Implications: Economic and military support for Ukraine from some allies diminishes due to concerns about escalating conflict. The global economy trends towards fragmentation, with increased military spending by NATO countries in response to perceived threats from Russia and China.

Future 2: Localized Instability

• Context and Strategy: After a less favorable war outcome, the US shifts to a less hardline approach towards Russia, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific region and addressing global governance issues. The focus is on deterring Russia through defensive support to Ukraine and seeking arms control agreements.

• Key Dynamics: Ukraine adopts a defensive "porcupine strategy" with US support, focusing on economic recovery and democratic resilience. NATO allies are divided on Russia policy, but there's more military support for Ukraine compared to Future 1. Modest progress is made on nuclear arms control, while economic divisions globally do not accelerate.

• Implications: Russia continues to pursue its interests in Ukraine and the broader region but faces strong resistance. The US reduces its military presence in Europe, reflecting a strategic recalibration towards Asia and a desire to stabilize relations with Russia.

Future 3: Cold War 2.0

• Context and Strategy: This scenario unfolds after a more favorable outcome for Ukraine, leading the US to a triumphalist stance. A hardline approach towards Russia is adopted, aiming to capitalize on Moscow's weakness and deter aggression through military and economic pressure.

• Key Dynamics: Ukraine commits to the ceasefire and adopts a forward defense posture, deepening integration with NATO. Economic aid bolsters Ukraine's recovery, but Russia-NATO tensions escalate, prompting increased gray zone activities by Moscow and a new arms race between the US and Russia.

• Implications: The strategic rivalry intensifies, with NATO divisions over strategy towards Russia. Economic decoupling between the West and Russia, along with China, gains momentum, impacting global economic relations and security dynamics.

Future 4: Cold Peace

• Context and Strategy: Following a more favorable war outcome, the US opts for a less hardline approach, seeking to stabilize Europe. The focus is on building a durable ceasefire and facilitating Ukraine's economic recovery and democratic processes through a defensive strategy.

• Key Dynamics: Ukraine's commitment to the ceasefire and defensive rearming, supported by allies, leads to a stable but tense peace. Economic aid and EU integration prospects contribute to Ukraine's recovery. Strategic tensions between the US and Russia ease, and while Russia's influence efforts continue, they do so with less intensity.

• Implications: Europe enters a period of "cold peace," with the new geopolitical division between Russia and the West solidified but stable. Russia and China maintain close relations, and the global economy experiences minimal fragmentation, reflecting a cautious optimism for peace and stability.

The analysis in the report suggests that the US must navigate the post-war period with a strategic foresight that accounts for the intricate balance between deterring Russian aggression and avoiding escalatory cycles that could lead to renewed conflicts. The authors highlight the importance of a nuanced approach that combines strength with diplomatic engagement, tailored to the evolving geopolitical landscape and the specific future scenario that unfolds. In any case, the US strategy must adapt to maintain its global leadership position while ensuring the security and prosperity of its allies and partners.

I urge you to look into the full report to better understand the analysis and insights therein.

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This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following sources: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, Royal United Services Institute, and RAND Corporation.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

Again, please share, subscribe, and stay tuned for next week’s installment!

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In this week’s newsletter, I have two compelling reports to highlight. The topics are:

• How are drones changing the dynamics of conflict between Russia and Ukraine?

• What are the proliferation risks of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)?

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

Evolution Not Revolution

Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

By Stacie Pettyjohn

Center for a New American Security

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report explores the impact of drones on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. It examines the deployment and effects of various types of drones, including military, commercial, and kamikaze drones, in the context of this specific conflict and broader implications for future warfare.

Analysis: Utilizing a mix of primary interviews, think tank reports, social media analysis, and secondary sources, the report provides an in-depth examination of drone warfare's tactical innovations, limitations, and cyclical adaptation between opposing forces.

Argument: While drones have introduced new capabilities and allowed for tactical innovations, their impact falls short of a military revolution. The localized effects of drones, coupled with the rapid adaptation and emulation by both Russian and Ukrainian forces, have prevented either side from gaining a decisive advantage. Moreover, the easy access to commercial drone technologies has further muddled the dynamics on the battlefield, indicating a complex evolution rather than a transformative leap in how conflicts are waged.

Insights: Rather than invest in hardening drone defenses and enhancing their survivability, both militaries are relying on “resiliency through reconstitution” by buying cheap commercial drones en masse. Tactically, drones are used more often for surveillance and targeting missions, as opposed to drone strikes.

Recommendations: Both military and civilian sectors should anticipate continued evolution in drone warfare, emphasizing the need for rapid innovation and countermeasures. The report advises military planners to integrate drone strategies into broader operational concepts and highlights the importance of international cooperation in regulating drone technology.

This CNAS report firmly establishes the critical role of drones in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, underscoring that while drones have significantly impacted tactics and operational strategies, they have not revolutionized warfare in its entirety. Rather, the report emphasizes the evolutionary nature of drone usage in warfare, facilitated by rapid cycles of innovation and adaptation by both Ukrainian and Russian forces.

The report differentiates between commercial and military drones, noting that the former are relatively affordable, whereas the latter boast enhanced survivability, longer range, and overall more advanced capabilities. Thus far, Ukraine has been more efficient in procuring and deploying commercial drones for targeting and surveillance operations:

“Ukrainian drone operations and tactics have evolved over time. In the first few phases of the war, Ukrainian drone teams typically drove to the front lines, found a location to hide, launched their drone, and searched for targets. They usually left when they found Russian forces or exhausted their drone’s battery life. As the conflict progressed and the front lines stabilized, Ukrainian forces have increasingly operated quadcopters in pairs or groups, which provides redundancy and the ability to execute different tasks simultaneously, and have been closely linked to nearby ires units. For instance, the BBC shows two Ukrainian drone operators searching for targets and correcting artillery ire, a mission they can complete even though one drone is lost. At other times, an unarmed quadcopter has looked for targets while an armed quadcopter has loitered nearby, prepared to engage any enemy forces that are found. In December 2022, analyst Sam Bendett noted that Russian soldiers on Telegram were reporting that Ukrainian drone operators had adopted a new tactic to expose Russian targets at night. One drone with a light shining would fly overhead to attract Russian fire, while another drone that was dark and hovering at a different altitude recorded the location of the firing unit.”

With the proliferation of ISR drones along the frontlines, maneuver operations have become increasingly dangerous and forces are hesitant to concentrate themselves. In fact, the report highlights that artillery shells can be deployed within three to five minutes after detection by a drone.

However, Russia has been quick to adapt and emulate Ukraine’s successful tactics with commercial drones, preventing large capability gaps from emerging. Moreover, despite initial supply shortages, Russia now has a strong advantage in the quality and quantity of its military drones, which it uses to see and strike Ukrainian forces further behind the frontlines. Russia’s supply of Orlan-10 and ZALA drones is substantial enough that Ukrainian forces sometimes refrain from shooting them and wasting munitions, as they will be quickly replaced.

Despite targeting and surveillance missions being more prominent, the report notes how drone strikes still play a notable role. For instance, Kamikaze First-Person View (FPV) drones are less potent than conventional anti-tank weapons, but they have a range six times further than advanced anti-tank weaponry. For this reason, a well-placed kamikaze drone poses a legitimate threat to tanks and has influenced how heavy forces maneuver. With respect to deep strategic strikes in enemy territory, Russia more frequently employs drones, specifically with Shahed-136’s.

“Shaheds have played three primary roles in Russia’s strategic strikes: interceptor sponges, pathfinders, and complements…In this role as interceptor sponges, the Shahed kamikazes are similar to decoys that distract defensive ires from the primary weapons…In the pathfinder role, a group of Shaheds are fired at targets, but Russia does not necessarily expect them to complete the strike mission. The main purpose instead is to reveal important information on the posture of Ukrainian SAMs and to help identify air corridors for follow-on missile salvos. Finally, the Shahed drones have complemented the missiles in complex massed missile and drone attacks that are harder to defeat than a homogenous salvo. There have been 29 such attacks. As complements, the Shaheds serve as penetration aids that increase the chance that the missiles reach their targets by confusing and distracting defenders.”

In conclusion, this report illuminates the nuanced impact of drones in the Ukraine conflict, highlighting their significant but evolutionary role in modern warfare through innovative tactics and adaptations by both sides.

To engage with the analysis more fully, I highly recommend reading the full report.

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Assessing Autonomous Weapons as a Proliferation Risk

The Future Has Not Been Written

By Paul O’Neill, Sam Cranny-Evans, and Dr. Sarah Ashbridge

Royal United Services Institute

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: This report examines the proliferation risks associated with Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS), categorizing them into three main types: Minimum Viable Product (MVP), Military Off-the-Shelf (MOTS), and boutique LAWS.

Analysis: The analysis is grounded in a comprehensive literature review and expert interviews, spanning from August 2022 to April 2023. It assesses technological, regulatory, and military factors influencing LAWS proliferation.

Argument: The proliferation of LAWS is inevitable due to the dual-use nature of the underlying technologies and their perceived military benefits. However, the lack of a clear definition for LAWS complicates efforts to regulate and control their spread. Moreover, depending on their sophistication, LAWS pose varying levels of risk and demand different responses from users and regulators.

Insights: MVP LAWS pose the highest risk of proliferation, especially among non-state actors, due to their low development barriers. MOTS LAWS are rapidly proliferating to any actor with sufficient funds, including non-state entities, offering significant battlefield advantages. Boutique LAWS, being highly sophisticated and costly, are less likely to proliferate beyond the most affluent states but pose high destabilization risks.

Recommendations: Military organizations to take a leading role in international discussions on LAWS, advocating for realistic regulation over outright prohibition. In addition, specific uses and outcomes of LAWS, rather than their autonomous nature, should guide regulatory efforts.

This RUSI report on LAWS provides an essential analysis in the evolving context of modern warfare, where autonomous systems are increasingly becoming central to national security strategies. It articulates the varying proliferation risks associated with different categories of LAWS: minimum viable product (MVP), military off-the-shelf (MOTS), and boutique LAWS. By defining LAWS as a spectrum of technologies rather than a monolithic entity, the report emphasizes the nuanced understanding required to grasp their implications for international security and stability. This introduction sets the stage for a comprehensive exploration of the strategic, ethical, and regulatory challenges posed by the advent and spread of autonomous weapons on the global stage.

The report details the proliferation risks of MVP LAWS, highlighting their relative accessibility due to low developmental barriers. Indeed, the dual-use nature of technologies like AI and drone technology can be repurposed for autonomous weapons by individuals and non-state actors with relative ease. Moreover, despite their inherent weaknesses and lower quality compared to more advanced systems, MVP LAWS represent a significant threat due to their potential for asymmetric use. Weaker powers or non-state actors could deploy these systems en masse, exploiting their numbers and autonomy to challenge stronger military forces, thereby altering the dynamics of conflict and deterrence.

As for stronger powers, their militaries will turn toward MOTS LAWS which will be of higher quality. Thus, the proliferation risks of MOTS LAWS are examined through the lens of specific countries:

• China: China's advancement in autonomous technology and its history of international arms sales position it as a significant proliferation challenge. Its defense industry has successfully developed and marketed LAWS internationally, such as the Blowfish A2 drone, highlighting a potential for widespread proliferation.

• Iran: Iran's support for proxy forces and its development of drones with autonomous capabilities underscore its significant proliferation risk. Its willingness to distribute sensitive technologies to allies and proxies enhances its potential impact on regional conflicts and beyond.

• Russia: Russia's development of autonomous weapons, such as the Lancet loitering munition, signals its intent to remain competitive in military technology. Despite potential constraints from Western sanctions, Russia's advancements suggest a commitment to integrating LAWS into its arsenal.

• UAE: The UAE's acquisition of advanced autonomous systems, like China's Blowfish A2 drone, indicates its capability and intent to enhance its military with autonomous technologies, raising concerns about regional proliferation risks.

