Quick Tanks: The Best of Long-Form Defense Analysis, Briefly
A weekly review of the long-form content from the national security policy, defense policy, and related technology analysis community.
Welcome back, hearty readers.
This week, I have two intriguing reports to share with you all. Their topics are:
How could the US and its allies employ effective economic sanctions against China
The scenarios for deliberate nuclear use by both the US and China in a conflict over Taiwan
Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.
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No Winners in This Game
Assessing the U.S. Playbook for Sanctioning China
By Emily Kilcrease
Center for a New American Security
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report assesses options for sanctioning China economically if relations deteriorate, analyzing China's vulnerability to sanctions and points of US leverage.Analysis: The report includes extensive economic and political analysis of China, an evaluation of sanctions options, and insights from an economic strategy game. The analysis draws heavily from economic data, research interviews with experts, and game scenarios.Argument: The central argument of the report is that while economic sanctions are a powerful tool in US foreign policy, their application against a major power like China presents unique challenges and risks. The United States does not have a clear asymmetric advantage across most sanctions options and faces substantial uncertainty around the impacts of maximal measures like financial sanctions. Insights: Sanctions against China would reverberate throughout the global economy, affecting not just China but also the US and its allies. Moreover, restrictions intended to deny China access to globally available commodities will require policy innovations like novel market incentives to limit China's alternatives. Thirdly, there are no easy pathways for sanctions to influence China’s political decision-making given its authoritarian structure, but economic impacts may constrain the sustainment of military operations.Recommendations: The report recommends a range of institutional, international, and operational steps for the US and its partners. Institutionally, it suggests developing integrated economic domain strategies and strengthening sanctions assessment and enforcement capabilities. Internationally, it calls for coordinated strategic planning, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic outreach. Operationally, it advocates for preparing various sanctions mechanisms, including technology denial, commodity embargo, and macroeconomic pressure operations.As the once-unthinkable prospect of imposing severe and widespread sanctions on China grows increasingly possible, this CNAS report provides a comprehensive analysis of the complexities and strategic considerations involved in sanctioning China. The core argument of the report is that while sanctioning China is a strategic imperative that the United States and its partners must consider in the face of deteriorating relations, it presents unprecedented challenges due to the complexity and scale of China’s economy.
The report notes several factors when it comes to assessing China as a potential target for sanction. For one, China’s deep integration in global supply chains greatly complicates sanctioning efforts, making it incredibly difficult to predict impacts on the US and its allies. From a political standpoint, China’s consolidated power structure is resilient to sanctions, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) prioritizes political stability over economic growth and maintains the ability to suppress any public dissent over economic repercussions. However, the report finds that its reliance on global financial infrastructure is a particular vulnerability, with China depending on the US dollar for much of its international trade and financial operations.
Should the US choose to apply macroeconomic pressure given the dollar’s dominance in global financial architecture, the report argues the US must coordinate with countries around the world, especially in the Global South. This coordination is crucial not only for building a broad coalition of support but also for understanding and addressing the diverse economic impacts that might arise in different regions.
In assessing the use of technology denial to diminish China's military capabilities, the report identifies that export controls targeting key sectors such as aviation, space, and artificial intelligence could be strategically beneficial. These measures, particularly when reinforced with support from European allies, could exert significant pressure on China's technological advancements in these critical areas. However, the report emphasizes that for technology denial to be truly effective, it necessitates a comprehensive and long-term strategic approach.
Furthermore, the report delves into the intricacies of embargoes on strategic commodities and minerals, highlighting the nuanced challenges in this domain. While the United States holds considerable sway in the realm of LNG exports, the landscape of energy alternatives available to China presents a complex scenario. China's robust capabilities in renewable energy, coupled with the presence of multiple oil-producing nations that do not necessarily align with US interests, afford China a range of options to circumvent potential embargoes.
“In the energy sector, for example, it may be naive to expect that major producers in the Middle East or elsewhere would align with U.S. sanctions, particularly if doing so would have negative commercial impacts. It may be more viable to secure buy-in if the United States can create incentives, rather than punishments, for alignment with the United States. The oil price cap currently being used in the Russia context is a good example of a novel market mechanism: it is designed to keep Russian energy on the market while depriving Russia of energy revenues and creating an incentive (i.e., cheaper oil) for non-aligned states. China is a net energy importer, and a novel market mechanism would be flipped to create incentives to deny China’s purchases—rather than sales—of energy.”
Ultimately, the report recommends a range of institutional, international, and operational steps for the US and its partners:
To better understand the nuanced recommendations and analyses, I highly encourage you to look into the full report.
