Introducing Quick Tanks - Your Weekly Defense Analysis Digest
Swarming Drones and AUKUS Subs: Envisioning Scalable UAV Employment and Overcoming Obstacles in Strategy, Social License, and Workforce for AUKUS Pillar I
Welcome to Quick Tanks, a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.
This week, I have two compelling reports to share with you all. The topics are:
What does a Mass Precision Strike Complex of UAVs look like?
What progress has been made for AUKUS Pillar I and what challenges remain?
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Mass Precision Strike
Designing UAV Complexes for Land Forces
By Professor Justin Bronk and Dr. Jack Watling
Royal United Services Institute
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report comprehensively examines the design and employment of UAV complexes for land forces. It outlines the components necessary for a mass precision strike complex, the trade-offs in UAV design, and the enabling capabilities required to field such systems effectively.Analysis: The authors conducted extensive fieldwork, including examination of Russian and Iranian UAVs, observation of UAV employment in Ukraine, and interviews with manufacturers, operators, and counter-UAV personnel.Argument: UAVs enable land forces to deliver precision effects at an unprecedented scale. However, designing an effective mass precision strike complex involves significant trade-offs and costs. UAVs must be ruthlessly optimized for specific tasks to balance capability and affordability, and rapid adaptation of software, tactics, and payloads is crucial to continuously counter adversary countermeasures.Insights: Government regulation is currently a major constraint on UAV design, procurement, and employment, impacting battlefield effectiveness. Moreover, swarming capabilities can improve UAV effectiveness against air defenses, but due to the complexity and cost required, swarming techniques are unlikely to be sustainable past “Night One” scenarios.Recommendations: NATO members should adapt regulatory structures to enable rapid UAV capability updates. As for defense planners, land forces should 1) establish specialist UAV formations with organic software development and intelligence support, 2) investment in mass precision strike complexes should be balanced against the opportunity costs for other capabilities, and 3) counter-UAV capabilities must be developed and fielded at scale to mitigate threats from adversary UAV complexes. This RUSI report provides a comprehensive analysis of the potential and limitations of UAVs in delivering precision effects at scale for land forces. The report underscores the importance of understanding the design trade-offs, mission sets, dependencies, and scaling effects involved in fielding a mass precision strike complex.
“UAVs' primary offer is their ability to deliver effect at either a cost or a scale that cannot be matched by other means. This means that UAV designs should be ruthlessly simplified and optimized for defined tasks. However, there are also limits to the extent to which costs can be driven down if a system is to be reliable and resilient. There are, in fact, very particular intersections between price and capability where UAVs are optimally effective.”
Design Trade-offs
Airframe: The airframe configuration is a key determinant of a UAV's aerodynamic parameters, performance, and payload capacity. The choice between rotary and fixed-wing designs is a significant trade-off, as rotary configurations like multi-copter UAVs offer greater flexibility and vertical take-off and landing capabilities, while fixed-wing designs provide better efficiency in terms of range and endurance for a given size and power. Moreover, the airframe size and weight have substantial implications for propulsion, power, and cost, with small increases in mission payload or range driving significant increases in overall airframe size, weight, and cost.
Propulsion and Power: UAVs can be powered by either electric motors or internal combustion engines. While electric power provides quieter operation and simpler installation, it has significantly lower energy density compared to gasoline, with batteries storing around 260 times less power for a given weight. This battery weight penalty increases non-linearly with the required range/endurance, making electric propulsion more suitable for light payloads over short ranges. On the other hand, combustion engines offer greater potential thrust and range but with increased noise, complexity, and logistical requirements.
Navigation: Accurate navigation is crucial for precision strikes, and UAVs rely on various methods such as global navigation satellite systems (GNSS), inertial navigation, terrain recognition, and emissions seekers. However, GNSS is vulnerable to jamming and spoofing, necessitating UAVs to incorporate multiple frequencies, antennae diversity, and reversionary modes like inertial navigation with periodic updates from terrain recognition or external sources. But again, these advanced navigation techniques, such as combining inertial navigation with high-fidelity terrain maps and slant range calculations, come with increased cost and complexity.
Datalinks: Radio frequency command links enable real-time control and data transmission between a UAV and its operator, but they are susceptible to jamming and have limited range without relays. Frequency-hopping radios, dual-frequency receivers, directional beam riding, and collaborative relay systems can enhance the resilience of datalinks against hostile electronic warfare (EW) but come with increased complexity and skill requirements. For instance, a group of UAVs passing authenticated data to one another on different frequency regimes can help overcome jamming attempts.
