Quick Tanks: The Best of Long-Form Defense Analysis, Briefly
A weekly review of the long-form content from the national security policy, defense policy, and related technology analysis community.
Welcome back, security scholars.
This week, I have two insightful reports to share with you all. Their topics include:
The glaring vulnerability in Russia’s missile production process
The need to modernize US air and missile defense capabilities, particularly in the Indo-Pacific
Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.
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How does Russia make missiles?
Rhodus Intelligence
Link to Twitter; Link to Substack
Focus: The report examines Russia's missile production capabilities, particularly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It explores how Russia has managed to maintain and even enhance its missile manufacturing despite significant sanctions, focusing on the transition from manual to computer-controlled production processes and the role of imported machine tools.Analysis: The analysis integrates a broad range of documentary, visual, and narrative sources, including propaganda footage, corporate reports, job listings, procurement databases, industry publications, and online forums. Argument: Russia's revived missile production leans heavily on imported computerized machine tools, majorly from Western nations and East Asia. Having lost much of its domestic precision machining skill base following 1991, Russia has relied on European and East Asian computerized machine imports from 2003 onward to plug the gap. Crucially, this import dependence represents a strategic vulnerability that Russia attempts to obfuscate.Insights: Despite awareness of their import dependence, the Russian government's attempts at import substitution have largely resulted in the obfuscation rather than the replacement of foreign machinery and technology. Moreover, even with potential suppliers like China, there is a notable lack of effective substitutes for Western-manufactured machine tools.Recommendations: Western governments and their allies should tighten export controls on machine tool imports and advanced manufacturing technologies that could be used in missile production, aiming to more effectively disrupt Russia's military capabilities.Missiles are the centerpiece of Russian military doctrine, as Russia’s significant missile production capacity allows it to numerically overwhelm adversary defenses. However, this Rhodus Intelligence report provides a critical examination of Russia's missile manufacturing industry, revealing a glaring fact: Russia depends on importing well over 90% of its computerized machining tools necessary for missile production, the vast majority of which are from Western Europe and East Asia. This reliance is not merely a logistical concern but a strategic vulnerability that undermines Russia's autonomy in its military endeavors.
The report explains how while Soviet-era missile production relied on manual machining, the collapse of the USSR and the loss of skilled workers forced missile producers to adapt. To survive the 1990s and early 2000s, missile producers imported European computerized machining tools to automate the machining process and offset the lack of craftsmanship in the new workforce. In the later 2000s, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan bolstered their machining technology and began importing to Russia as well.
However, despite more recent geopolitical tensions, Russia remains importing European and East Asian machining tools at a disproportionately high rate. The report notes that since 2011, Russia's import-substitution policy aimed to boost domestic production of metal-cutting equipment for strategic military needs has largely failed. The policy created a significant gap between the military's demand for machine tools and what the domestic industry could supply, leading to a reliance on disguised imports rather than genuine domestic production. Consequently, despite intentions to foster local CNC machine production, the result has been an obfuscation of imports, with domestic output remaining limited and heavily dependent on European and East Asian technology.
“In contrast to Taiwan and South Korea, China has been seen as an undesirable supplier. First, it was rarely capable of meeting the Russian demand for precision metalworking equipment of consistent quality. Second, it appears that the Russian military plants avoided using Chinese machinery even when the Chinese alternative existed. The deliberate semi-exclusion of China would explain the almost complete invisibility of Chinese machine tools in the Russian missiles industry. It was only with the start of the Special Operation, that the use of Chinese machine tool brands was normalized. Still, China remains a last choice supplier in the high-end sector, the Russian military producers seeking to secure Western European and Japanese, or at least Taiwanese and Korean production whenever possible.”
The report concludes by urging the international community, especially Western countries, to refine sanctions and import controls targeting the machinery and technology that underpin Russia's missile production. By focusing on these strategic chokepoints, it is possible to significantly impact Russia's military manufacturing capabilities, addressing a critical aspect of national and international security.
Follow Rhodus Intelligence on Twitter and Substack to learn more about their analysis and to access the full report.
