Quick Tanks: The Best of Long-Form Defense Analysis, Briefly
A weekly review of the long-form content from the national security policy, defense policy, and related technology analysis community.
Welcome back, defense aficionados.
In this week’s newsletter, I have two compelling reports to highlight. The topics are:
How are drones changing the dynamics of conflict between Russia and Ukraine?
What are the proliferation risks of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)?
Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.
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Evolution Not Revolution
Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine
By Stacie Pettyjohn
Center for a New American Security
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report explores the impact of drones on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. It examines the deployment and effects of various types of drones, including military, commercial, and kamikaze drones, in the context of this specific conflict and broader implications for future warfare.Analysis: Utilizing a mix of primary interviews, think tank reports, social media analysis, and secondary sources, the report provides an in-depth examination of drone warfare's tactical innovations, limitations, and cyclical adaptation between opposing forces.Argument: While drones have introduced new capabilities and allowed for tactical innovations, their impact falls short of a military revolution. The localized effects of drones, coupled with the rapid adaptation and emulation by both Russian and Ukrainian forces, have prevented either side from gaining a decisive advantage. Moreover, the easy access to commercial drone technologies has further muddled the dynamics on the battlefield, indicating a complex evolution rather than a transformative leap in how conflicts are waged.Insights: Rather than invest in hardening drone defenses and enhancing their survivability, both militaries are relying on “resiliency through reconstitution” by buying cheap commercial drones en masse. Tactically, drones are used more often for surveillance and targeting missions, as opposed to drone strikes.Recommendations: Both military and civilian sectors should anticipate continued evolution in drone warfare, emphasizing the need for rapid innovation and countermeasures. The report advises military planners to integrate drone strategies into broader operational concepts and highlights the importance of international cooperation in regulating drone technology.This CNAS report firmly establishes the critical role of drones in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, underscoring that while drones have significantly impacted tactics and operational strategies, they have not revolutionized warfare in its entirety. Rather, the report emphasizes the evolutionary nature of drone usage in warfare, facilitated by rapid cycles of innovation and adaptation by both Ukrainian and Russian forces.
The report differentiates between commercial and military drones, noting that the former are relatively affordable, whereas the latter boast enhanced survivability, longer range, and overall more advanced capabilities. Thus far, Ukraine has been more efficient in procuring and deploying commercial drones for targeting and surveillance operations:
“Ukrainian drone operations and tactics have evolved over time. In the first few phases of the war, Ukrainian drone teams typically drove to the front lines, found a location to hide, launched their drone, and searched for targets. They usually left when they found Russian forces or exhausted their drone’s battery life. As the conflict progressed and the front lines stabilized, Ukrainian forces have increasingly operated quadcopters in pairs or groups, which provides redundancy and the ability to execute different tasks simultaneously, and have been closely linked to nearby ires units. For instance, the BBC shows two Ukrainian drone operators searching for targets and correcting artillery ire, a mission they can complete even though one drone is lost. At other times, an unarmed quadcopter has looked for targets while an armed quadcopter has loitered nearby, prepared to engage any enemy forces that are found. In December 2022, analyst Sam Bendett noted that Russian soldiers on Telegram were reporting that Ukrainian drone operators had adopted a new tactic to expose Russian targets at night. One drone with a light shining would fly overhead to attract Russian fire, while another drone that was dark and hovering at a different altitude recorded the location of the firing unit.”
With the proliferation of ISR drones along the frontlines, maneuver operations have become increasingly dangerous and forces are hesitant to concentrate themselves. In fact, the report highlights that artillery shells can be deployed within three to five minutes after detection by a drone.
However, Russia has been quick to adapt and emulate Ukraine’s successful tactics with commercial drones, preventing large capability gaps from emerging. Moreover, despite initial supply shortages, Russia now has a strong advantage in the quality and quantity of its military drones, which it uses to see and strike Ukrainian forces further behind the frontlines. Russia’s supply of Orlan-10 and ZALA drones is substantial enough that Ukrainian forces sometimes refrain from shooting them and wasting munitions, as they will be quickly replaced.