Sensors: UAVs also employ a wide range of sensors, including electro-optical (EO), infrared (IR), radar, and electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems, each with their own strengths and limitations. EO/IR cameras are passive, lightweight, and cost-effective but are vulnerable to weather conditions and camouflage. For example, EO cameras combined with image-intensifying capabilities can extend a UAV's utility into low-light conditions but struggle in minimal ambient light. Conversely, radars provide all-weather capability but are more expensive, power-hungry, and detectable, with the power and aperture size required for long-range sensing limiting their use to larger, more complex, and expensive airframes.
Effectors: Kinetic effectors for UAVs include general-purpose warheads (e.g., HE-FRAG), shaped-charge warheads (e.g., explosively formed penetrators), and multirole warheads, with varying levels of effectiveness against different target types. For example, small multi-copter UAVs equipped with HE-FRAG payloads roughly the size of a hand grenade can have a lethal radius of several meters against soft targets but offer little destructive effect against buildings. In contrast, non-kinetic effectors, such as EW payloads, can degrade hostile sensors but are more complex, expensive, and reliant on up-to-date mission data files compared to kinetic options.
Mass Precision Strike Mission Sets
Close ISR: UAVs optimized for tactical reconnaissance require low cost, simplicity, and attrition tolerance to provide persistent coverage in contested airspace. Key design considerations for these systems include lightweight EO/IR sensors, hands-off control, and the ability to operate without GPS. For instance, the report suggests a target price point below $2,500 per airframe, a weight below 2 kg, 40 minutes of endurance, and an operating range of approximately 10 km to enable sustainable expenditure in support of platoon-level operations.
Close Strike: UAVs designed for precision strikes in the close fight must be capable of engaging armored vehicles and other high-value targets within a range of 20-30 km. Shaped-charge warheads (e.g., modified RPG-7 grenades) and robust guidance systems are essential for effectiveness, while the unit cost should be kept below $40,000 to allow for mass employment. A prime example is the Russian Lancet-3M loitering munition, which features a 5 kg shaped-charge warhead, a 35 km range, and an estimated unit cost of $30,000. This system has demonstrated the ability to reliably disable armored vehicles in Ukraine when launched in groups of 2-3 per target.
Deep ISR: UAVs tasked with over-the-horizon reconnaissance require longer range, endurance, and more advanced sensors and datalinks compared to close ISR systems. Fixed-wing designs with a wingspan of approximately 4 m, a target airspeed of 125 km/h, and an endurance of 2.5 hours (including 30 minutes of loiter time) are optimal for this mission set, allowing for a maximum depth of 70 km. The ability to precisely locate targets using laser rangefinders or advanced terrain matching algorithms and operate in GPS-denied environments using inertial navigation and pre-loaded maps is essential, driving up the unit cost to around $200,000 per airframe.
Deep Strike: Long-range precision strike UAVs offer the potential to disrupt enemy logistics and command and control elements at operational depths of up to 500 km. These systems must carry significant fuel reserves, robust navigation systems, and sizable warheads, resulting in unit costs upwards of $30,000, as seen with the Iranian Shahed-136. The effectiveness of deep strike UAVs depends on their ability to penetrate hostile airspace, adapt to evolving defenses (e.g., through iterative updates to navigation and terminal behavior), and coordinate with other joint force assets. For example, Shahed-136s have been used in combination with cruise and ballistic missiles to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.
Enabling Effects: UAVs can also serve as communications relays, EW platforms, and decoys to enable other elements of the mass precision strike complex. These systems require sophisticated electronics payloads, power generation, and cooling capabilities, making them larger and more expensive than strike UAVs. For example, EW payloads designed for stand-in jamming of key hostile systems, such as surveillance and air defense radars, must be carried deep into enemy airspace, necessitating more complex and expensive airframes compared to kinetic effectors with similar range and propulsion. The effectiveness of enabling UAVs depends on their endurance, signal transmission range, and ability to adapt to hostile countermeasures while minimizing interference with friendly force elements.
Dependencies and Scaling Effects
The report emphasizes the importance of treating UAVs as systems rather than individual platforms, as their effectiveness is contingent upon continuous updates to software, behavioral logic, sensors, and radios every six to 12 weeks. This modular approach to UAV design and procurement is crucial for staying ahead of adversary countermeasures and ensuring the long-term viability of the mass precision strike complex. For example, the average period of peak effectiveness for a newly deployed UAV navigation and/or control system on the Ukrainian battlefield was around two weeks, with degrading effectiveness over four more weeks, and near-complete adversary adaptation within six to 12 weeks. The authors highlight the regulatory challenges associated with this rapid iteration process, as current certification and safety requirements in NATO countries can significantly slow down development and increase costs, preventing NATO states from employing UAVs as effectively as potential adversaries.