• Israel: Israel's dual role as a developer and exporter of military technology, including autonomous systems like the Harpy, places it at the forefront of LAWS proliferation, albeit moderated by its strategic relationship with the United States.

• Turkey: Turkey's active development and deployment of indigenous drones and autonomous systems in recent conflicts underscore its engagement with autonomous technologies, potentially influencing regional security dynamics and proliferation trends.

Boutique LAWS, as described in the report, are sophisticated systems designed for specific strategic purposes by major powers. Their high cost and technological complexity make them less susceptible to widespread proliferation. However, the report argues that their existence and potential use carry significant implications for global security, particularly in terms of destabilizing effects and the conveyance of political messages. These systems epitomize the cutting edge of military technology, raising concerns about arms races and the escalation of conflicts through advanced autonomous capabilities.

“The US Air Force Skyborg Programme was established to explore varying degrees of autonomy in human–machine teams. Operating alongside Next Generation Air Dominance, it aims to develop next-generation combat air capabilities, including loyal wingman drones and new command-and-control systems. Others are also developing loyal wingman drones, including Airbus (in Europe), Turkey (Programme Kizilelma), Australia (Ghost Bat) and the UK. China has also joined the fray with its FH-97A, which is orientated towards aerial combat and breaching enemy air defenses. The loyal wingman concepts generally seek to unlock difficult missions for air forces such as augmenting aerial situational awareness in heavily defended airspace, or penetration and suppression of enemy air defenses, which makes them potentially destabilizing, albeit within very specific boundaries.

Creating systems designed to penetrate and defeat national defenses could be destabilizing, but this should not be overstated. Air defense networks are not perfect solutions and are vulnerable to strikes from the air, land and sea. However, it is possible that future iterations of these and other boutique autonomous weapons could lead to fractious international relations. An example might be the potential effects of autonomous weapons designed specifically to hunt and destroy elements of a country’s nuclear deterrent, such as the US Navy’s Sea Hunter, which is designed to conduct autonomous ocean patrols and track enemy submarines.”

Finally, the report offers insights into mechanisms for constraining the proliferation of LAWS, advocating for a regulatory focus on the outcomes and uses of these systems rather than their inherent autonomy. It suggests that international agreements, controls on critical components and software, and restrictions on the dissemination of training data could play pivotal roles in managing the risks associated with LAWS. By differentiating between defensive and offensive uses, such as distinguishing between autonomous air defense systems and those capable of autonomous offensive operations, the report calls for nuanced and outcome-focused regulatory frameworks to prevent the destabilizing proliferation of autonomous weapons.

I highly recommend reading the full report to better understand the risks of LAWS proliferation.

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This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following sources: Center for a New American Security and the Royal United Services Institute.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

Again, please share, subscribe, and stay tuned for next week’s installment!

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This week, I have two insightful reports to share with you all. Their topics include:

• The glaring vulnerability in Russia’s missile production process

• The need to modernize US air and missile defense capabilities, particularly in the Indo-Pacific

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

How does Russia make missiles?

Rhodus Intelligence

Link to Twitter; Link to Substack

Focus: The report examines Russia's missile production capabilities, particularly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It explores how Russia has managed to maintain and even enhance its missile manufacturing despite significant sanctions, focusing on the transition from manual to computer-controlled production processes and the role of imported machine tools.

Analysis: The analysis integrates a broad range of documentary, visual, and narrative sources, including propaganda footage, corporate reports, job listings, procurement databases, industry publications, and online forums. 

Argument: Russia's revived missile production leans heavily on imported computerized machine tools, majorly from Western nations and East Asia. Having lost much of its domestic precision machining skill base following 1991, Russia has relied on European and East Asian computerized machine imports from 2003 onward to plug the gap. Crucially, this import dependence represents a strategic vulnerability that Russia attempts to obfuscate.

Insights: Despite awareness of their import dependence, the Russian government's attempts at import substitution have largely resulted in the obfuscation rather than the replacement of foreign machinery and technology. Moreover, even with potential suppliers like China, there is a notable lack of effective substitutes for Western-manufactured machine tools.

Recommendations: Western governments and their allies should tighten export controls on machine tool imports and advanced manufacturing technologies that could be used in missile production, aiming to more effectively disrupt Russia's military capabilities.

Missiles are the centerpiece of Russian military doctrine, as Russia’s significant missile production capacity allows it to numerically overwhelm adversary defenses. However, this Rhodus Intelligence report provides a critical examination of Russia's missile manufacturing industry, revealing a glaring fact: Russia depends on importing well over 90% of its computerized machining tools necessary for missile production, the vast majority of which are from Western Europe and East Asia. This reliance is not merely a logistical concern but a strategic vulnerability that undermines Russia's autonomy in its military endeavors.

The report explains how while Soviet-era missile production relied on manual machining, the collapse of the USSR and the loss of skilled workers forced missile producers to adapt. To survive the 1990s and early 2000s, missile producers imported European computerized machining tools to automate the machining process and offset the lack of craftsmanship in the new workforce. In the later 2000s, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan bolstered their machining technology and began importing to Russia as well.

However, despite more recent geopolitical tensions, Russia remains importing European and East Asian machining tools at a disproportionately high rate. The report notes that since 2011, Russia's import-substitution policy aimed to boost domestic production of metal-cutting equipment for strategic military needs has largely failed. The policy created a significant gap between the military's demand for machine tools and what the domestic industry could supply, leading to a reliance on disguised imports rather than genuine domestic production. Consequently, despite intentions to foster local CNC machine production, the result has been an obfuscation of imports, with domestic output remaining limited and heavily dependent on European and East Asian technology.

“In contrast to Taiwan and South Korea, China has been seen as an undesirable supplier. First, it was rarely capable of meeting the Russian demand for precision metalworking equipment of consistent quality. Second, it appears that the Russian military plants avoided using Chinese machinery even when the Chinese alternative existed. The deliberate semi-exclusion of China would explain the almost complete invisibility of Chinese machine tools in the Russian missiles industry. It was only with the start of the Special Operation, that the use of Chinese machine tool brands was normalized. Still, China remains a last choice supplier in the high-end sector, the Russian military producers seeking to secure Western European and Japanese, or at least Taiwanese and Korean production whenever possible.”

The report concludes by urging the international community, especially Western countries, to refine sanctions and import controls targeting the machinery and technology that underpin Russia's missile production. By focusing on these strategic chokepoints, it is possible to significantly impact Russia's military manufacturing capabilities, addressing a critical aspect of national and international security.

Follow Rhodus Intelligence on Twitter and Substack to learn more about their analysis and to access the full report.

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Strengthening the Phalanx

Layered, Comprehensive, and Distributed Air and Missile Defense in the Indo-Pacific

By Carl Rehberg and Herbert Kemp

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: This report centers on enhancing air and missile defense in the Indo-Pacific through a comprehensive, layered, and distributed approach. It addresses the evolving threat landscape, particularly from China, and the current limitations of US defenses against mass precision-guided air and missile attacks on forward bases and facilities.

Analysis: The report examines the missile threats from China, assesses the US’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities, and explores concepts for future IAMD, drawing on government reports and expert analysis.

Argument: Current IAMD plans are insufficient against the spectrum of threats posed by China, including advanced ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles, as well as unmanned aerial systems (UAS). A layered, comprehensive, and distributed defense strategy is essential for effective deterrence and defense.

Insights: Missile defense should be reframed as a “salvo competition,” as China can now launch large salvos of missiles against US bases and territory in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, emerging technologies like high-power microwave weapons and gun-based systems can provide cost-effective salvo defense.

Recommendations: See below for the full list of recommendations.

This CSBA report emphasizes the critical challenge the US faces from new Chinese threats in the Indo-Pacific region, underscoring the urgent need to enhance Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) systems. It highlights the significance of adapting to China's advancing capabilities to ensure national security and maintain strategic stability in a vital geopolitical theater.

The author notes how China possesses over 1,250 advanced ballistic and cruise missiles able to strike US bases across the Western Pacific. This includes DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, DF-17 missiles with difficult-to-intercept hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), an array of land-attack cruise missiles launched from H-6 bombers and submarines, as well as increasingly sophisticated unmanned aerial systems (UAS) presenting swarming threats. Consequently, China could unleash devastating salvos combining multiple missile types and trajectories to saturate US defenses.

In terms of the US’s defensive potential, the CSBA report finds critical gaps in the US military's IAMD capabilities: the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) systems do not address emerging hypersonic threats; the Navy lacks comprehensive coverage; the Army faces delays in cruise missile defenses; and the Air Force lacks procurement authority, underscoring inter-service coordination issues. While new joint offices — Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) and the Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO) — have been established, the overall assessment is that the current US IAMD posture remains fragmented, vulnerable to cruise missiles and drone threats, and lagging behind the rapid advancement of Chinese capabilities in these areas.

Importantly, the authors provide a conceptual framework for layered IAMD through concentric “outer,” “inner,” and “close-in” rings:

• Outer Ring: Focuses on long-range detection and engagement of threats far beyond the range of ground-based systems. Technologies and systems in this ring are designed to counter threats before they can reach critical areas, utilizing advanced radar, satellite surveillance, and long-range interceptors.

• Inner Ring: Provides protection for areas immediately surrounding a critical site or base, employing medium-range air and missile defense systems. This layer is designed to intercept threats that penetrate the outer ring, using systems like Patriot and THAAD batteries, UAS, and emerging hypervelocity railguns.

• Close-In Ring: Offers point defense against direct attacks on specific assets within a base or site. This ring utilizes short-range defense systems, including high-power microwaves to disable electronics and laser point defenses to protect against low-altitude, close-proximity threats such as drones, cruise missiles, and low-flying aircraft.

In addition, the report provides the following recommendations to DoD and policymakers:

1. Prioritize and Expedite the Guam Defense System: Continue supporting the Guam Defense System, focusing on capability, cost-effectiveness, and minimal personnel needs. Demand urgency in implementation, address non-material impediments through Congressional hearings, and create a new Guam Master Plan that integrates and prioritizes defense requirements.

2. Integrate Advanced Command and Control Systems: Continue the integration of CEC and IBCS to support battle management and command and control (BMC2), leveraging new JADC2 efforts to enhance tactical C2 capabilities across the services.

3. Deploy Advanced Sensing and Defense Technologies: Field Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) equipped with sensors for persistent detection and early warning of salvo attacks, and develop low-cost kinetic and non-kinetic short- to medium-range defenses, including sUAS/sUAS swarm threats. Integrate high-energy lasers (HELs) and high-power microwave/electronic warfare (HPM/EW) capabilities on UAS for enhanced defense capabilities.

4. Expand High-Power Microwave/Electronic Warfare Defenses: Acquire multiple types of HPM/EW defenses capable of countering UAS swarms, cruise missiles, and other threats, taking advantage of technologies like those demonstrated by the THOR C-UAS program.

To engage with the analysis and recommendations further, I recommend reading the full report.

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***Editor’s note: Much analysis is devoted to identifying promising systems and capabilities for DoD to invest in and acquire. However, with the financial constraints imposed on DoD, many of these efforts cannot be realized. Analyses should consider budgetary restraints first and foremost and look to find solutions within those limits.

This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following source: Rhodus Intelligence and Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

Again, please share, subscribe, and stay tuned for next week’s installment!

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This week, I have two compelling reports to share with you all. The topics are as follows:

• How can militaries leverage human-machine collaboration (HMC) and human-machine teaming (HMT) to reshape battlefield dynamics?

• A survey of 87 experts regarding China’s capabilities and its approach toward Taiwan in 2024 and beyond

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

Leveraging Human–Machine Teaming

Dr. Sidharth Kaushal, Justin Lynch, Juliana Suess, Jung-Ju Lee, Luke Vannurden and Ylber Bajraktari

Royal United Services Institute

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report aims to explore and guide the integration of human-machine collaboration (HMC) and human-machine teaming (HMT) in defense strategies. It specifically targets the operational and strategic enhancement of the US and UK military forces through the adoption of these technologies.

