Quick Tanks: The Best of Long-Form Defense Analysis, Briefly
A weekly review of the long-form content from the national security policy, defense policy, and related technology analysis community.
Welcome back, fellow defense enthusiasts! I'm thrilled to deliver this week's edition of the Quick Tanks newsletter, summarizing the latest and greatest analysis on military strategy and technology.
In today's briefing, we'll explore:
Assumptions hindering the U.S. defense strategy and six barriers to U.S. defense reform
An in-depth look at Taiwan's evolving defense strategy as it faces rising tensions with China
Insights into the Russian military's thinking on future warfare and force design in the shadow of its struggles in Ukraine
Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of U.S. defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.
The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.
Thank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading!
Defending Without Dominance
Accelerating the Transition to a New U.S. Defense Strategy
by Michael J. Mazarr
RAND Corporation
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: Post-Cold War assumptions in U.S. defense strategy and barriers to U.S. defense reform
Analysis: Qualitative analysis of U.S. defense strategy documents, expert interviews, wargaming
Argument: Despite recognizing the need to move beyond post-Cold War assumptions, the U.S. has failed to implement the degree of defense reform required due to bureaucratic and institutional barriers
Insights: The U.S. lacks a coherent theory of success for major contingencies and the character of war is changing faster than the U.S. is adapting. The report identifies the fundamental disconnect between the rhetoric and reality of defense transformation and points to key symptoms like proliferation of buzzwords and "defense reform theater"
Recommendations: The U.S. should form executive-legislative coalitions to achieve reforms, aim to deter without dominance by regulating ambitions, accelerate development of joint concepts, and plan to fight initial battles with forces on hand
The unchallenged military primacy enjoyed by the U.S. for decades has ended. Continuing to assume otherwise hampers defense reform and leaves the country unprepared for conflicts with powerful adversaries like China and Russia. Strategies that proved successful in the Gulf War and Global War on Terror will largely fail against peer and near-peer threats. The adversarial landscape and the very nature of warfare have evolved since the 2000s, necessitating a revamped U.S. defense strategy. This RAND report highlights how, despite acknowledging inadequacies, U.S. defense leaders have been slow to enact meaningful reforms.
"Many public statements of senior U.S. defense leaders, along with the rhetoric in some public concepts and service strategies, accept the seriousness of these trends, including the potential for a break point in the character of major warfare. But the actual policies of defense institutions do not match the diagnosis of the need for change. Much of the behavior of the U.S. defense establishment — the weapons it buys, the forces it builds, the kinds of posture it seeks to develop, and the career paths and skills it emphasizes — is appropriate for a world in which the character of war remains static, or at most changes very slowly. Accelerating this pace of change, and making the institutional reforms necessary to empower that change, is the dominant challenge in defense policy today."
To explain the lack of preparedness, the report lays out the various assumptions plaguing U.S. defense policy after multiple decades of uncontested military dominance. The belief that U.S. forces can freely deploy into combat theaters, for instance, ignores capabilities like China's long-range weapons, cyber capabilities, mines, and submarines. Likewise, the assumptions of invulnerable space assets and homeland security no longer hold. Given these outdated assumptions and concerning trends, the study identifies and analyzes six key barriers to defense reform:
Incomplete progress challenging default strategy assumptions
Lack of a coherent strategic concept and theory of success
Institutional rigidity
Over-reliance on expensive advanced systems
Innovation barriers
Structural vulnerabilities
Though some efforts to adapt strategy are underway, the scope and efficiency of this transformation remains insufficient. The report recommends several actions to improve reform, including:
Forming executive-legislative coalitions to achieve long-delayed reforms in a handful of critical areas
Aiming to deter without dominance, in part by regulating U.S. operational ambitions
Planning to achieve initial operational objectives with forces in place plus modest reinforcements
Accelerating the development of a true joint concept for how U.S. forces will fight in future major contingencies across all domains
Redoubling the focus on and investments in sensing and targeting grids and battle-management systems
Shifting focus to power projection capabilities over force structure
Overall, this report highlights the assumptions underlying current U.S. defense strategy and the barriers impeding efforts to adapt it to today's strategic landscape. I urge you to carefully examine the analysis and recommendations in this study, so that we can ensure military preparedness in potential future conflicts.