Despite targeting and surveillance missions being more prominent, the report notes how drone strikes still play a notable role. For instance, Kamikaze First-Person View (FPV) drones are less potent than conventional anti-tank weapons, but they have a range six times further than advanced anti-tank weaponry. For this reason, a well-placed kamikaze drone poses a legitimate threat to tanks and has influenced how heavy forces maneuver. With respect to deep strategic strikes in enemy territory, Russia more frequently employs drones, specifically with Shahed-136’s.
“Shaheds have played three primary roles in Russia’s strategic strikes: interceptor sponges, pathfinders, and complements…In this role as interceptor sponges, the Shahed kamikazes are similar to decoys that distract defensive ires from the primary weapons…In the pathfinder role, a group of Shaheds are fired at targets, but Russia does not necessarily expect them to complete the strike mission. The main purpose instead is to reveal important information on the posture of Ukrainian SAMs and to help identify air corridors for follow-on missile salvos. Finally, the Shahed drones have complemented the missiles in complex massed missile and drone attacks that are harder to defeat than a homogenous salvo. There have been 29 such attacks. As complements, the Shaheds serve as penetration aids that increase the chance that the missiles reach their targets by confusing and distracting defenders.”
In conclusion, this report illuminates the nuanced impact of drones in the Ukraine conflict, highlighting their significant but evolutionary role in modern warfare through innovative tactics and adaptations by both sides.
To engage with the analysis more fully, I highly recommend reading the full report.
Assessing Autonomous Weapons as a Proliferation Risk
The Future Has Not Been Written
By Paul O’Neill, Sam Cranny-Evans, and Dr. Sarah Ashbridge
Royal United Services Institute
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: This report examines the proliferation risks associated with Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS), categorizing them into three main types: Minimum Viable Product (MVP), Military Off-the-Shelf (MOTS), and boutique LAWS.Analysis: The analysis is grounded in a comprehensive literature review and expert interviews, spanning from August 2022 to April 2023. It assesses technological, regulatory, and military factors influencing LAWS proliferation.Argument: The proliferation of LAWS is inevitable due to the dual-use nature of the underlying technologies and their perceived military benefits. However, the lack of a clear definition for LAWS complicates efforts to regulate and control their spread. Moreover, depending on their sophistication, LAWS pose varying levels of risk and demand different responses from users and regulators.Insights: MVP LAWS pose the highest risk of proliferation, especially among non-state actors, due to their low development barriers. MOTS LAWS are rapidly proliferating to any actor with sufficient funds, including non-state entities, offering significant battlefield advantages. Boutique LAWS, being highly sophisticated and costly, are less likely to proliferate beyond the most affluent states but pose high destabilization risks.Recommendations: Military organizations to take a leading role in international discussions on LAWS, advocating for realistic regulation over outright prohibition. In addition, specific uses and outcomes of LAWS, rather than their autonomous nature, should guide regulatory efforts.This RUSI report on LAWS provides an essential analysis in the evolving context of modern warfare, where autonomous systems are increasingly becoming central to national security strategies. It articulates the varying proliferation risks associated with different categories of LAWS: minimum viable product (MVP), military off-the-shelf (MOTS), and boutique LAWS. By defining LAWS as a spectrum of technologies rather than a monolithic entity, the report emphasizes the nuanced understanding required to grasp their implications for international security and stability. This introduction sets the stage for a comprehensive exploration of the strategic, ethical, and regulatory challenges posed by the advent and spread of autonomous weapons on the global stage.
The report details the proliferation risks of MVP LAWS, highlighting their relative accessibility due to low developmental barriers. Indeed, the dual-use nature of technologies like AI and drone technology can be repurposed for autonomous weapons by individuals and non-state actors with relative ease. Moreover, despite their inherent weaknesses and lower quality compared to more advanced systems, MVP LAWS represent a significant threat due to their potential for asymmetric use. Weaker powers or non-state actors could deploy these systems en masse, exploiting their numbers and autonomy to challenge stronger military forces, thereby altering the dynamics of conflict and deterrence.
