Quick Tanks: The Best of Long-Form Defense Analysis, Briefly
A weekly review of the long-form content from the national security policy, defense policy, and related technology analysis community.
Welcome back, hearty readers.
Once again, I've compiled some fascinating reports for you that are worth a read. These reports dive into topics like:
How the Australian Defence Force can more effectively integrate uncrewed systems
The future of the global digital infrastructure landscape and the potential ramifications for US-China military competition
Changes in Russia's nuclear posture since its invasion of Ukraine and implications for the US and NATO
Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.
The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.
Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.
Raising AUKUS’s Second Pillar:
Integrating Uncrewed and Other Emerging Technologies into the Australian Defence Forces
By Bryan Clark & Dan Patt
Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: This report focuses on how the Australian Defence Force (ADF) can more effectively integrate uncrewed systems across air, surface, and underwater domains to improve operational flexibility and scale against China.Analysis: The authors conduct a qualitative analysis, drawing analogies from commercial technology adoption practices. They assess recent defense concepts like AUKUS and the PLA's system destruction warfare doctrine, and their data sources include defense budgets, force structure, and capability development processes.Argument: The report argues that to fully exploit their potential, uncrewed systems need to be employed as independent elements in adaptable systems of systems rather than mere extensions of crewed units. This would allow Australia to gain flexibility and scale to counter China's numerical and technical advances.Insights: The report advocates adopting a "mission integration" model, akin to commercial practices for rapid technology adoption, to field uncrewed systems at an operationally relevant scale. This bottom-up approach focuses on evolving tactics and workflows rather than building autonomous replacements for crewed platforms.Recommendations: The report recommends establishing the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator as the lead for a new mission integration process. It advises creating software integration processes and ecosystem managers to enable rapid fielding of new capabilities. It also highlights opportunities for collaborative AUKUS efforts in assessment, prototyping, and experimentation.At a time of intensifying military competition in the Indo-Pacific, this report from Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology provides critical insights into how the Australian Defence Force can gain an operational advantage by expanding its use of uncrewed systems. Against major adversaries like China, incrementally developing more advanced technologies alone will not confer decisive superiority. Instead, creativity in force employment and command, control, and communications will be vital. With this in mind, the authors outline a systematic process for integrating uncrewed vehicles into flexible systems of systems (SoS), offering practical steps toward a more adaptable and resilient force structure.
A core argument of the report is that uncrewed systems should not just extend crewed platforms, but rather enable new operational concepts as independent elements of effects chains. Thus, the characteristics of uncrewed vehicles – expendability, persistence, reduced operator costs – can be exploited through an SoS approach. Moreover, the limits of vehicle autonomy necessitate their use in collaborative systems of systems rather than as stand-alone solutions.
To rapidly integrate uncrewed systems at operationally relevant scale, the report details a six-function process for the Australian Defence Department:
Identify gaps and opportunities
Assess SoS solutions through modeling and simulation
Prioritize and resource further development
Build prototypes and experiment
Digitally integrate successful systems
Validate and implement solutions
Importantly, these functions would occur in parallel and interactively, not linearly. For instance, analysis from modeling and simulation may influence which capability gaps should be prioritized. Furthermore, this six-function process presents substantial opportunities for collaboration under AUKUS.
“The ADF conducts prototyping and experimentation at a comparable tempo to the US military, when the relative size of the forces is considered. However, the US DoD may have more access to available government or commercial uncrewed vehicles, crewed military or surrogate platforms, and modular mission systems. The ADoD and US DoD leads for AUKUS Pillar Two should collaborate to allow existing capabilities under US DoD control to be made available to ADF prototype SoS development. This effort could include efforts to navigate or relax technology transfer restrictions.
Conversely, the US lacks range capacity for some types of experimentation, such as electromagnetic spectrum operations, long-range fires, and IAMD. And even the US DoD’s highly capable ranges are only available for limited periods due to encroachment of civilian air and maritime activities, which slows the tempo of prototype SoS evaluations. Australia’s test and training ranges, which are less encumbered, are ideal environments for assessing alliance prototype SoS through frequent, high-tempo experimentation campaigns that would help speed US and Australian innovation. The US Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and CASG should coordinate to identify opportunities to better employ the alliance’s range capabilities.”
Overall, the report makes three recommendations to enable the Australian Defence Force to more rapidly field uncrewed systems:
Formalize a mission integration process that would conduct the functions of SoS development to address near-term gaps and opportunities.
Establish the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator as the resource sponsor for systems-of-systems development and the manager of the mission integration process.
Create a process for digital integration that combines industry expertise with government ownership of interfaces between systems. This would use ecosystem managers to oversee the integration of new systems into the software environment.