Analysis: The analysis draws on expert input via a series of workshops, a literature review, and consultations. Notable data sources include official defense documents on strategy and capabilities from the US, UK, China, and Russia.

Argument: Effective use of HMC and HMT can offer significant operational advantages in warfare. This includes improved decision-making, cost-effective warfare, and better situational awareness in conflict scenarios. Such integration is vital to maintain a competitive edge against adversaries like China and Russia, who are rapidly advancing in similar domains.

Insights: HMC/HMT can shift risk to machines, enable dispersed operations, and restore mass through attritable systems. However, HMC/HMT will not provide persistent technological superiority like past offsets. Rather, success through HMC/HMT relies more on effective organizational integration.

Recommendations: Defense organizations must implement structural and cultural changes like clarifying risk thresholds, establishing experimental spaces for capability development, and integrating civilian expertise. Political leaders need to define a compelling vision for how HMC and HMT can offset adversary strengths while accentuating enduring asymmetrical advantages rooted in flexible command concepts. Finally, partnerships between the public and private sectors built on incentives and shared priorities are crucial for the rapid development of key enabling technologies and priority capabilities.

In a rapidly evolving global security landscape, the integration of HMC and HMT emerges as a crucial factor in maintaining strategic advantage. HMC focuses on optimizing decision-making through cognitive task-sharing between humans and machines, while HMT extends this collaboration to physical tasks in complex environments. Importantly, this RUSI report explores how militaries can leverage HMC and HMT to reshape the contemporary and future battlefield through six objectives:

1. Absorb and effectively use ever-increasing volumes of data at the operational

   and strategic level

   “Properly programmed and supervised machines, enabled by a data-sharing regime, are well suited to augment human bandwidth, generating better situational awareness and recommending plans. HMC can enable the exploitation of data already within the joint force – much of which is wasted. There is a second way that HMC and HMT can enhance the situational awareness of human operators: by enabling them to get more out of existing sensors. Many existing sensors have the ability to track elusive targets, but they generate false positives – something that can be overcome with ML, which is already being applied to tasks such as radar signal processing. A third way in which machines could enable the use of increasingly advanced commercial capabilities to transfer data is by providing encryption at speed and at a level that would allow data to pass through a commercial network safely. Finally, human and autonomous asset teaming can enable more aggressive data gathering in peacetime.”

2. Develop a faster, higher-quality decision-making cycle

3. Automate routine actions and processes to augment human decision-making

4. Generate physical and virtual effects at scale in heavily denied environments

5. Overwhelm adversary defenses with lower risk to friendly forces

   “Massed machines, assigned tasks by their human teammates, could overwhelm traditional defenses through a combination of sheer volume and attacking on many vectors simultaneously, often at a lower cost in human casualties compared with more traditional offensive operations. They might also supplement crewed platforms by acting as decoys or stand-in jammers.50 Machines could also serve as the ‘eyes and ears’ of their human teammates, particularly in urban warfare, by helping them gain more information about their environment and taking risks in their place.”

6. Penetrate multi-layered defense systems through coordinated, multifaceted approaches

As militaries work toward the above objectives, the report outlines several critical areas where HMC and HMT significantly alter warfighting paradigms:

1. Casualty Rates: By shifting high-risk tasks to machines, HMC and HMT can substantially reduce human casualties in conflict situations.

2. Operational and Strategic Risk Appetite: Enhanced machine participation enables militaries to undertake more aggressive strategies with minimized human risk.

3. Restoration of Mass: HMC and HMT facilitate the deployment of large numbers of cost-effective machines, offering a strategic advantage in mass and presence.

4. Force Composition: These technologies promote a shift towards more specialized human roles and a greater reliance on automated systems.

5. Increased Battlefield Awareness: Advanced sensing and data processing capabilities of machines augment human situational awareness.

6. Changes to Command and Control: HMC and HMT lead to more decentralized and agile decision-making processes, empowering lower echelons with greater autonomy and responsiveness.

The report also notes that the effective deployment of HMT and HMC necessitates a focus on several key areas. These include the development of efficient and user-friendly interfaces for seamless human-machine interaction and the creation of innovative operating concepts that leverage the combined strengths of both. Additionally, the authors call for a specialized workforce trained for new roles, empirical fielded experimentation in structured environments, and crucially, the reform of acquisition processes to integrate emerging technologies swiftly and effectively.

To more holistically understand the role of HMC and HMT in contemporary and future battlefields, I highly recommend reading the full report.

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Surveying the Experts

U.S. and Taiwan Views on China's Approach to Taiwan

By Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Chen Ming-Chi, Shen Ming-Shih, Samantha LuTruly Tinsley, and Yu-Jie (Grace) Liao

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report surveys US and Taiwan experts on their views of China's capabilities and approach toward Taiwan in 2024 and beyond.

Analysis: The authors surveyed 52 US experts and 35 Taiwanese experts with substantial experience in government, academia, or think tanks. 

As cross-strait and US-China tensions reach historic highs, an expert survey from the CSIS provides timely insights into potential Chinese actions against Taiwan. The main takeaways are outlined below:

China’s Capabilities

• A quarantine or blockade is more likely than an invasion in the next five years.

  

• A blockade alone is not sufficient to force unification.

  • Most participants in the survey believed that merely implementing a blockade would be inadequate to compel Taiwan's unification. A significant proportion, about one-third of the experts from Taiwan, expressed concerns that such a blockade might escalate into an invasion.

Key Factors Shaping China’s Use of Force

• If Beijing seeks to punish and coerce Taiwan, a law enforcement-led quarantine is the PRC’s likeliest action.

  • “Both US and Taiwan experts agreed that a quarantine would be the likeliest action if Beijing’s goal is to punish and coerce, but there are important differences in their views. US experts tended to think a quarantine of Taiwan’s outlying islands (such as Kinmen and Matsu) would be the likeliest scenario, with 65 percent saying so. About 66 percent of Taiwan experts also said that a quarantine of outlying islands would be likely; however, 71 percent believed a quarantine of the main island of Taiwan would be likely. In other words, Taiwan respondents thought a quarantine of the main island of Taiwan would be likelier, whereas US respondents believed a quarantine of outlying islands would be slightly more likely. In fact, a slim majority of US experts did not think a quarantine of the main island of Taiwan would be likely under these conditions.”

• If Beijing seeks to immediately force unification, a highly kinetic joint blockade is the PRC’s likeliest action.

  

Taiwan’s and China’s Ability and Willingness to Fight

• Taiwan is unlikely to resist Beijing in the long term without US military intervention.

  • US and Taiwan experts largely agreed that Taiwan could hold out for between one and three months. Only 27% and 29% of US and Taiwan experts believed Taiwan could hold out for longer than three months.

• US experts believe China can sustain a high-intensity conflict for longer.

  • 72% of US respondents believed China could continue large-scale, kinetic operations for more than a year, while only 52% of Taiwan respondents shared the same sentiment

US and Allied Approaches

• There is high confidence in a US Military intervention against a blockade or invasion.

  

• There is limited confidence in US allies and partners to defend Taiwan.

  • “US and Taiwan experts did not share the same level of confidence in US allies and partners to intervene militarily to defend Taiwan—even if they are led by the US military. Of the seven scenarios surveyed, there were only two of these in which a majority of both US and Taiwan experts were completely or moderately confident in military intervention from allies and partners. These were an invasion and a post-failed invasion blockade.”

• Deterring China requires more threats than assurances.

  

Likelihood of a 2024 Taiwan Strait Crisis

• A majority of respondents believe a Taiwan Strait crisis is likely in 2024.

  

• Efforts to stabilize US-China ties will not stave off a Taiwan Strait crisis.

  • “Despite notable efforts by Washington and Beijing to stabilize relations, the bilateral relationship remains fundamentally focused on competition. The November 2023 summit between President Biden and President Xi did not change this. About 75 percent of US experts and 66 percent of Taiwan experts said that the Biden-Xi meeting did not stabilize relations such that it significantly reduced the potential of a Taiwan Strait crisis.”

• China’s economic downturn will not push Beijing to use force against Taiwan.

  • “Less than a third of Taiwan experts and only 21 percent of US experts thought a [economic] slowdown would increase the likelihood of any use of force, including a quarantine, blockade, and invasion.”

I highly encourage you to look into the full report to better gauge experts’ opinions on this important issue.

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This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following source: Royal United Services Institute and Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

Again, please share, subscribe, and stay tuned for next week’s installment!

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This week, I am delighted to share with you two thought-provoking reports. They delve into the following subjects:

• What are the problems hindering the DoD’s adoption of innovative technologies and how can the DoD and Congress fix them?

• How can amphibious forces maintain their effectiveness in the operational environments of the future?

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption

Final report

By Whitney M. McNamara, Peter Modigliani, Matthew MacGregor, and Eric Lofgren

Atlantic Council

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report identifies challenges the DoD faces in adopting innovative technologies into its operations and weapons systems, and it aims to provide recommendations to accelerate DoD's ability to leverage cutting-edge innovations from the commercial sector.

Analysis: The report is based on interviews with over 70 experts across the DoD, industry, and Congress.

Argument: The DoD doesn't lack innovation but faces significant challenges in adopting it for military use. Given the increasing geopolitical tensions and threats posed by rivals like Russia and China, comprehensive reform across the DoD is necessary. 

Insights: Over the past decades, the DoD has shifted from being the primary driver of global R&D to becoming more of a follower, reliant on commercial technologies. Moreover, the DoD's traditional prime contractors are more focused on near-term defense requirements, rather than broad warfighter needs, revealing a misalignment in innovation adoption.

Recommendations: The report offers 10 priority recommendations for DoD leaders and Congress to accelerate innovation adoption. See below for the full list.

In a world where the US faces growing threats from competing powers like Russia and China, this Atlantic Council report emphasizes the urgency for the DoD to fundamentally shift its approach to adopting and integrating new technologies. Historically, US defense technology advancements were driven by government research and traditional defense industries. However, the landscape has shifted, with significant innovation now emerging from commercial, dual-use technology and smaller, nontraditional companies. The report critically examines the DoD's current acquisition system, which is ill-equipped to keep pace with rapid technological advancements, creating barriers to effective collaboration with these innovative sectors.

The authors identify the following challenges to the DoD innovation adoption:

1. Outdated R&D Model: The DoD's processes have not adapted to the reality of reduced federal R&D funding and the increased importance of critical technologies driven by the commercial sector.

2. Long Timelines and Inflexible Execution: The DoD struggles to incorporate new technologies to effectively respond to dynamic threats due to the lengthy development processes currently in place.

3. Fewer Companies Providing Defense Solutions: A shrinking industrial base, driven by complex regulations and high compliance costs, deters new entrants.

4. Valleys of Death: Many innovations fail to transition from the research phase to production, raising questions about the effectiveness of funding numerous defense research organizations.

5. Hamstrung Workforce: A bureaucratic culture focused on excessive compliance limits the DoD’s capacity for innovative problem-solving and discourages the rewarding of creative risks.

6. Program-centric Acquisition: The focus on individual programs and proprietary solutions by prime contractors hinders the adaptability and interoperability necessary for modern defense needs.

7. Cumbersome Reporting from DoD to Congress: Inconsistent documentation impedes Congress's understanding and trust in the DoD's technology adoption.

8. Limited Understanding of Emerging Technology: The DoD struggles to effectively leverage critical emerging technologies, such as biotechnology and quantum information technology, due to a lack of comprehensive understanding among those responsible for generating requirements and drafting proposals.

To illustrate what success should look like, the report offers discreet examples where the DoD rapidly adapted to pressing capability gaps, such as with the Navy's Task Force 59 in the Middle East. Through iterative experimentation and feedback loops with operators, the task force fielded a mix of emerging technologies as a service and forged partnerships with dozens of companies to enhance maritime domain awareness tenfold.

To close the adoption gap, the report provides ten recommendations:

1. Introduce a new capability portfolio model: Empower and resource five PEOs through a new capability portfolio model to break down barriers with industry.