Before Zero Day
Taiwan’s Evolving Defense Strategy and the Struggle for Peace
by Ian Easton, Eric Lee, Grace Price, Colby Ferland, Cathy Fang, Mark Stokes, and Alice Cho
Project 2049
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: Taiwan's defense strategy and U.S.-Taiwan relations in light of the war in Ukraine
Analysis: Interviews, speeches, strategy documents, and media reports that elicit Taiwanese perspectives
Argument: The war in Ukraine is driving major changes in Taiwan's defense strategy and threat perceptions, and the U.S. should help Taiwan bolster its defenses and deter China from invading
Insights: Taiwanese experts see invasion as increasingly likely and happening sooner than expected. Moreover, deterrence against China is weakening, requiring bolder steps by the U.S. and Taiwan
Recommendations: The U.S. should increase military cooperation with Taiwan through exercises, ship visits, troop deployments, and more
It is not hard to find a report that covers some dimension of the security crisis surrounding Taiwan. Nevertheless, this Project 2049 report stands out, as it tackles the question of Taiwanese defense strategy directly. Combining history, strategy, and boots-on-the-ground reporting, this report is a valuable resource to help understand the Taiwan-China situation and Taiwan's respective defense strategy.
To explain how the current strategy arose, the authors analyze the evolution of Taiwan strategy from Chiang Kai-shek's initial "Offensive Defensive" to the modern-day blend of asymmetric warfare and traditional defense. Still, the report situates itself in the context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Specifically, it argues the war in Ukraine represents an inflection point for Taiwan, as the Taiwanese government is undertaking significant military reforms, extending conscription, and increasing defense spending in light of Russia's invasion.
The report also pays heed to public sentiment in Taiwan towards a potential Chinese invasion and provides interesting insights into the Taiwanese "will to fight." Despite pervasive Chinese disinformation, propaganda and cyber attacks, the report indicates the Taiwanese determination to fight remains strong and, in some cases, been further emboldened.
"Ukraine’s experience seems to have imbued a large segment of the Taiwanese public with a strong sense of confidence and renewed dedication to defend their country. Polling data suggest that the majority of people in Taiwan will fight if the CCP invades. On March 15, 2022, a public opinion poll, ‘War in Ukraine and Taiwan Strait Security,’ found that 70.2 percent of respondents were willing to go to war in defense of Taiwan. On March 23, 2022, another poll, ‘Today Ukraine, Tomorrow Taiwan,’ found that 55 percent of Taiwanese respondents believed the United States would not send forces to defend Taiwan in the event of a PRC attack. By way of comparison, a poll conducted in 2011 found that only 27 percent believed that the United States would not intervene militarily to defend Taiwan. In spite of mistrust in American commitments, over 60 percent of Taiwanese between ages 20 and 39 (and ages 50-59) said they were willing to ‘go to the battlefield’ themselves, and 72 percent of respondents between the ages of 40-49 were willing to go to war. Both polls found that a majority of the Taiwanese people were willing to defend their country, although only 44 percent of them believed Taiwan could actually stop a Chinese invasion without U.S. military intervention. If accurate, these polls would seem to indicate that many people in Taiwan will fight to defend their country even if they believe it’s a lost cause."
The report concludes with several recommendations:
Increase high-level diplomatic exchanges and military coordination between the U.S. and Taiwan through actions like direct presidential communications, bilateral military exercises, and advisory groups in Taiwan.
Enhance U.S. military presence and early warning capabilities around the Taiwan Strait through measures like ship patrols, submarine visits, and intelligence cooperation.
Accelerate U.S. arms transfers and assistance to strengthen Taiwan’s defense capabilities, including in asymmetric warfare.
Assist Taiwan in implementing urgent defense reforms and integrating into the regional security architecture.