Overall, the report provides an insightful roadmap for how creative employment of uncrewed systems can confer advantages amid rising military competition. Its emphasis on adaptable systems over advanced platforms alone highlights important lessons for strategists and defense leaders. Those interested in the future of warfare should examine the report's recommendations in detail.
Alternative Futures for Digital Infrastructure
Insights and Considerations for the Department of Defense
By Julia Brackup, Sarah Harting, Daniel Gonzales, and Brandon Corbin
RAND Corporation
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report assesses the future of the global digital infrastructure landscape and the potential implications for US-China military competition.Analysis: The report leverages an alternative futures analysis, informed by previous RAND research defining digital infrastructure and the factors shaping competition outcomes. The authors develop one baseline future projection and three alternative futures.Argument: The report argues that the future digital infrastructure landscape will have significant military implications, affecting how, where, and when US and Chinese forces operate in competition and potential conflict.Insights: Ceding a digital infrastructure advantage to China could erode US military power, and structural factors like the STEM workforce will shape digital infrastructure outcomes.Recommendations: The report recommends that the DoD account for the digital infrastructure footprint and comparative advantages when assessing military competition. Moreover, the authors identify areas for further research like understanding China's perspective and developing scenarios to explore operations implications.As the United States and China jockey for advantage in the high-stakes competition over digital infrastructure (DI), this RAND report provides a critical examination of how this vital domain could evolve and its potential implications for future military operations. The report leverages an alternative futures approach to map out scenarios for DI in 2050, assessing the strategic considerations for defense planners as DI becomes a new battleground between great powers.
The report develops one baseline projection based on current trends and three alternatives that could emerge. In the “Baseline” future, ownership remains diffuse with no clear winner. China gains ground in wireless networks and submarine cables, but the US leads in space infrastructure. In a time of conflict, interconnected supply chains pose vulnerabilities in cyber and intelligence operations. But, the US retains inherent advantages if it has conventional supremacy. Posture and operations could be limited in regions dominated by Chinese DI.
The "Cyber Fortress" future depicts China controlling global DI hardware through microchip dominance, while the US maintains leadership in software. To mitigate risks, the US invests heavily in cybersecurity for a closed DI with allies, becoming a leader in sanitizing malicious hardware. On the other hand, China exploits the global ubiquity of its DI for espionage and influence. This future makes US military communications and operations more complex globally, and power projection and overseas presence become difficult without bringing US DI to the theatre of operations.
In the "Technological Decoupling" future, deliberate US and Chinese government efforts result in separate, incompatible DI spheres by 2050 - one led by the US, one by China. With limited interoperability, military coordination is confined within each bloc. Operational assessments suggest power projection remains viable within US-allied DI territories, but global intelligence operations become more constrained.
The "Rise of the Corporations" future sees US tech giants dominating DI, competing against Chinese state control. With minimized government influence, military implications are unclear. But China's weakened tech firms likely limit PLA modernization and force employment. Unfettered US tech giants control DI and data as power centers, challenging traditional state functions.
“For the United States, DI appears most significant for competition activities and setting the conditions for conflict, if it were to emerge. As a result, DI OAC matters greatly for competition, and activities that determine DI OAC ultimately dictate the DI footprint for conflict. For conflict, the ability to conduct kinetic operations will likely continue regardless of DI OAC, assuming the United States has alternative methods for basic communications and transmitting data. In this way, DI OAC might facilitate kinetic activities and create various advantages, but the lack of DI OAC likely does not restrict the military from conducting strike missions. In a conflict environment, imposing costs will always matter, and how an actor creates costs on the enemy might differ depending on a variety of factors. Furthermore, the United States has little to no ability to shape the DI footprint once a conflict has broken out, particularly if with China. Therefore, activities in competition to shape the DI footprint become increasingly important. DI offers greater advantages in competition to work with allies and partners, create influence, and conduct intelligence operations. Without DI OAC in competition, these activities, particularly security cooperation, might become very difficult.”
The RAND analysis highlights DI as an emerging central arena of military power and competition that warrants greater prioritization from defense leaders. Specifically, the report advises accounting for DI footprints in assessments, comprehending Chinese viewpoints, developing metrics to measure DI capabilities, and analyzing implications of potential decoupling scenarios. As DI promises to fundamentally shape the future strategic landscape, the authors strongly recommend that policymakers devote further resources to understanding this vital domain. For policymakers seeking to gain an advantage in this high-stakes arena, this RAND study delivers an essential starting point.