2. Consolidate program elements: Consolidate program elements and budget line items to simplify budget submissions and allow greater flexibility.

3. Reset reprogramming authorities: Modify reprogramming authorities to historical norms to streamline the process and enable greater flexibility.

4. Modernize the DoD: Elevate the Defense Innovation Unit to better align and harness the nontraditional defense industrial base.

5. Strengthen capital market alignment: Create pathways to better leverage capital market funding for defense innovation.

6. Incentivize tech companies: Increase incentives like higher procurement budgets and reduce barriers like security clearance backlogs.

7. Modernize budget documents: Streamline and modernize budget justification documents to focus on concise overviews.

8. Bridge funding: Allocate funds to scale successfully demonstrated innovative technologies.

9. Scale the SDA model: Adopt the Space Development Agency model more broadly for rapidly fielding capabilities.

10. Modernize requirements: Establish a team to overhaul outdated defense requirements processes.

The authors acknowledge the DoD and Congress have made progress in implementing some of these recommendations. However, continued effort and commitment are essential to fully realize the potential of these recommendations. The successful implementation of all ten recommendations is pivotal for the US to swiftly deploy cutting-edge technology at scale, thereby ensuring a robust posture against evolving threats and maintaining global leadership in defense innovation.

I highly recommend reading the full report to better analyze the challenges and recommendations therein.

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Amphibious Futures

The Royal Marines in Contested New Operating Environments

By Dr. Sidharth Kaushal and Brigadier Mark Totten

Royal United Services Institute

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report aims to identify key adaptations necessary for Western amphibious forces, particularly the UK's Royal Marines, to remain effective in future operational environments. 

Analysis: The analysis draws on historical literature, operations research, and insights from exercises and wargaming conducted under the Royal Marines' Future Commando Force program.

Argument: Western maritime forces face undeniable challenges to maneuvering and maintaining a presence in littoral (coastal) spaces. However, rather than ceding control of these areas or allowing wider separation from joint forces, these challenges can be proactively addressed. Doing so requires rethinking both force design and military tactics and procedures at a fundamental level.

Insights: Employing small, dispersed teams of marines across a wide littoral area can greatly expand the space an adversary must monitor and make it harder for them to concentrate sensors and defenses. Moreover, repurposing amphibious connectors as multifunctional strike platforms rather than just transport could enhance overall firepower.

Recommendations: The report makes several key recommendations for the Royal Marines and wider UK defense establishment. They are outlined below.

This RUSI report provides a compelling analysis of how amphibious forces can remain relevant in future operational environments increasingly shaped by anti-access/area denial capabilities. As the authors cogently argue, while amphibious forces have historically provided invaluable strategic flexibility and operational maneuverability, they will need to integrate with naval forces conceptually and equip themselves differently to retain their utility.

The report astutely identifies the undiminished significance of amphibious forces in modern military strategy, categorizing their roles into two primary functions crucial for UK national priorities: expeditionary power projection and sea control missions. These roles extend well beyond the NATO area of responsibility, underscoring the global reach and strategic importance of amphibious forces.

“Amphibious capabilities can play a role in deterrent signaling. By virtue of the visibility of their supporting vessels, they represent a visible diplomatic signal. However, amphibious forces are scalable – a portion of a force can be deployed ashore while the rest remains offshore, for example. They can also be withdrawn from a theatre as diplomatic circumstances dictate, meaning that their deployment need not represent a commitment that is difficult to reverse. Scalability is important, as a key dimension of deterrence is that it must be balanced against efforts to mitigate misperception – an opponent should be able to distinguish between a deterrent threat and preparations for an attack. Moreover, the coordination of military means with diplomacy also necessitates the ability to demonstrate that a threat can be withdrawn if an opponent complies.”

However, the paper doesn't shy away from addressing the burgeoning challenges these forces face. The authors note the mounting difficulties in theater entry, the implications of increasingly urbanized littorals, and the heightened resource burdens on fleets. These challenges are not only tactical but also pose significant strategic and logistical implications, necessitating a reevaluation of operational doctrines and resource allocation strategies.

“Once forces are disembarked, amphibious forces’ lodgements ashore will be at considerable risk, and the operational pauses needed to build up capabilities will likely prove fatal. A range of capabilities, including tactical ballistic missiles, artillery UAVs and glider-equipped unguided bombs, such as the Russian FAB-500, launched from fixed-wing aircraft, will threaten disembarked forces. Of course the risk posed by operational pauses has long been a persistent feature of amphibious campaigns. But the diversification of air and missile threats will make protecting a lodgement even more difficult than it has been previously.”

In response to the evolving threat landscape and operational challenges, the report proposes a suite of innovative approaches to ensure the continued relevance of amphibious forces. It advocates for a strategic shift in operations, focusing on the wide distribution of forces along the littoral front to sustain a high operational tempo and achieve strategic goals. Moreover, the report emphasizes the adoption of strike-centric concepts, which entail using distributed forces with long-range capabilities to create convergent effects.

Further recommendations include:

• The Royal Marines should transition to a more specialized force optimized for strike and raiding functions. This includes adopting a distributed tactical model based around 12-person teams supported by long-range precision fires.

• Core capabilities like communications, logistics, mobility, and deception measures should be upgraded to support dispersed operations. Specific technologies to explore include mesh networking, counter-electromagnetic warfare systems, modular connector vessels, and multispectral signature management.

• Conceptually, amphibious operations should fall under naval strike and sea control missions, rather than be treated separately. Force generation and planning should align the Royal Marines with routine naval deployments and operations.

• Institutionally, the UK Ministry of Defence needs to enable better integration of the Royal Marines into naval operations through changes to planning assumptions, budgets, and cross-component coordination.

To engage with the analysis more comprehensively, I urge you to read the full report.

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This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following source: Atlantic Council and Royal United Services Institute.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

Again, please share, subscribe, and stay tuned for next week’s installment!

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This week, I'm excited to present two enlightening reports for your consideration. They cover the following topics:

• How "on-chip governance mechanisms" could allow for more effective and flexible governance of AI systems over time.

• What are potential defense capabilities that can address the escalating challenge posed by China in the Western Pacific region

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

Secure, Governable Chips

Using On-Chip Mechanisms to Manage National Security Risks from AI & Advanced Computing

By Onni Aarne, Tim Fist and Caleb Withers

Center for a New American Security

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report focuses on the concept of "on-chip governance mechanisms" - technical restrictions and verification capabilities built into AI chips that could allow for more effective and flexible governance of AI systems over time.

Analysis: The analysis revolves around the feasibility and implementation of on-chip governance mechanisms as a solution to AI governance challenges, relying on data and examples from current technology practices in companies like Apple and NVIDIA.

Argument: On-chip mechanisms could enable more surgical, end-user-focused export controls for powerful AI chips, avoiding broad restrictions that harm US competitiveness. They also could support the verification of future multilateral agreements restricting the development of dangerous AI systems.

Insights: On-chip governance mechanisms to enable adaptive governance in the AI domain, as new security regulations arise. Moreover, much of the needed functionality for on-chip governance is already in place in various chips, including cutting-edge AI chips. Thirdly, these mechanisms don't require invasive monitoring or insecure backdoors, but rather can be implemented through privacy-preserving verification and operating licenses.

Recommendations: The report recommends a multi-faceted approach to implement on-chip governance. See below for the full list of recommendations.

This timely CNAS report introduces the concept of "on-chip governance mechanisms" - secure physical mechanisms built directly into AI chips that provide a platform for adaptive governance of AI systems. As the national security risks from AI continue to rapidly evolve, flexible tools like this will be needed to effectively govern dual-use technologies without compromising American technological leadership.

The core of the article’s proposal is a hardened "security module" included on all high-performance data center AI chips. It relies on security features like secure boot, which verifies firmware integrity, and remote attestation, which uses digital signatures to authenticate measurements about the chip’s state. Specifically, remote attestation allows the module to securely verify claims about chip usage and location that can be trusted by a third-party regulator or manufacturer. For example, attestation could convey how much compute was used to train an AI model, without revealing proprietary code or data. Moreover, the module works in tandem with a timed operating license requiring periodic renewal. Failure to renew this license can remotely disable access to the GPU or other sensitive chip functions, providing an enforcement mechanism for policies. For instance, export-controlled chips could have their license revoked if end-use terms are violated. Importantly, many building blocks for these on-chip governance capabilities already exist on commercial chips from firms like NVIDIA, Apple, and Intel.

The report underscores how on-chip mechanisms allow more targeted controls regarding end-use, as compared to sweeping export regulations that risk "de-Americanizing" supply chains. This surgical approach reduces the need for broad, top-down bans while enabling policies like verifiably tracking the usage of AI chips. The existence of on-chip governance could also facilitate flexible international AI governance agreements in the future.

“Implementing these features on AI chips provides a platform for adaptive governance. These features would allow for a wide range of policies (for example, a training compute reporting requirement above a certain threshold, as called for by the recent White House executive order) to be implemented and updated directly on the chip by simply deploying a firmware or software update…These technical features ideally would be supported by robust supply chain tracking and “Know Your Customer” policies for AI chip exports/sales, which would allow the controller to know which chips are being used by which actors. This system of supply chain tracking also could include periodic monitoring and inspections to ensure that any novel attempts to physically tamper with chips can be caught.”

However, realizing the potential of on-chip governance requires ensuring these mechanisms reliably function even when adversaries actively attempt to circumvent them, such as in export control enforcement contexts. This necessitates hardening the security of existing technologies beyond their current commercial forms. The report advocates a staged approach to development and rollout that allows intermediate R&D to still serve production use cases. Initially, firmware updates could deploy basic operating license restrictions to exported AI chips, tying licenses to export terms. Subsequent generations would become tamper-evident, leaving indelible proof of physical tampering attempts. Finally, mechanisms would progress towards tamper-proofing on par with high-assurance hardware security modules. This gradual escalation in security allows on-chip governance to be tested and deployed in minimally adversarial settings while more mature tamper-resistance is developed for eventual application in openly adversarial contexts.

To achieve these goals, the report outlines several recommendations:

1. Establish government coordination: An executive order should be issued to create a NIST-led interagency working group focused on incorporating on-chip governance mechanisms into all export-controlled data center AI chips.

2. Create commercial incentives: The Department of Commerce should use advance export market commitments to incentivize US chip designers to conduct the necessary R&D.

3. Accelerate security R&D: NIST should coordinate with industry and government funding bodies to support R&D conducted outside leading chip companies, with a focus on technologies that would benefit from industry-wide standardization.

4. Plan for a staged rollout and extensive red-teaming: The Department of Commerce and the Department of Homeland Security should establish flexible export licensing and red-teaming programs to ensure the proper design and safe introduction of on-chip governance mechanisms.

5. Coordinate with allies: The State and Commerce Departments should work with allies on policies and standards for on-chip governance.

6. Encourage AI chip firms to move early: Chip firms should be motivated to build and harden the required security features for on-chip governance

I highly recommend reading the full report to better understand the technology behind on-chip governance and its potential implications.

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Security in the Western Pacific

Building Future Capabilities in the Time of AUKUS

By Mark F. Cancian

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: This report examines future defense capabilities needed to deal with the rising challenge from China in the Western Pacific, with a focus on the AUKUS agreement and its technology-sharing aims. Specifically, it looks at capabilities to pursue while waiting for an expanded submarine fleet, given constraints on submarine production.

Analysis: The report analyzes wargaming scenarios related to a Chinese invasion, blockade, or gray zone campaign against Taiwan, as well as assessments of capabilities valuable in the Russia-Ukraine war. The report’s data sources include US Navy shipbuilding plans, proposed fleet architectures, and Congressional testimony.

Argument: Although strategists want more attack submarines to compete with China, industrial base constraints mean the submarine fleet will decline through the 2030s before recovering. With the "submarine gap," the US and its allies need to explore other capabilities in the near/mid-term across various domains, such as large UUVs, electronic warfare, sea mines, aircraft hardening, and missile defense.