To maximize the impact of UAVs, the report recommends the establishment of specialized UAV formations that can employ different types of UAVs in combination and have the in-house capacity to update and reconfigure their systems. These formations would be responsible for mission planning, crew training, and the integration of UAV capabilities with other force elements such as artillery, electronic warfare, and air defense. For example, with tactical ISR already encompassed in most combat formations, a hypothetical, specialized UAV battalion could consist of a deep ISR company, a close strike company, a deep strike company, an intelligence and headquarters company, and a support company.
The effectiveness of these formations would depend on their access to enabling infrastructure including high-quality orbital EMS surveillance systems, appropriate downlink facilities and ground stations, along with a processing and distribution framework designed to analyze collected data and swiftly deliver it to operational units at or close to the front lines. Indeed, the ability to map, interpret, and respond to hostile and friendly EW effects and EMS usage in near-real-time across the area of operations is a prerequisite for effective mission planning and command and control of a mass precision strike complex.
I highly recommend reading the full report to engage with many more insights contained therein.
Foundations for AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines
Perspectives from AUKUS partners
By Professor Peter J. Dean, Alice Nason, Dr. Philip Shetler-Jones, and Dr. Charles Edel
United States Studies Centre
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: This report examines the progress, challenges, and opportunities in implementing the AUKUS partnership's Pillar I on nuclear-powered submarines, drawing on insights from a Track 1.5 dialogue with experts and officials from Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.Analysis: The report is based on qualitative analysis, leveraging insights from a multi-stakeholder dialogue involving over 50 experts and officials. Notable data sources include government announcements, strategic documents, and public opinion polls from the three AUKUS countries.Argument: While significant progress has been made in establishing governance structures, adapting policy settings, and initiating workforce training, critical challenges remain in aligning national strategies, building public support, and addressing workforce shortages. Overcoming these hurdles will require concerted efforts from all three governments to ensure the long-term success of the AUKUS partnership.Insights: AUKUS must improve its public communication strategy to gain broader public support and address skepticism, particularly regarding its strategic intentions and benefits. Moreover, there's a critical need for more inclusive stakeholder engagement within each country, involving unions, industry groups, and educational institutions to support workforce development.Recommendations: The report recommends various avenues to address the strategy alignment, public support, and workforce concerns of AUKUS. See below for the full list.Drawing upon insights from a dialogue with experts and officials from Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, this USSC report assesses the progress made in implementing the AUKUS Pillar I and highlights the challenges that lie ahead. The report emphasizes the urgent need for the three nations to align their strategies, cultivate public understanding and support, and develop a skilled workforce to ensure the long-term success of the partnership over the next three decades.
Progress Thus Far: Governance, Policy, and Industry Preparedness
Embedding AUKUS into the Bureaucratic Fabric: The three countries have taken significant steps to integrate AUKUS into their bureaucratic structures. The United States has distributed responsibility for both AUKUS Pillars among officials in the Pentagon, White House, and US Navy, while the United Kingdom has established a dedicated role, Director General – AUKUS, within the Ministry of Defence. Australia has formed the Australian Submarine Agency (ASA) to spearhead Pillar I, and advocacy groups have emerged in the legislatures of all three countries to advance AUKUS efforts at the political level. Notably, the unwavering commitment of the heads of state has been the driving force behind the rapid progress of AUKUS cooperation.
Paving the Way for Collaboration: The passage of the US 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provided crucial authorizations to facilitate AUKUS cooperation. These include a "powerful national exemption" to streamline export license controls for Australia, provisions for transferring Virginia-class submarines to Australia, and approval for Australian contractors to train in US shipyards. Similarly, Australia introduced the Defence Trade Controls Amendment Bill 2023 to address US concerns about information security, effectively creating a military free trade zone with its AUKUS partners and imposing strict penalties for unauthorized technology sharing.