Assessing the Evolving Russian Nuclear Threat
By Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Michael Kofman, Nicholas Lokker and Heli Hautala
Center for a New American Security
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report focuses on changes in Russia's nuclear posture and rhetoric since its invasion of Ukraine.Analysis: The authors employ a qualitative analysis of Russian nuclear rhetoric, military exercises, policies, and force posture compared to the pre-invasion baseline, drawing on Russian official documents, speeches, military exercises, and deployments.Argument: While definitive conclusions are premature, the observed changes suggest Russia will adopt a more assertive nuclear posture. Moreover, rhetoric changes indicate a high likelihood that Russia will increase first-use threats and rely more heavily on nuclear weapons to offset conventional weaknesses. Lastly, the evidence points to Russia exploiting ambiguity in doctrine to enlarge the scope for nuclear use.Insights: Heightened Russian nuclear rhetoric could alter its public’s views on acceptable use over time, eroding a constraint on Russian decision-making. Russia may also increase efforts to divide NATO, including through nuclear provocations or insincere arms control offers.Recommendations: NATO should prepare for a more aggressive Russian nuclear posture, rhetoric, and exercises. The US should expect no near-term arms control opportunities. Additionally, the US should hedge against potential Russian nuclear employment, while avoiding exaggerating risks.As nuclear threats emanating from Moscow grow increasingly strident, this CNAS report examines the complex evolution of Russia's nuclear stance since its invasion of Ukraine. By analyzing the Kremlin’s nuclear rhetoric, drills, and policies, the report illuminates how Russia might employ nuclear weapons in a future conflict. Equally important, the report identifies resulting challenges for the US and NATO, as both sides navigate heightened nuclear tensions not seen since the Cold War.
Since the invasion, the report documents how Russia's nuclear rhetoric has become more permissive by exploiting ambiguities in doctrine, more inconsistent between different officials, and more instrumental for coercive purposes. Russia has also increased the frequency of strategic nuclear exercises, scheduling them out of sequence from their typical annual timeline. Additionally, Russia made alarming changes to policies and planning, especially the decision to deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons to Belarus and the suspension of New START — the final remaining nuclear arms control treaty with the US.
Given these developments, the report forecasts several ways Russia’s nuclear-related actions may evolve. Russia will likely adopt a more aggressive overall nuclear force posture, particularly increasing the role of non-strategic nuclear weapons, to signal it is no longer a status quo power. The Kremlin will also probably escalate efforts to divide NATO, including through nuclear provocations or feigned offers for arms control agreements. Furthermore, Moscow will continue exploiting its nuclear arsenal to burnish great power credentials, since nuclear weapons now play an outsized role following the decline in Russia’s conventional military, economic, and diplomatic status.
“This begs the question: Why has Moscow eschewed nuclear use in this war? Ukraine does not enjoy extended nuclear deterrence from other countries and has no nuclear weapons of its own. There are several possible answers. First, Russian leaders may believe nuclear use is unnecessary for achieving their objectives in the war. The conditions are therefore not sufficient to require drastic measures. Nuclear use also carries costs, risks, and attendant uncertainties, especially given the likelihood of a response from the United States and other countries. In this view, the benefits are outweighed by the potential costs, and Moscow may be deterred by Western threats. Another possibility is that nuclear weapons are simply not seen as providing significant benefits on the battlefield, although this view (espoused primarily in Western circles) seems overly optimistic, eliding much of the history of nuclear strategy and expectations of nuclear effects. The notion that several dozen nuclear weapons would not have a decisive impact on a military operation seems technically dubious at best. Perhaps a better reading of the factors involved is that to be effective, multiple nuclear weapons would have to be used, hence singular employment is unlikely to achieve a specific result. This may pose a higher threshold for use, even if the difference in political cost between using several dozen nuclear weapons and a single nuclear weapon may not be dramatic when it comes to external audiences and the reactions of other states.”
The report also highlights the stark implications of Russia’s changing nuclear behavior for the US and NATO. For one, the analysis suggests Russia may perceive a need to use nuclear weapons earlier in a hypothetical future war with NATO given current deficiencies in its conventional military power. Moreover, heightened Russian nuclear rhetoric could gradually shift domestic public opinion over time regarding acceptable use, weakening a key constraint on the Kremlin. In addition, US opportunities for productive nuclear arms control with Russia seem limited in the short-term; as its global reputation deteriorates, Russia appears increasingly disinterested in nonproliferation.
Overall, this CNAS report provides indispensable warnings about the dangerous evolution of the Russian nuclear threat that US and NATO policymakers must internalize. The analysis is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the complexity of this threat and how Western nuclear deterrence policies must adapt to manage escalation risks.