Insights: AUKUS implementation faces barriers like export controls and data exchange restrictions that could hinder technology sharing. Moreover, with many potential avenues to pursue, industry needs signals on where to focus attention and resources.

Recommendations: The author recommends governments and industry pursue a spectrum of capabilities that enhance submarine effectiveness, counter air threats, defend ships, and support allied interoperability. This includes large UUVs, upgraded missile defenses, advanced countermeasures, coalition training contractors, forward rearming, and hardened infrastructure. Ultimately, testing multiple approaches would reveal promising areas for further investment.

As China continues its sizable military modernization evident in a naval fleet now larger than the US Navy and ground-based missiles that may outrange US systems, this CSIS report is critical for the defense industry and governments in identifying future capabilities to address the increasing challenge from China. It highlights the significance of the AUKUS agreement as a major development in this context. However, while strategists aim to expand submarine numbers, the current US fleet will not see substantial growth until the 2040s, necessitating alternative strategies to manage this gap. The report thus examines wargames and the Ukraine war to identify ways for the United States and its partners to address this challenge.

Wargames from CSIS, RAND, and CNAS reveal priority capability gaps the US and its allies must address to prevail in potential Western Pacific contingencies. Specifically, submarines boast unique survivability to strike behind enemy lines but lack the long-range missiles needed to fully capitalize on this advantage. Bombers can wield abundant standoff munitions yet remain acutely dependent on secure basing locations to even participate against Chinese missile barrages. Thirdly, uncrewed aerial and underwater platforms frustrate adversaries through dispersion and stealth, but they require supporting technologies and operational concepts optimized for Pacific distances.

Meanwhile, the Ukraine war spotlights additional deficiencies that demand urgent redress. Firstly, insufficient munitions quantities force difficult tradeoffs after months of supplying Ukraine has drained US inventories. In addition, atrophied industrial capacity precludes the surge production essential to wage the extended, intense war envisioned in a US-China conflict. Furthermore, the challenges in maintaining logistics under contested conditions call for innovative platforms and strategies to extend combat effectiveness, which is further complicated by gaps in interoperability among allies. Finally, deployable command systems and expanded training capacities must cultivate the coalition integration that any contingency spanning Australia to Japan would require.

Still, promising near and mid-term efforts can mitigate these shortfalls as the US and its allies await delayed expansions of attack submarine fleets. For one, uncrewed underwater vehicles would multiply manned submarines’ striking capacity inside Chinese defensive bubbles. Dispersed basing complicates targeting of what bombers remain in theater. Upgraded missile defense and electronic warfare tools enable surface ships and aircraft to operate at acceptable risk deeper into enemy battle networks. Essentially, collectively employing capabilities across domains, functions, and geographies accrues advantage to hedge against China’s military modernization until longer-range plans come to fruition.

The author notes further areas to explore including:

“Bring more forces to bear more effectively:

• Deployable command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) packages would allow US forces to link more effectively with allies and partners.

• Operational contracting can supplement limited military logistics units in providing the logistics needed to cover the vast expanses of the Pacific.

Plan to operate in a hostile environment:

• Building hardened aircraft shelters would protect aircraft remaining at large bases during conflict.

• Assisting Taiwan in developing a balanced force with both traditional and asymmetric capabilities would hedge against the spectrum of threats it faces, from gray zone harassment to invasion.

Hedge against unconventional threats:

• Stronger countermine capabilities, long neglected by the U.S. Navy, would protect against a common adversary tactic.

• Counter-swarming capabilities would allow military and civilian ships to continue operations without resorting to lethal force against harassing elements.

Defend against air threats in all their manifestations:

• Expanding and fielding systems to counter adversary UASs would protect friendly forces from adversary reconnaissance and attack amid the ubiquity of such systems on the battlefield, and defensive systems against aircraft are generally too expensive for this use.

Think offensively, even when on the defensive:

• Enhanced jamming and counter-C3I would disrupt China’s ability to coordinate forces.

• Sea mines with standoff capabilities can emplace minefields with less risk to the launch platforms.

• UASs can perform missions that are too dangerous, extended, or monotonous for crewed platforms.”

To better engage with the range of analysis on security in the Western Pacific, I urge you to read the full report.

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This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following source: Center for a New American Security and Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

Again, please share, subscribe, and stay tuned for next week’s installment!

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This week, I have two insightful reports to share with you all. Their topics include:

• How will advances in biotechnology change the future nature of warfare and what are their strategic implications

• An analytical approach for comparing how the US and China are developing critical military technologies

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

Plagues, Cyborgs, and Supersoldiers

The Human Domain of War

By Luke J. Matthews, Mary Lee, Brandon De Bruhl, Daniel Elinoff and Christopher A. Eusebi

RAND Corporation

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report examines the strategic implications of recent advances in biotechnology for warfare, particularly focusing on engineered pathogens, Internet of Bodies (IoB) technologies, and genomics.

Analysis: The report utilizes a mix of qualitative and quantitative analyses. Data sources include published literature, patent analysis, and expert consultations.

Argument: Ongoing innovation in biotechnology poses risks and opportunities for warfighting, with the United States well positioned in some areas but lacking in others compared to strategic competitors. 

Insights: Certain cultural values make countries differentially able to control the spread of dangerous pathogens, and the US is relatively disadvantaged in these cultural factors. Moreover, China is rapidly catching up to the United States in areas like brain-computer interface patents.

Recommendations: The report provides both near- and long-term recommendations for US policymakers. See below for the full list.

This RAND report underscores how biotechnology could fundamentally reshape conflict, as developments in engineered pathogens, Internet of Bodies (IoB) devices, and genomics confer both unprecedented opportunities and risks. While the human body is not necessarily a new warfighting domain, the report projects an intensifying biotechnology arms race that deeply links human bodies with national security.

On engineered pathogens, the report highlights their significant potential as covert strategic weapons, especially if coordinated with kinetic actions. Indeed, a transmissible pathogen’s intrinsic ambiguity makes attribution difficult. Meanwhile, a pathogen can deplete a country’s forces, disrupt its supply chains, and generally degrade its warfighting capabilities. The report also underscores how cultural values influence a country’s ability to resist a pathogen’s spread, as countries with less cultural tightness and higher cosmopolitanism — like the US — are more vulnerable.

Furthermore, emerging IoB technologies, like wearables, implants, and brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), offer warfighting benefits. With IoB technologies, the services could better track soldiers’ fitness, commanders could communicate more efficiently, and soldiers could control systems with BCIs if they lost the use of a limb. However, IoB technologies also expose risks. Specifically, the report notes scenarios where artificial lenses open up espionage opportunities and hacking BCIs in policymakers could affect their moods, altering their decision-making and the US international reputation. Morover, the IoB field grows evermore critical because China is rapidly closing the gap with the US when it comes to IoB development.

In terms of genomics, the report discusses the potential of genomic enhancement to increase soldier endurance, although this is a distant capability. However, more imminent genomic surveillance technology to screen recruits' genetic propensities could optimize assignments to specialized roles. As for research dominance, the US has historically led in genomics, but China is making serious strides in key areas such as sequencing, proteomics, and gene editing, potentially challenging U.S. supremacy in this field.

“Should the challenges of genome-phenome associations be solved in the near future, then genomic data may be useful to identify traits in warfighting forces that could be used in a predictive sorting model. For example, if a nation-state needed to employ a military draft and the relevant genomic and phenotypic data were adequately collected and stored, then a learning algorithm might sort candidates into the proper class of job for the term of service or perhaps develop a hierarchy of associated jobs using demand. These data, properly collected, can be crosswalked with other data sources to identify key traits for recruitment. Genomic surveillance will only be a value-add, however, if it predicts potential or future phenotypic traits that are not easily observable through phenotype itself. For example, a genetic test that predicted height or strength would seem relatively useless because these features are more easily and inexpensively observed in the phenotype directly. In contrast, a genetic test that predicted the potential for an individual to master a specialized BCI after weeks or months of training might be highly valuable if this future potential were not readily observable phenotypically.”

To aptly prepare for the risks of biotechnology, the report prescribes several near- and long-term recommendations.

Near-Term Recommendations:

1. Revise the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) to include stronger protections like independent monitoring of high-risk labs.

2. Pursue bilateral bioweapon treaties with countries on the advantaged side of bioweapon use or divest from supporting their biolabs.

3. Continue scrutinizing adversary biotechnology advancements for BWC violations.

4. Resist anti-vaccine populism that compromises military readiness.

5. Be vigilant about entities that misuse biotechnologies and enhance IoB device security.

6. Allocate funding to identify and manage genomic surveillance risks and opportunities.

7. Develop guidance on integrating biological warfighting capabilities across services and with allies.

Long-Term Recommendations:

1. Develop warfighting conventions on the use of invasive bioelectronic devices like brain-computer interfaces.

2. Develop ways to employ genomic surveillance to improve military personnel selection and assignment.

3. Encourage research on strategies to anticipate and counter adversary biotechnology threats.

To better engage with the analysis and insights, I highly recommend reading the full report.

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Comparative Analysis of U.S. and PRC Efforts to Advance Critical Military Technology

Volume 1, Analytic Approach for Conducting Comparative Technology Assessments

By Sarah Harting, Daniel Gonzales, Michael J. Mazarr and Jon Schmid

RAND Corporation

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report is centered on developing a methodology to compare US and People's Republic of China (PRC) efforts in advancing critical military technologies.

Analysis: The analysis integrates multiple methods, including literature reviews, quantitative data analysis, and expert engagements. Key data sources include government reports, scientific publications, patents, and technology assessments.

Argument: Effectively comparing complex innovation ecosystems requires a multidisciplinary approach that accounts for the technological, operational, economic, organizational, and other factors shaping technology development and deployment.

As the high-stakes technology competition between the US and China intensifies, the defense community urgently requires an analytical framework to comprehensively compare critical military technology development between the two rivals. This RAND report offers precisely such an invaluable approach. The report outlines a rigorous 5-part process to assess and compare critical technology development in both countries across areas like directed energy, hypersonics, biotech, and more.

The first task focuses on establishing a contextual baseline for each discrete technology area under examination. This entails framing the strategic rationales behind pursuit in both countries, delineating precise definitions and scope, identifying essential components for transitioning to operational systems, and evaluating current status and trends. This groundwork crucially anchors the ensuing comparative analysis.

The second task focuses on evaluating the research and development activities underway, using an innovative model that examines the national innovation ecosystems sustaining technology advancement. The model incorporates metrics across 15 elements like research funding, organizational infrastructure, technology transition processes, and testing infrastructure. For example, the report suggests measuring patent output as one indicator of development progress.

The third task centers on gauging the operational effectiveness of critical technology systems once fielded. This entails defining the operational problems each country aims to solve with the technology, the specific military missions and tasks it would support, the feasibility and significance of its contributions, and factors affecting costs and survivability against countermeasures. Directed energy technology for air and missile defense offers one case for analysis.

The fourth task involves identifying and assessing countermeasure systems that could defeat, degrade, or mitigate a critical technology capability. The dimensions for evaluation include descriptions of current and emerging countermeasures, the extent of their operational use, and challenges posed by their technical complexity and integration.

Lastly, the cross-cutting fifth task accounts for international R&D activities, knowledge gaps, analytical limitations, and recommendations to address them to enable continual refinement of future comparative assessments.

This framework promises to benefit policymakers and DoD leadership as they navigate intense great power technological competition. I highly encourage you to read the full report and stay tuned for the follow-up comparative analysis.

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This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following source: RAND Corporation.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

Again, please share, subscribe, and stay tuned for next week’s installment!

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In this first installment of 2024, I have a suite of compelling reports for you all. Their topics are:

• The various tradeoffs in designing space and airborne sensor architectures for missile defense

• Russia’s critical vulnerabilities in the defense, economic, diplomatic, and political domains and how the West can exploit them

• How to evolve US security cooperation approaches in an era of great power competition

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

Getting on Track

Space and Airborne Sensors for Hypersonic Missile Defense

By Masao Dahlgren

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report focuses on the need for an advanced sensor architecture to detect, identify, and track missile threats.