Deliberate Nuclear Use in a War over Taiwan
Scenarios and Considerations for the United States
By Matthew Kroenig
Atlantic Council
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report focuses on scenarios for deliberate nuclear use by the US or China in a potential war over Taiwan, and considers strategy, policy, and operational questions for the US in response.Analysis: The analysis examines possible rational incentives and scenarios for limited, deliberate nuclear use by either side, drawing on nuclear strategy theory and historical Cold War examples to illustrate concepts.Argument: Deliberate nuclear use, not just inadvertent escalation, is plausible in a Taiwan conflict given the high stakes. Specifically, China could use threats, demonstration blasts, or limited strikes to deter outside intervention, compel Taiwan's surrender, or defeat US/allied forces. Conversely, the US could use nuclear weapons if unable to halt a Chinese invasion conventionally or to retaliate for an initial Chinese nuclear strike.Insights: Both the US and China would have strong resolve in a Taiwan conflict, willing to take major risks including nuclear threats or use. The US could target PLA Navy vessels, militarized islands in the South China Sea, and PLA beachheads in Taiwan, while China could target Taiwanese political and military leadership and possibly even US or allied forces.Recommendations: The US should identify off-mainland PLA targets suitable for proportionate, militarily useful nuclear strikes that minimize civilian harm, while warning China not to expect sanctuary status for its mainland. In addition, the US should explicitly extend the US nuclear umbrella over Taiwan, enhance defenses of regional bases, initiate Taiwan contingency planning for potential nuclear use, and prioritize conventional forces and capabilities that both deter Chinese aggression and enable damage limitation if deterrence fails.As tensions rise in the Taiwan Strait, the prospect of war between the United States and China looms heavy. This Atlantic Council report sounds the alarm on a chilling possibility - deliberate nuclear use by either power. Given the conflict's immense stakes, the report argues nuclear weapons may be rational, not just as a deterrent, but as usable tools to achieve victory.
The report explains that the US and China would both have enormous resolve to prevail in a Taiwan conflict. For the US, defeat would undermine the rules-based international order and alliance commitments worldwide. For Beijing, the legitimacy of the CCP hinges on restoring China as a leading global power, with the unification of Taiwan seen as essential for the nation's rejuvenation.
The analysis explores scenarios in which the US or China could employ limited nuclear strikes to secure objectives where conventional means fall short. For China, the options range from nuclear signaling and demonstrations to outright nuclear attacks on Taiwan, US forces, or the territory of the US or its allies. Such actions could stem from China's perceived strategic advantages, an effort to compel negotiations, or a belief that US nuclear use is impending. Conversely, if facing conventional defeat, the US might contemplate nuclear first use as a drastic measure to thwart a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
“The likeliest scenarios for US nuclear first use during a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be an attack directly against the Chinese invasion force in the face of a Taiwanese defeat or as retaliation for a large-scale non-nuclear strategic attack on the US homeland or that of its allies.
The United States could find itself in a scenario in which the president decides to use nuclear weapons because he or she seeks to prevent the success of a Chinese invasion but lacks the conventional forces to do so. This situation could come about for a variety of reasons, including an intelligence failure that does not provide warning of a Chinese buildup, a successful Chinese conventional preemptive strike on key US conventional forces in the region, or a failure by the United States to invest in sufficient conventional forces to defend Taiwan. In this case, the United States would seek to use nuclear weapons against the invasion force to frustrate the immediate success of the attack and to provide time for reinforcements or give room for diplomacy.”
Should China first employ a nuclear attack, the author argues the US must respond with a nuclear attack of its own in order to restore intrawar and global deterrence. Specifically, a US nuclear response should demonstrate to China and other nuclear rivals that further nuclear escalation would not be beneficial, assuring allies, and minimizing the risk of further escalation. The US might target PLA Navy vessels, militarized islands in the South China Sea, or PLA beachheads in Taiwan in response to Chinese nuclear use. Each option carries specific risks and benefits, with considerations around the potential for escalation, civilian casualties, and the strategic importance of the targets.
“Another reason why Chinese nuclear use would require a US nuclear response is that a devastating conventional response would be especially hard to achieve and communicate clearly in the midst of a high-intensity conventional war between the United States and China. If Chinese nuclear use occurs several weeks or months into the conflict, there will then likely be an ongoing exchange of conventional munitions, and many ideal targets will likely already be degraded. In this instance, it is not clear that a conventional strike could represent a significant enough escalation to signal to China that it had underestimated US resolve. If the United States was already engaged in a campaign to degrade military forces and bases involved in the war on Taiwan, would striking another such target with conventional munitions really constitute a devastating response to Chinese nuclear use? The target set suitable for conventional retaliation is also constrained by another objective of a US response: preventing escalation to a strategic exchange and following the law of war. A strike on some targets serviceable by conventional forces—for example, national leadership, national command-and-control facilities, nuclear forces—could be perceived as a decapitating or disarming strike with a greater risk of escalation than desired.”
The report argues the US should build a strong conventional deterrent against Chinese aggression with allies like Taiwan while also extending nuclear deterrence coverage to Taiwan explicitly. It advises dispersing and sheltering regional US facilities, deploying new tactical nuclear weapons like sea-launched cruise missiles, and identifying non-escalatory Chinese targets for potential nuclear response. Other recommendations include assisting Taiwan in handling nuclear threats, expanding homeland missile defenses to address nuclear-armed competitors like China, and prioritizing conventional forces that could support nuclear counterforce strikes if required. Overall the report urges the US to plan seriously for deliberate nuclear use in a Taiwan crisis, strengthen deterrence accordingly, and coordinate with allies to mitigate risks.
I highly recommend looking into the full report to learn more about the scenarios and rationale discussed above.