As for stronger powers, their militaries will turn toward MOTS LAWS which will be of higher quality. Thus, the proliferation risks of MOTS LAWS are examined through the lens of specific countries:
China: China's advancement in autonomous technology and its history of international arms sales position it as a significant proliferation challenge. Its defense industry has successfully developed and marketed LAWS internationally, such as the Blowfish A2 drone, highlighting a potential for widespread proliferation.
Iran: Iran's support for proxy forces and its development of drones with autonomous capabilities underscore its significant proliferation risk. Its willingness to distribute sensitive technologies to allies and proxies enhances its potential impact on regional conflicts and beyond.
Russia: Russia's development of autonomous weapons, such as the Lancet loitering munition, signals its intent to remain competitive in military technology. Despite potential constraints from Western sanctions, Russia's advancements suggest a commitment to integrating LAWS into its arsenal.
UAE: The UAE's acquisition of advanced autonomous systems, like China's Blowfish A2 drone, indicates its capability and intent to enhance its military with autonomous technologies, raising concerns about regional proliferation risks.
Israel: Israel's dual role as a developer and exporter of military technology, including autonomous systems like the Harpy, places it at the forefront of LAWS proliferation, albeit moderated by its strategic relationship with the United States.
Turkey: Turkey's active development and deployment of indigenous drones and autonomous systems in recent conflicts underscore its engagement with autonomous technologies, potentially influencing regional security dynamics and proliferation trends.
Boutique LAWS, as described in the report, are sophisticated systems designed for specific strategic purposes by major powers. Their high cost and technological complexity make them less susceptible to widespread proliferation. However, the report argues that their existence and potential use carry significant implications for global security, particularly in terms of destabilizing effects and the conveyance of political messages. These systems epitomize the cutting edge of military technology, raising concerns about arms races and the escalation of conflicts through advanced autonomous capabilities.
“The US Air Force Skyborg Programme was established to explore varying degrees of autonomy in human–machine teams. Operating alongside Next Generation Air Dominance, it aims to develop next-generation combat air capabilities, including loyal wingman drones and new command-and-control systems. Others are also developing loyal wingman drones, including Airbus (in Europe), Turkey (Programme Kizilelma), Australia (Ghost Bat) and the UK. China has also joined the fray with its FH-97A, which is orientated towards aerial combat and breaching enemy air defenses. The loyal wingman concepts generally seek to unlock difficult missions for air forces such as augmenting aerial situational awareness in heavily defended airspace, or penetration and suppression of enemy air defenses, which makes them potentially destabilizing, albeit within very specific boundaries.
Creating systems designed to penetrate and defeat national defenses could be destabilizing, but this should not be overstated. Air defense networks are not perfect solutions and are vulnerable to strikes from the air, land and sea. However, it is possible that future iterations of these and other boutique autonomous weapons could lead to fractious international relations. An example might be the potential effects of autonomous weapons designed specifically to hunt and destroy elements of a country’s nuclear deterrent, such as the US Navy’s Sea Hunter, which is designed to conduct autonomous ocean patrols and track enemy submarines.”
Finally, the report offers insights into mechanisms for constraining the proliferation of LAWS, advocating for a regulatory focus on the outcomes and uses of these systems rather than their inherent autonomy. It suggests that international agreements, controls on critical components and software, and restrictions on the dissemination of training data could play pivotal roles in managing the risks associated with LAWS. By differentiating between defensive and offensive uses, such as distinguishing between autonomous air defense systems and those capable of autonomous offensive operations, the report calls for nuanced and outcome-focused regulatory frameworks to prevent the destabilizing proliferation of autonomous weapons.
I highly recommend reading the full report to better understand the risks of LAWS proliferation.