Analysis: The analysis draws on simulations, optimization studies, and modeling conducted by the CSIS Missile Defense Project to evaluate design tradeoffs in constellation design, assess coverage, and analyze sensor performance.

Argument: Current missile defense capabilities are insufficient against modern missile threats, particularly hypersonic missiles. An effective architecture should be orbitally diverse, deploy sensors gracefully starting with regional coverage, and incorporate both space and airborne sensors.

Insights: Proliferated low-earth orbit (LEO) constellations are vulnerable to systemic threats like space debris, cyber attacks, and nuclear detonations. Moreover, airborne sensors could provide useful regional coverage to complement space-based sensors. Importantly, as sensor architecture becomes more complex, the development of sensor fusion software is an underappreciated schedule risk.

Recommendations: The report recommends a disciplined approach to acquiring the new sensor architecture, emphasizing the need for policy oversight to ensure schedule discipline, orbital and systems diversity, and adherence to missile defense requirements. Congress and the DoD should avoid temptations to optimize for coverage efficiencies at the expense of resilience and schedule. More specifically, they should explore persistent regional airborne sensors and accelerate investments into multi-sensor data fusion and common data standards to mitigate schedule risk.

The proliferation of advanced ballistic and hypersonic missiles has heightened the urgency of developing an effective space sensor architecture for missile tracking and defense. As this CSIS report compellingly argues, “One cannot defend against what one cannot see.” Neither legacy warning systems nor surface radars can address emerging challenges like high-speed maneuvering weapons with unpredictable trajectories. Without robust space-based tracking, missile defense is fundamentally handicapped.

The report notes there is no perfect sensor architecture design. Rather, architects face complex trade-offs related to orbital regimes, sensor types and configurations that reflect policy assumptions and priorities. Each orbit offers advantages and disadvantages regarding coverage, cost, and resilience.

“LEO constellations benefit from proliferation and economies of scale but suffer challenges with persistence, orbital lifespan, and relative motion. MEO constellations offer more coverage and persistence but require potentially costlier satellites with larger apertures and radiation-hardened subsystems. GEO and HEO satellites provide unique coverage characteristics, requiring few satellites to selectively cover a given pole or longitude, but generate high unit costs and stringent reliability requirements. Airborne sensors can generate persistence unbounded by spacecraft orbital mechanics but have smaller detection footprints and require appropriate basing locations to operate.”

Likewise, sensor selection involves balancing factors like field-of-view, resolution, integration times, and fixed vs. mobile configurations. For one, wide field-of-view sensors can minimize the number of satellites needed but may sacrifice image resolution. Ultimately, the report argues a diversified architecture is prudent, leveraging multiple orbits and sensors so that adversaries must develop varied countermeasures.

As for the DoD’s current efforts, the author acknowledges several initiatives are underway. The planned Resilient Missile Warning/Missile Tracking (RMW/MT) constellation combines low and medium Earth orbit assets for complementary global coverage. In addition, the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) and Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) represent significant steps in developing a comprehensive system for missile defense. With that being said, how these efforts are unified and scaled remains an open question.

Overall, the report identifies three main temptations in the development of sensor architecture that must be avoided. First, fire control missions enabling intercept guidance should not be abandoned despite technical hurdles. Secondly, constellations solely optimized for global sensor coverage risk delays fielding useful regional capability against priority threats. Finally, architectures consolidated into a single orbital regime invite disruption compared to diversified approaches.

The report incisively details the pressing need for elevated missile tracking, surveying available near-term technology options while clarifying longer-term pitfalls that could undermine this essential, emerging capability. I highly recommend reading the full analysis.

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Identifying Russian Vulnerabilities and How to Leverage Them

By Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Richard Connolly, Siemon Wezeman, Gavin Wilde, Elina Ribakova, Benjamin Hilgenstock, Edward Fishman, Eric Ciaramella, Paul Stronski, Peter Schroeder, Timothy Frye and Maria Snegovaya

Center for a New American Security

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report focuses on identifying critical vulnerabilities in Russia's defense, economic, diplomatic, and political domains after the invasion of Ukraine, aiming to inform US and allied strategies.

Analysis: The report leverages a variety of data sources, including economic reports, defense industry analyses, and political assessments. It comprehensively examines Russia's dependencies on foreign technologies, economic sanctions impacts, military capabilities, and the state of its political and diplomatic relations.

Argument: Russia has significant weaknesses across different areas that the West has not fully taken advantage of. By targeting these pressure points, the US and its allies can undermine Russia's capacity for aggression in Ukraine and beyond its borders.

Insights: The exodus of IT professionals and reliance on foreign technology, especially for cybersecurity and military technology, signal a decline in Russia's technological self-sufficiency. Moreover, Russia's actions in Ukraine have strained relationships with key regions like Central Asia and the South Caucasus, diminishing its diplomatic influence. Thirdly, Russia's arms export industry is set to decline due to competition, the loss of key markets, and its inability to produce next-generation weapons.

Recommendations: The US and its allies should tighten technology export controls to impact Russia's defense and cyber capabilities; strengthen sanctions, particularly in the financial and energy sectors; support Russian civil society and independent media to foster internal dissent; and deepen engagement with countries in Russia's periphery to reduce its regional influence.

This CNAS report provides a comprehensive analysis of Russia's current vulnerabilities across various domains, crucial for understanding the national security landscape. By examining Russia's weaknesses in defense, economic, and political-diplomatic areas, the authors offer insights into how these vulnerabilities could be leveraged. Only through applying steady, forceful counterpressure against these fault lines can the West hope to roll back Russian aggression, facilitate gradual political change, and potentially enable more constructive relations with Russia.

The report first highlights several vulnerabilities in Russia's defense sector. These include a heavy reliance on imported components for weapon production, which makes Russia susceptible to supply restrictions. Additionally, the need to replenish its own arsenal and the impact of Western sanctions have complicated Russia's arms sales, a crucial revenue source. The report also notes the challenges faced by Russia's technology and cyber industries due to the loss of access to vital technology and talent, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine.

“Cyber power on the global stage draws from the interplay between state, commercial, human, and technical capacities. Russia now risks running major deficits in all these areas in the coming years. The private-sector ecosystem to develop and test new digital toolsets is now losing both institutional heft and investment capital. The domestic telecommunications infrastructure to both deploy and exfiltrate such toolsets is losing pace with global standards. Data storage capacity is reportedly at critically low levels, as is the country’s share of young, entrepreneurial, tech-savvy workers. R&D spending remains relatively stagnant. Russia has burned through a significant number of offensive cyber toolsets against Ukraine with little strategic impact—other than a much more resilient adversary—to show for it. Under such conditions, Moscow may be able to redirect dwindling digital and human resources toward the military and security services but will nonetheless have to run faster just to stay in place.”

Equally prominent are weaknesses in Russia’s undiversified, oil and gas-dependent economy which leaves national revenues vulnerable to sanctions pressure and fluctuations in global energy markets. Although high commodity prices buffered Russia in 2022, widening deficits and overreliance on its energy income stream spell trouble. Furthermore, Western sanctions and accompanying Russian capital controls continue to limit normal central bank operations and private sector access to foreign credit and investment. While Russia’s financial system has proven quite resilient so far, underlying issues remain that sanctions could still amplify.

“Ukraine’s sudden emergence as a soft power juggernaut also spells long-term trouble for Russia. Ukrainian activists have forced Russian musicians and performers who want to continue working in the West to denounce the war or else face a boycott. Ukrainian officials and athletes are cajoling the West into freezing Russian and Belarusian athletes out of international sporting competitions, especially the 2024 Olympics in Paris. Russian soft power was already on the decline before the invasion; Ukraine will make sure it is dead and buried.”

The report additionally calls attention to several mounting political and diplomatic vulnerabilities, highlighting the regime’s declining regional influence in Central Asia and the growing domestic discontent over the failures of the war effort. Russian diplomacy itself has become a liability rather than an asset, losing strength globally with reduced avenues to punch above the country's modest geopolitical weight. Lastly, Russia’s long-standing problem with ‘brain drain’ has intensified, as over 800,000 educated Russians have fled since the invasion, jeopardizing the country’s economic, technological, and military competitiveness.

While the report offers a range of recommendations, the overarching suggestion is for the United States and its allies to exploit these vulnerabilities strategically. This involves maintaining pressure on the defense industry, leveraging economic weaknesses, and taking advantage of political and diplomatic opportunities to reduce Russia's global influence and capability.

For a detailed understanding and a comprehensive view of these vulnerabilities and recommendations, I recommend reading the full report.

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Winning the Future Together

Evolving Cooperative Security Approaches for Tomorrow’s Realities

By John T. Watts

Atlantic Council

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report focuses on evolving US security cooperation approaches, particularly with its most capable allies and partners, to ensure they are more effective in an era of great power competition.

Analysis: The report employs a qualitative analysis, drawing on discussions and workshops with a wide range of experts from industry, academia, and government.

Argument: While the US security cooperation approach has been evolving, changes in the strategic context necessitate deeper reconceptualization to generate high-end cooperative security. The report argues for a more nuanced and flexible approach to cooperation, emphasizing the importance of aligning strategies with the specific needs and capabilities of different allies.

Insights: The increasing importance of technological innovation in defense necessitates a shift from traditional military aid to more technology-focused collaborations. Secondly, the evolving nature of warfare, as evidenced in recent conflicts, highlights the need for dynamic and adaptable security strategies. Finally, interoperability in multinational defense efforts is critical to effectively leverage the strengths and capabilities of diverse allies.

Recommendations: The report advocates for a "Collaboration-First" mentality with close and capable allies for effective information and technology sharing. It also emphasizes increasing cooperation in planning and production, as well as elevating the strategic prioritization and first principles planning of security cooperation activities. See below for the exhaustive list of recommendations.

This Atlantic Council report examines how the United States can adapt its security cooperation approaches to ensure allies and partners are more capable and resilient amid intensifying great power competition. The author argues that while the core principles guiding US security cooperation remain sound, the modern threat landscape necessitates targeted evolutions in mentality, focus, and specific policies.

Considering Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the report explains how the prioritization of defense partnerships is now imperative, as the US and allies can no longer expend limited resources evenly across the globe. Meanwhile, Ukraine's effective absorption of advanced Western weaponry against Russia shows how emerging technologies can enable smaller forces to impose significant losses on more sophisticated adversaries. Thus, the modern threat landscape warrants careful reassessment of the roles, needs, and tools provided to allies.

The report also notes the major challenges to security cooperation in the 21st century. For one, insufficient stockpiles highlight the limitations in weapons production capacities across NATO states struggling to meet Ukraine’s requests. Moreover, the conflict in Ukraine is a reminder that adequate political will is necessary to access allies’ expansive arsenals. Indeed, while European allies actively assist Ukraine near their borders, few partners may deploy major assets to high-end fights distant from immediate interests. Thirdly, interoperability rests upon balancing cost and capacity, as exquisite US systems can be prohibitively expensive for allies. Fourthly, disconnects between US defense planning, force development, and security cooperation communities impede unified strategies. Lastly, allies now juggle intensifying economic ties with Russia and China against defense commitments to the US, creating complex political calculations amid multifaceted competition.

The report concludes with six major recommendations:

• Embrace a ‘collaboration-first’ approach in information and technology sharing with key allies.

• Expand pathways for adopting and adapting allied technological advancements.

• Streamline processes like ITAR to remove counterproductive burdens and speed up foreign military sales (FMS).

• Explore alternative means to fulfill partner capability needs, including co-production and integration of allied capabilities into U.S. systems.

• Ensure security cooperation policy and strategic goal-setting is primarily threat-informed, considering partners' capability gaps and intentions.

• Invest in and prioritize the security cooperation workforce, recognizing the importance of person-to-person relationships and strategic effects generated by security cooperation.