Bolster deterrence by being more transparent about certain Taiwanese military capabilities and PLA weaknesses.
"The cardinal lesson of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is far more obvious. It’s so simple and easily perceived, in fact, that it seems self-evident. The lesson is this: Relatively small, non-nuclear democracies cannot and should not be expected to successfully deter large, nuclear-armed dictatorships in isolation."
Overall, this report provides invaluable insights into how Taiwan is preparing for the possibility of conflict with China. The evolution of Taiwan's defense strategy and the U.S. commitment to its defense will have profound implications for peace and stability in Asia. I highly recommend giving the full report a read!
In the Shadow of Ukraine
Russian Concepts of Future Wars and Force Design
By Seth G. Jones
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: Russian military thinking on future warfare and force design over the next 5 years
Analysis: Russian military journals and interviews with U.S., European, and Ukrainian officials
Argument: Russia continues to see the U.S. as its main threat. It will focus on reconstituting its military, especially the army, and on long-range precision weapons, autonomous systems, emerging tech, and hybrid warfare
Insights: Russia faces challenges implementing reforms due to their economic crisis, corruption, strained defense industry, and civil-military friction
When Russia invaded Ukraine in February of 2022, the ubiquitous expectation was that the conflict would be over in days or weeks. Yet, the war remains ongoing over a year and a half later, thanks to the Ukrainians’ unquestionable willpower and determination, billions of dollars worth of military assistance from U.S. and fellow NATO allies, and, in large part, abject failure by the Russian military. Despite numerical and technological advantages over their Ukrainian counterparts, the Russia military’s weaknesses have been exposed. But as this incisive CSIS report highlights, there is no time to gloat while Russia looks to adapt and improve its deficiencies.
In his report, Seth Jones provides examines two central questions: How does Russia think about future warfare, and how will Russia evolve its force design over the next five years?
Before exploring what’s ahead of the Russian military, the report backgrounds its analysis with a historical account of post-Soviet Russia’s views on warfare and force design. Indeed, Russia’s military evolution through its development of precision weapons, its force structure reform resulting in the Battalion Tactical Group, and its utilization of information and cyber operations to build out its hybrid warfare strategy all shaped our expectations for a swift Russian victory in Ukraine. Thus, the historical account is crucial, for we can see from where our miscalculations arose.
In terms of future warfare, the report argues Russian military analyses view the fundamental nature of war as unchanging, focused on controlling territory and breaking the enemy's will. However, the character of warfare is evolving rapidly due to technology. The report highlights key areas of interest such as the continued relevance of contact warfare alongside the growth of long-range precision strikes, the increasing use of autonomous systems like drones, and new technologies including AI, hypersonics, and electronic warfare. Also, Russia sees future wars involving more non-state actors and hybrid warfare.
As for force design, Russia aims to revitalize its military, especially the army, over the next 5 years. After the army’s struggles in Ukraine, the report expects the army to shift back to a division structure and focus on increasing mobility and decentralization of forces. The air force will expand in size and integrate more autonomous vehicles, and the navy will strengthen its nuclear submarine forces. However, Russia faces economic and industrial challenges in rebuilding its military fully. It may prioritize cheaper improvements like restructuring the army and expanding drones rather than expensive new platforms. Ultimately, Russia's ability to close gaps with Western militaries will depend on overcoming economic limitations and corruption.
“Achieving many of these goals will be challenging, if not impossible, as the next chapter explains. Russian leaders may want to make numerous changes, but they will be highly constrained. Russia faces a suite of financial, military, political, social, and other issues that will force political and military leaders to prioritize changes in force design. Building a bigger navy and air force will be expensive, as will increasing the size of Russian ground forces by 22 total divisions. Moscow plans to boost its defense budget in 2024 to roughly 6 percent of gross domestic product, up from 3.9 percent in 2023. But this increase will not be sufficient to implement all the changes Moscow’s leaders have discussed.”
Even for the casual observer, this report is an intriguing window into the mindset of a global rival. If you want to comprehend Russia's military future beyond the latest Ukraine headlines, this report hits the mark.