Strengthening the Phalanx
Layered, Comprehensive, and Distributed Air and Missile Defense in the Indo-Pacific
By Carl Rehberg and Herbert Kemp
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: This report centers on enhancing air and missile defense in the Indo-Pacific through a comprehensive, layered, and distributed approach. It addresses the evolving threat landscape, particularly from China, and the current limitations of US defenses against mass precision-guided air and missile attacks on forward bases and facilities.Analysis: The report examines the missile threats from China, assesses the US’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities, and explores concepts for future IAMD, drawing on government reports and expert analysis.Argument: Current IAMD plans are insufficient against the spectrum of threats posed by China, including advanced ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles, as well as unmanned aerial systems (UAS). A layered, comprehensive, and distributed defense strategy is essential for effective deterrence and defense.Insights: Missile defense should be reframed as a “salvo competition,” as China can now launch large salvos of missiles against US bases and territory in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, emerging technologies like high-power microwave weapons and gun-based systems can provide cost-effective salvo defense.Recommendations: See below for the full list of recommendations.This CSBA report emphasizes the critical challenge the US faces from new Chinese threats in the Indo-Pacific region, underscoring the urgent need to enhance Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) systems. It highlights the significance of adapting to China's advancing capabilities to ensure national security and maintain strategic stability in a vital geopolitical theater.
The author notes how China possesses over 1,250 advanced ballistic and cruise missiles able to strike US bases across the Western Pacific. This includes DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, DF-17 missiles with difficult-to-intercept hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), an array of land-attack cruise missiles launched from H-6 bombers and submarines, as well as increasingly sophisticated unmanned aerial systems (UAS) presenting swarming threats. Consequently, China could unleash devastating salvos combining multiple missile types and trajectories to saturate US defenses.
In terms of the US’s defensive potential, the CSBA report finds critical gaps in the US military's IAMD capabilities: the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) systems do not address emerging hypersonic threats; the Navy lacks comprehensive coverage; the Army faces delays in cruise missile defenses; and the Air Force lacks procurement authority, underscoring inter-service coordination issues. While new joint offices — Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) and the Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO) — have been established, the overall assessment is that the current US IAMD posture remains fragmented, vulnerable to cruise missiles and drone threats, and lagging behind the rapid advancement of Chinese capabilities in these areas.
Importantly, the authors provide a conceptual framework for layered IAMD through concentric “outer,” “inner,” and “close-in” rings:
Outer Ring: Focuses on long-range detection and engagement of threats far beyond the range of ground-based systems. Technologies and systems in this ring are designed to counter threats before they can reach critical areas, utilizing advanced radar, satellite surveillance, and long-range interceptors.
Inner Ring: Provides protection for areas immediately surrounding a critical site or base, employing medium-range air and missile defense systems. This layer is designed to intercept threats that penetrate the outer ring, using systems like Patriot and THAAD batteries, UAS, and emerging hypervelocity railguns.
Close-In Ring: Offers point defense against direct attacks on specific assets within a base or site. This ring utilizes short-range defense systems, including high-power microwaves to disable electronics and laser point defenses to protect against low-altitude, close-proximity threats such as drones, cruise missiles, and low-flying aircraft.
In addition, the report provides the following recommendations to DoD and policymakers:
Prioritize and Expedite the Guam Defense System: Continue supporting the Guam Defense System, focusing on capability, cost-effectiveness, and minimal personnel needs. Demand urgency in implementation, address non-material impediments through Congressional hearings, and create a new Guam Master Plan that integrates and prioritizes defense requirements.
Integrate Advanced Command and Control Systems: Continue the integration of CEC and IBCS to support battle management and command and control (BMC2), leveraging new JADC2 efforts to enhance tactical C2 capabilities across the services.
Deploy Advanced Sensing and Defense Technologies: Field Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) equipped with sensors for persistent detection and early warning of salvo attacks, and develop low-cost kinetic and non-kinetic short- to medium-range defenses, including sUAS/sUAS swarm threats. Integrate high-energy lasers (HELs) and high-power microwave/electronic warfare (HPM/EW) capabilities on UAS for enhanced defense capabilities.
Expand High-Power Microwave/Electronic Warfare Defenses: Acquire multiple types of HPM/EW defenses capable of countering UAS swarms, cruise missiles, and other threats, taking advantage of technologies like those demonstrated by the THOR C-UAS program.
To engage with the analysis and recommendations further, I recommend reading the full report.
***Editor’s note: Much analysis is devoted to identifying promising systems and capabilities for DoD to invest in and acquire. However, with the financial constraints imposed on DoD, many of these efforts cannot be realized. Analyses should consider budgetary restraints first and foremost and look to find solutions within those limits.