“To maximize the value of the network, DOD should take a ‘collaboration-first’ mentality with its closest and most capable allies in information and technology sharing. For example, rather than a reflexive move to classify documents as Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals (NOFORN) out of an over-abundance of caution or lack of proper training which unnecessarily constrains information-sharing with likeminded nations, DOD personnel should seek to be as collaborative as possible. While reforms are underway across DOD to improve issues of over-classification, these efforts must be broadened to encompass the way classification is taught, the mentality of leadership and desk officers, and even adjustments in simple systems, such as changing the order of drop-down classification options in digital interfaces so that NOFORN is not the top (and laziest) choice. The United States can also learn from its friends: In some allied nations, classification of information as NOFORN-equivalent requires approval by director and above leadership. Of course, this does not mean all information should be shared—or that classifications should be abandoned—rather it means that unnecessary barriers to information sharing ought to be further examined, and the mindset changed from a simplistic ‘better to be safe than sorry’ to considering what might opportunities or benefits might be lost by not sharing, and a realistic assessment of the actual risk of sharing.”

I highly recommend delving into the full report to further understand the analysis and recommendations.

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This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following sources: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Center for a New American Security and Atlantic Council.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

Again, please share, subscribe, and stay tuned for next week’s installment!

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In the final Quick Tanks newsletter of 2023, I have two insightful reports to share with you this week. The topics are:

• How the B-21 Raider and its unique capabilities will bolster deterrence against China and Russia and provide assurance to US allies

• How heavy armored forces like main battle tanks (MBTs) can still be effective on contemporary battlefields

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

America’s B-21 Raiders

Deterring and Assuring in the New Cold War

By Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, Mackenzie Eaglen, Dr. Jennifer Bradley, Dr. Christopher Bowie, Dr. Rebecca Grant, and Kari A. Bingen

Hudson Institute

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report examines the role of the B-21 Raider bomber in contemporary US defense strategy, focusing on the B-21’s significance in deterring threats from Russia and China and in assuring US allies.

Analysis: The report uses a combination of strategic analysis and expert commentary, relying on data from the Department of Defense and insights from defense analysts to assess the B-21's capabilities and strategic value.

Argument: The B-21 Raider, with its advanced capabilities in stealth and payload flexibility, is crucial for maintaining US strategic deterrence and assurance in the face of evolving global threats.

Insights: The B-21 Raider is a remarkable success story in defense acquisition, as it is both on time and on budget. Moreover, the B-21 stands out as the most visible element of the US nuclear triad, enhancing credibility and signaling US resolve to allies. Lastly, the B-21's advanced stealth coatings are easier and cheaper to maintain than past bombers, allowing it to operate more flexibly from allied airbases and on a lower budget.

Recommendations: To strengthen deterrence, the report urges the Air Force to grow the buy size to at least 200 B-21s. Furthermore, Congress must appropriate additional funding to scale production. This expansion as essential for fulfilling the US's commitments to deterrence and assurance.

Faced with major nuclear adversaries like Russia and China and the challenges posed by rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, the United States is in a new Cold War-like scenario. This Hudson Institute report, featuring a compilation of expert essays, highlights the critical role of the B-21 Raider in this high-stakes environment. The report explains the B-21 will uniquely signal American technological capability and power projection, bolstering both deterrence and ally assurance efforts.

The report lauds the B-21 Raider's acquisition program as a rare success story in Pentagon procurement. Since the Pentagon awarded the contract to Northrup Grumman in 2015, it has maintained stability in timing, design, and funding, demonstrating a model for future major acquisition programs. Notably, active contract management and data-sharing agreements between Northrup Grumman and the Air Force have controlled overall expense risk and mitigated requirements creep. Moreover, Northrup Grumman touts various advances in the B-21 design, driving down the maintenance costs that have made past stealth aircraft so prohibitively expensive.

“Adjusted for inflation, the average procurement unit cost (APUC) of a single B‑2 was $1.38 billion, while the APUC of a B‑21 is an estimated $706 million, roughly half the price. While the exact operating costs of the B‑21 remain unknown, the program was designed to learn from past projects’ shortcomings. At the unveiling of the aircraft last year, Defense Secretary Austin proclaimed that the B‑21 would be ‘carefully designed to be the most maintainable bomber ever built.’ This appears to be true, as decades of innovation in stealth technology have made its coating easier and cheaper to maintain. Northrup Grumman has continuously improved on its radar absorbent material coating, and its latest development will allow the aircraft to be maintained and housed on the light line rather than in cooled hangers. The Air Force has also opted for an ‘open architecture’ approach for flexible hardware and software, which allows new technologies, capabilities, and weapons to be more easily incorporated into the aircraft. This is in conjunction with Northrup Grumman’s ‘digital engineering’ approach, which lets engineers run tests on computer simulations as opposed to real-world models. Both of these new models directly address key obstacles uncovered in making changes to the B‑2, where frequent and complex hardware and software modifications created steep additional costs.”

The report stresses how the B-21 Raider is distinguished by its stealth, long-range capabilities, payload flexibility, and open-architecture design. These features make it uniquely suited to address US nuclear deterrent requirements. Its ability to carry both nuclear and conventional munitions, combined with long-range penetrating strike capabilities, ensures it can hold at risk a wide array of targets deep in adversary territory. The report notes this flexibility in operations and mission planning offered by the B-21 significantly enhances its warfighting potential against sophisticated defenses and forces opponents into a paralyzing risk calculation regarding escalation.

“Importantly, the B‑21 gives the president strategic options. Today, the US relies largely on nuclear‑tipped, large‑yield intercontinental and sea‑launched ballistic missiles to hold at risk hard and deeply buried targets, missile launch sites, command and control (C2) nodes, and military infrastructure deep within adversary borders. Current US conventional strike aircraft and cruise missiles do not have the range or the ability to pierce sophisticated air defenses. A B‑21 delivering conventional munitions deep inland allows the president to target key military nodes while remaining below the nuclear threshold. It also provides nuclear options complementary to other legs of the nuclear triad.

Bombers have shown their flexibility in conducting a range of missions, including supporting those typically associated with other military services and platforms. The B‑21 creates tactical options for a theater commander. It could be used to disable air defenses, thereby creating access corridors for less stealthy tactical aircraft and other assets. The B‑52 and B‑1, which can both carry advanced radar systems and anti‑ship cruise missiles, retain a maritime surveillance and maritime strike mission, with crews still actively trained in finding and targeting enemy surface combatants. The B‑21 could follow suit.”

The authors also emphasize how the B-21 Raider plays a significant role in assuring allies, especially in the context of extended nuclear deterrence. Its global reach, relative visibility within the nuclear triad, and the potential for combined operations with allies enhance the credibility of US security commitments. The B-21's ability to operate from various locations, including those provided by allies for refueling or basing, demonstrates America's commitment to extended deterrence and strengthens alliances. This is particularly important in regions like the Indo-Pacific, where US allies face direct threats from nuclear-armed adversaries​.

The report recommends that the US should prioritize the B-21 Raider to maintain its strategic edge. It suggests increasing the fleet size beyond the initially planned 100 aircraft to effectively deter two major powers simultaneously and address the growing target set. The report argues for acquiring at least double the original number of B-21s and calls on Congress to adjust funding and planning for additional production. In addition, allies should explore providing B-21 basing, refueling support, and other combined operations.

To fully appreciate the report’s analysis and recommendations, I encourage readers to consult the full report.

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Heavy Armoured Forces in Future Combined Arms Warfare

By Nick Reynolds

Royal United Services Institute

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: This report focuses on the role of heavy armored forces and main battle tanks (MBTs) in future combined arms warfare. It examines whether MBTs will remain relevant given emerging threats like precision strikes and debates over alternative force structures.

Analysis: The analysis is rooted in historical and contemporary combat theories, technological advancements, and strategic policy reviews, pulling from a combination of literature surveys, expert interviews, military exercise observations, and fieldwork.

Argument: Despite the vulnerabilities and evolving threats in modern warfare, heavy armored forces remain vital for credible warfighting capabilities, enabling operational momentum while under fire. However, adaptations around mobility, vehicle design, crew skills, and logistical support are essential.

Insights: Mobility, rather than protection, will be the most important aspect of heavy armored forces in contemporary battlefields. Moreover, MBTs remain difficult to replace with unmanned systems due to the versatility and independence of human crews in complex situations. Thirdly, while aircraft, UAS, and precision fires are useful for the attrition of the enemy’s key capabilities, they cannot independently hold ground or control populations, whereas ground forces and MBTs can.

Recommendations: The British Army should adapt its heavy armored forces by prioritizing mobility and embracing technological innovations. MBT interiors should be redesigned for ergonomics and system integration, and units must practice battlefield recovery and repair to manage attrition. Overall, the qualitative edge of competent crews is the key determinant, not just technology.

Amidst the backdrop of the Russo-Ukrainian War which has been characterized by high losses of MBTs to new weapons, this RUSI report offers crucial insights into the continued utility of heavy armored forces. The author argues that MBTs remain an indispensable capability despite the vulnerabilities revealed by contemporary battlefields. At their core, MBTs uniquely combine mobility, protection, and substantial combat power, enabling ground forces to seize and hold terrain in ways aircraft cannot. However, retaining the credibility of heavy armored forces mandates major adaptations across logistics, operating concepts, and technology.

Addressing the challenges posed by pervasive ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance) and precision strike capabilities, the report identifies the significant logistical footprint of heavy armored forces as a vulnerability. To mitigate this risk, the author emphasizes the need for effective combined arms integration, ensuring that heavy armored units can operate effectively in the face of advanced surveillance and precision targeting by adversaries. This integration is critical for maintaining operational agility and reducing susceptibility to targeted attacks.

The report discusses the need for alternative ground force combat structures in response to evolving threats like ATGMs (Anti-Tank Guided Missiles), which pose a significant risk to MBTs. It debates the merits of medium versus heavy armored forces, acknowledging that while medium armored forces might be more cost-effective, they are often outmatched in close combat by heavier forces. Thus, the report underscores the necessity for a balanced force structure that can effectively counter a range of threats on the battlefield.

“In the direct fight, increasingly capable ATGMs pose the most obvious threat to MBTs. While opposing MBTs can be armed with barrel-launched or tube-launched ATGMs, the fact that ATGMs do not rely on velocity means that they can be launched from a tube, and that in theory any light vehicle or dismounted soldier can thus be equipped with an effective anti-tank weapon. The technology continues to develop, and at present the lethality of modern systems such as Javelin, NLAW and Kornet is difficult for MBTs to counter directly. The most effective ATGMs, such as Javelin, have a top-attack function whereby the missile guides itself via an irregular trajectory to strike the weaker top armour of a targeted vehicle. Top-attack munitions also have the advantage of being difficult to counter with active protection systems (APS), as these must track and calculate the trajectory of the incoming missile in order to intercept it. However, ATGMs come at a high per unit cost, and top-attack munitions are the most expensive of all (and will require skilled operators until sensor and guidance technology improves). They are also bulky and heavy for dismounted infantry to carry, not to mention the difficulties of a dismounted unit carrying more than a handful of spare missiles with it, are slow to reload compared with the main gun of an MBT, and so have severe tactical constraints, even if they are more lethal in absolute terms. In a direct line-of-sight fight with MBTs and heavy armoured forces, the operators of ATGMs can be vulnerable, although if they are well-sited and implement good battlefield discipline to minimise their visual signature, they are very difficult to spot and can be used to conduct effective ambushes.”

In discussing logistics, sustainment, recovery, and reconstitution, the report emphasizes the importance of efficient management in these areas. It cites examples where the ability to quickly recover and reconstitute armored formations after suffering battlefield losses has been crucial for maintaining operational momentum and effectiveness, particularly in prolonged engagements.

“In terms of lessons learned from recent operations in Ukraine, the majority of Russian armor losses have still been the result of poor maintenance or logistics. In the case of the Ukrainian armed forces, the majority of repairs are carried out up to 300 km away from the frontlines in order to protect irreplaceable maintenance machinery and personnel from artillery fires. While the journey from the frontline to these facilities could be only five or six hours, an impressive feat of logistics in itself, this still constitutes a major endeavor. In the summer of 2022, Ukrainian tanks that had been destroyed on the battlefield, but recovered, were being repaired in Poland at a rate of 20–30 per month.”