Forging a Skilled Workforce: A range of national and trilateral initiatives are converging to equip US, UK, and Australian companies and workers for the challenges ahead. Since July 2023, six Australian Navy officers have graduated from the US Naval Nuclear Power Training Command and Nuclear Power School. Meanwhile, five Australian military personnel have been embedded into the UK military, and thirteen Australian industrial personnel have completed a seven-week training and familiarization program in the United Kingdom working with UK defense industry partners. In addition, the Australian Government and its state-level counterparts have launched initiatives to accelerate worker recruitment and training, such as the South Australian Government's Defence Industry Workforce and Skills Report, which aims to engage 27,000 students and 1,500 teachers in STEM education pathways.
Navigating the Challenges: Strategy Alignment, Public Support, and Workforce Development
Aligning Strategies in an Evolving Landscape: While the three countries concur that AUKUS serves as a robust deterrent against potential adversaries' advanced submarine capabilities, their strategic perspectives diverge in other areas. For the United Kingdom, AUKUS is not solely about China, and there are concerns about focusing resources on an Indo-Pacific-centric capability at the expense of its near region. In Australia, political leaders and the public are not fully aligned on the strategic rationale behind AUKUS, with apprehensions about the country's role in potential future conflicts. Thirdly, the US faces the critical question of whether deterrence is best achieved through expanding its national capabilities or empowering its allies.
Recommendations for Aligning Strategies:
Increase the frequency of leader-level statements to effectively communicate the rationale for AUKUS capabilities to the public and bureaucracy in each country, considering both national and trilateral strategic interests.
Develop strategic thinking that accounts for the evolving regional and global strategic environment over the coming decades to justify investments in a capability with a long-term horizon.
Emphasize AUKUS as a technology-sharing agreement with theater and threat-agnostic capabilities to foster a deeper understanding of the cooperation's rationale within the UK and Australian systems.
Cultivating Public Support: Public support for nuclear-powered submarine cooperation is either stagnant or declining in each country. In Australia, only 33% of young people believe it is a good idea for the nation to possess nuclear-powered submarines, a decrease from 43% in 2022. The level of public awareness about the AUKUS partnership in the United Kingdom and the United States does not reflect the significance of the undertaking, with less than a quarter of those surveyed in both countries being familiar with the agreement. Furthermore, experts noted that universities and think tanks in the United Kingdom and the United States have not yet fully grasped the opportunities presented by AUKUS cooperation.
Recommendations for Growing Public Support:
Foster trilateral coordination among senior officials on domestic strategic communications to avoid contradictions that may raise concerns for other partners, such as Australia's emphasis on sovereignty and the United States' perception of its participation, especially in Pillar II, as altruistic.
As the three countries brace for potential government changes, encourage trilateral engagement through bipartisan political friendship groups in each country – the AUKUS Caucus in Washington, the Parliamentary Friends of AUKUS in Canberra, and the All-Party Parliamentary Group on AUKUS – to solidify political-level support for the future.
Address the lack of dedicated funding avenues for think tanks and universities to conduct Track 1.5 dialogues and other forms of research and public engagement, which are crucial for increasing public awareness, promoting dialogue, and developing policy options for the enterprise at the national and trilateral levels. For instance, consider placing AUKUS fellows at think tanks and universities in the three countries and designing AUKUS programs of study that offer international exposure to enhance public engagement.
Overcoming Workforce Challenges - The Achilles' Heel of AUKUS: Identifying, training, and retaining the workforce required to sustain AUKUS cooperation is the most formidable challenge to realizing the agreement’s full potential. Indeed, the scale of the requirements is likely to exacerbate existing shortages in the public services, militaries, and industrial workforces of the three countries. AUKUS projects in Australia are expected to require 8,500 industrial workers, while the US submarine industrial base will need an additional 100,000 trained workers and 17,000 supply chain workers over the next decade. In addition, the UK shipyard workforce must grow from 10,000 to 17,000 by the end of the decade. Australia faces a particularly acute workforce problem, as it must develop a sovereign enterprise without an established major shipbuilding or manufacturing industry to rely upon, further complicating the challenge of attracting workers to the shipbuilding sector.
Recommendations for Tackling Workforce Challenges:
Promote greater public understanding of the diverse roles and opportunities within the nuclear supply chain, which is essential for all three countries as they expand their nuclear industries, particularly in Australia, where there is no pre-existing acceptance of nuclear technology within the workforce.
Engage Australian and UK unions and industry representatives as partners in assisting governments to gain a clear understanding of labor shortages and share best practices for designing training and recruitment strategies.
Pursue trilateral cooperation on technologies aimed at enhancing productivity at shipbuilding sites to mitigate the impact of worker shortages in the future.
For those interested in better understanding the path forward for AUKUS, I urge you to read the full report.