The report advocates for significant changes in tank design, including the integration of UAS for enhanced situational awareness and the improvement of repairability to reduce operational downtime. In discussing Uncrewed Ground Vehicles (UGVs), the report views them as complementary to MBTs, suggesting that while UGVs can add valuable capabilities, they are not a substitute for the versatility of manned tanks. This balance between crewed and uncrewed assets is presented as crucial for the future effectiveness of armored forces.

Ultimately, the report recommends the British Army must evolve its heavy armored forces, with a focus on enhancing mobility and incorporating technological advances. The interior design of Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) should be reconfigured to improve ergonomics and facilitate the integration of advanced systems. Additionally, it is crucial for units to regularly conduct exercises in battlefield recovery and repair, as a strategy to effectively handle attrition. Importantly, the decisive factor of the heavy armored forces lies in the proficiency and skill of the crews, rather than the technological capabilities alone. Thus, the British Army must invest in the training and development of personnel, ensuring they are adept at leveraging technology while also capable of critical thinking and innovation in dynamic combat scenarios.

I highly recommend that readers review the entire report to thoroughly understand its analysis and recommendations.

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Stay tuned for the next Quick Tanks installment in January 2024!

This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following sources: Hudson Institute and Royal United Services Institute.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

If you are interested in having your report featured in this newsletter or if you have any comments or feedback, please contact Shane Dennin (Sdennin@hudson.org).

Again, please share, subscribe, and stay tuned for next week’s installment!

Share Quick Tanks

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This week, I have two intriguing reports to share with you all. Their topics are:

• How could the US and its allies employ effective economic sanctions against China

• The scenarios for deliberate nuclear use by both the US and China in a conflict over Taiwan

Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.

The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.

Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.

No Winners in This Game

Assessing the U.S. Playbook for Sanctioning China

By Emily Kilcrease

Center for a New American Security

Link to PDF; Link to Report Page

Focus: The report assesses options for sanctioning China economically if relations deteriorate, analyzing China's vulnerability to sanctions and points of US leverage.

Analysis: The report includes extensive economic and political analysis of China, an evaluation of sanctions options, and insights from an economic strategy game. The analysis draws heavily from economic data, research interviews with experts, and game scenarios.

Argument: The central argument of the report is that while economic sanctions are a powerful tool in US foreign policy, their application against a major power like China presents unique challenges and risks. The United States does not have a clear asymmetric advantage across most sanctions options and faces substantial uncertainty around the impacts of maximal measures like financial sanctions. 

Insights: Sanctions against China would reverberate throughout the global economy, affecting not just China but also the US and its allies. Moreover, restrictions intended to deny China access to globally available commodities will require policy innovations like novel market incentives to limit China's alternatives. Thirdly, there are no easy pathways for sanctions to influence China’s political decision-making given its authoritarian structure, but economic impacts may constrain the sustainment of military operations.

Recommendations: The report recommends a range of institutional, international, and operational steps for the US and its partners. Institutionally, it suggests developing integrated economic domain strategies and strengthening sanctions assessment and enforcement capabilities. Internationally, it calls for coordinated strategic planning, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic outreach. Operationally, it advocates for preparing various sanctions mechanisms, including technology denial, commodity embargo, and macroeconomic pressure operations.

As the once-unthinkable prospect of imposing severe and widespread sanctions on China grows increasingly possible, this CNAS report provides a comprehensive analysis of the complexities and strategic considerations involved in sanctioning China. The core argument of the report is that while sanctioning China is a strategic imperative that the United States and its partners must consider in the face of deteriorating relations, it presents unprecedented challenges due to the complexity and scale of China’s economy.

The report notes several factors when it comes to assessing China as a potential target for sanction. For one, China’s deep integration in global supply chains greatly complicates sanctioning efforts, making it incredibly difficult to predict impacts on the US and its allies. From a political standpoint, China’s consolidated power structure is resilient to sanctions, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) prioritizes political stability over economic growth and maintains the ability to suppress any public dissent over economic repercussions. However, the report finds that its reliance on global financial infrastructure is a particular vulnerability, with China depending on the US dollar for much of its international trade and financial operations.

Should the US choose to apply macroeconomic pressure given the dollar’s dominance in global financial architecture, the report argues the US must coordinate with countries around the world, especially in the Global South. This coordination is crucial not only for building a broad coalition of support but also for understanding and addressing the diverse economic impacts that might arise in different regions.

In assessing the use of technology denial to diminish China's military capabilities, the report identifies that export controls targeting key sectors such as aviation, space, and artificial intelligence could be strategically beneficial. These measures, particularly when reinforced with support from European allies, could exert significant pressure on China's technological advancements in these critical areas. However, the report emphasizes that for technology denial to be truly effective, it necessitates a comprehensive and long-term strategic approach.

Furthermore, the report delves into the intricacies of embargoes on strategic commodities and minerals, highlighting the nuanced challenges in this domain. While the United States holds considerable sway in the realm of LNG exports, the landscape of energy alternatives available to China presents a complex scenario. China's robust capabilities in renewable energy, coupled with the presence of multiple oil-producing nations that do not necessarily align with US interests, afford China a range of options to circumvent potential embargoes.

“In the energy sector, for example, it may be naive to expect that major producers in the Middle East or elsewhere would align with U.S. sanctions, particularly if doing so would have negative commercial impacts. It may be more viable to secure buy-in if the United States can create incentives, rather than punishments, for alignment with the United States. The oil price cap currently being used in the Russia context is a good example of a novel market mechanism: it is designed to keep Russian energy on the market while depriving Russia of energy revenues and creating an incentive (i.e., cheaper oil) for non-aligned states. China is a net energy importer, and a novel market mechanism would be flipped to create incentives to deny China’s purchases—rather than sales—of energy.”

Ultimately, the report recommends a range of institutional, international, and operational steps for the US and its partners:

To better understand the nuanced recommendations and analyses, I highly encourage you to look into the full report.

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Deliberate Nuclear Use in a War over Taiwan

Scenarios and Considerations for the United States

By Matthew Kroenig

Atlantic Council

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Focus: The report focuses on scenarios for deliberate nuclear use by the US or China in a potential war over Taiwan, and considers strategy, policy, and operational questions for the US in response.

Analysis: The analysis examines possible rational incentives and scenarios for limited, deliberate nuclear use by either side, drawing on nuclear strategy theory and historical Cold War examples to illustrate concepts.

Argument: Deliberate nuclear use, not just inadvertent escalation, is plausible in a Taiwan conflict given the high stakes. Specifically, China could use threats, demonstration blasts, or limited strikes to deter outside intervention, compel Taiwan's surrender, or defeat US/allied forces. Conversely, the US could use nuclear weapons if unable to halt a Chinese invasion conventionally or to retaliate for an initial Chinese nuclear strike.

Insights: Both the US and China would have strong resolve in a Taiwan conflict, willing to take major risks including nuclear threats or use. The US could target PLA Navy vessels, militarized islands in the South China Sea, and PLA beachheads in Taiwan, while China could target Taiwanese political and military leadership and possibly even US or allied forces.

Recommendations: The US should identify off-mainland PLA targets suitable for proportionate, militarily useful nuclear strikes that minimize civilian harm, while warning China not to expect sanctuary status for its mainland. In addition, the US should explicitly extend the US nuclear umbrella over Taiwan, enhance defenses of regional bases, initiate Taiwan contingency planning for potential nuclear use, and prioritize conventional forces and capabilities that both deter Chinese aggression and enable damage limitation if deterrence fails.

As tensions rise in the Taiwan Strait, the prospect of war between the United States and China looms heavy. This Atlantic Council report sounds the alarm on a chilling possibility - deliberate nuclear use by either power. Given the conflict's immense stakes, the report argues nuclear weapons may be rational, not just as a deterrent, but as usable tools to achieve victory.

The report explains that the US and China would both have enormous resolve to prevail in a Taiwan conflict. For the US, defeat would undermine the rules-based international order and alliance commitments worldwide. For Beijing, the legitimacy of the CCP hinges on restoring China as a leading global power, with the unification of Taiwan seen as essential for the nation's rejuvenation.

The analysis explores scenarios in which the US or China could employ limited nuclear strikes to secure objectives where conventional means fall short. For China, the options range from nuclear signaling and demonstrations to outright nuclear attacks on Taiwan, US forces, or the territory of the US or its allies. Such actions could stem from China's perceived strategic advantages, an effort to compel negotiations, or a belief that US nuclear use is impending. Conversely, if facing conventional defeat, the US might contemplate nuclear first use as a drastic measure to thwart a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

“The likeliest scenarios for US nuclear first use during a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be an attack directly against the Chinese invasion force in the face of a Taiwanese defeat or as retaliation for a large-scale non-nuclear strategic attack on the US homeland or that of its allies.

The United States could find itself in a scenario in which the president decides to use nuclear weapons because he or she seeks to prevent the success of a Chinese invasion but lacks the conventional forces to do so. This situation could come about for a variety of reasons, including an intelligence failure that does not provide warning of a Chinese buildup, a successful Chinese conventional preemptive strike on key US conventional forces in the region, or a failure by the United States to invest in sufficient conventional forces to defend Taiwan. In this case, the United States would seek to use nuclear weapons against the invasion force to frustrate the immediate success of the attack and to provide time for reinforcements or give room for diplomacy.”

Should China first employ a nuclear attack, the author argues the US must respond with a nuclear attack of its own in order to restore intrawar and global deterrence. Specifically, a US nuclear response should demonstrate to China and other nuclear rivals that further nuclear escalation would not be beneficial, assuring allies, and minimizing the risk of further escalation. The US might target PLA Navy vessels, militarized islands in the South China Sea, or PLA beachheads in Taiwan in response to Chinese nuclear use. Each option carries specific risks and benefits, with considerations around the potential for escalation, civilian casualties, and the strategic importance of the targets​.

“Another reason why Chinese nuclear use would require a US nuclear response is that a devastating conventional response would be especially hard to achieve and communicate clearly in the midst of a high-intensity conventional war between the United States and China. If Chinese nuclear use occurs several weeks or months into the conflict, there will then likely be an ongoing exchange of conventional munitions, and many ideal targets will likely already be degraded. In this instance, it is not clear that a conventional strike could represent a significant enough escalation to signal to China that it had underestimated US resolve. If the United States was already engaged in a campaign to degrade military forces and bases involved in the war on Taiwan, would striking another such target with conventional munitions really constitute a devastating response to Chinese nuclear use? The target set suitable for conventional retaliation is also constrained by another objective of a US response: preventing escalation to a strategic exchange and following the law of war. A strike on some targets serviceable by conventional forces—for example, national leadership, national command-and-control facilities, nuclear forces—could be perceived as a decapitating or disarming strike with a greater risk of escalation than desired.”

The report argues the US should build a strong conventional deterrent against Chinese aggression with allies like Taiwan while also extending nuclear deterrence coverage to Taiwan explicitly. It advises dispersing and sheltering regional US facilities, deploying new tactical nuclear weapons like sea-launched cruise missiles, and identifying non-escalatory Chinese targets for potential nuclear response. Other recommendations include assisting Taiwan in handling nuclear threats, expanding homeland missile defenses to address nuclear-armed competitors like China, and prioritizing conventional forces that could support nuclear counterforce strikes if required. Overall the report urges the US to plan seriously for deliberate nuclear use in a Taiwan crisis, strengthen deterrence accordingly, and coordinate with allies to mitigate risks.

I highly recommend looking into the full report to learn more about the scenarios and rationale discussed above.

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This newsletter is only as insightful as the reports it highlights, so thank you to the amazing authors whose research and work we all appreciate. This installment draws from the following sources: Center for a New American Security and Atlantic Council.

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