Quick Tanks: The Best of Long-Form Defense Analysis, Briefly
A weekly review of the long-form content from the national security policy, defense policy, and related technology analysis community.
Welcome back, defense buffs.
This week, I am delighted to share with you two thought-provoking reports. They delve into the following subjects:
What are the problems hindering the DoD’s adoption of innovative technologies and how can the DoD and Congress fix them?
How can amphibious forces maintain their effectiveness in the operational environments of the future?
Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.
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Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.
Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption
Final report
By Whitney M. McNamara, Peter Modigliani, Matthew MacGregor, and Eric Lofgren
Atlantic Council
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report identifies challenges the DoD faces in adopting innovative technologies into its operations and weapons systems, and it aims to provide recommendations to accelerate DoD's ability to leverage cutting-edge innovations from the commercial sector.Analysis: The report is based on interviews with over 70 experts across the DoD, industry, and Congress.Argument: The DoD doesn't lack innovation but faces significant challenges in adopting it for military use. Given the increasing geopolitical tensions and threats posed by rivals like Russia and China, comprehensive reform across the DoD is necessary. Insights: Over the past decades, the DoD has shifted from being the primary driver of global R&D to becoming more of a follower, reliant on commercial technologies. Moreover, the DoD's traditional prime contractors are more focused on near-term defense requirements, rather than broad warfighter needs, revealing a misalignment in innovation adoption.Recommendations: The report offers 10 priority recommendations for DoD leaders and Congress to accelerate innovation adoption. See below for the full list.In a world where the US faces growing threats from competing powers like Russia and China, this Atlantic Council report emphasizes the urgency for the DoD to fundamentally shift its approach to adopting and integrating new technologies. Historically, US defense technology advancements were driven by government research and traditional defense industries. However, the landscape has shifted, with significant innovation now emerging from commercial, dual-use technology and smaller, nontraditional companies. The report critically examines the DoD's current acquisition system, which is ill-equipped to keep pace with rapid technological advancements, creating barriers to effective collaboration with these innovative sectors.
The authors identify the following challenges to the DoD innovation adoption:
Outdated R&D Model: The DoD's processes have not adapted to the reality of reduced federal R&D funding and the increased importance of critical technologies driven by the commercial sector.
Long Timelines and Inflexible Execution: The DoD struggles to incorporate new technologies to effectively respond to dynamic threats due to the lengthy development processes currently in place.
Fewer Companies Providing Defense Solutions: A shrinking industrial base, driven by complex regulations and high compliance costs, deters new entrants.
Valleys of Death: Many innovations fail to transition from the research phase to production, raising questions about the effectiveness of funding numerous defense research organizations.
Hamstrung Workforce: A bureaucratic culture focused on excessive compliance limits the DoD’s capacity for innovative problem-solving and discourages the rewarding of creative risks.
Program-centric Acquisition: The focus on individual programs and proprietary solutions by prime contractors hinders the adaptability and interoperability necessary for modern defense needs.
Cumbersome Reporting from DoD to Congress: Inconsistent documentation impedes Congress's understanding and trust in the DoD's technology adoption.
Limited Understanding of Emerging Technology: The DoD struggles to effectively leverage critical emerging technologies, such as biotechnology and quantum information technology, due to a lack of comprehensive understanding among those responsible for generating requirements and drafting proposals.
To illustrate what success should look like, the report offers discreet examples where the DoD rapidly adapted to pressing capability gaps, such as with the Navy's Task Force 59 in the Middle East. Through iterative experimentation and feedback loops with operators, the task force fielded a mix of emerging technologies as a service and forged partnerships with dozens of companies to enhance maritime domain awareness tenfold.
To close the adoption gap, the report provides ten recommendations:
Introduce a new capability portfolio model: Empower and resource five PEOs through a new capability portfolio model to break down barriers with industry.
Consolidate program elements: Consolidate program elements and budget line items to simplify budget submissions and allow greater flexibility.
Reset reprogramming authorities: Modify reprogramming authorities to historical norms to streamline the process and enable greater flexibility.
Modernize the DoD: Elevate the Defense Innovation Unit to better align and harness the nontraditional defense industrial base.
Strengthen capital market alignment: Create pathways to better leverage capital market funding for defense innovation.
Incentivize tech companies: Increase incentives like higher procurement budgets and reduce barriers like security clearance backlogs.
Modernize budget documents: Streamline and modernize budget justification documents to focus on concise overviews.
Bridge funding: Allocate funds to scale successfully demonstrated innovative technologies.
Scale the SDA model: Adopt the Space Development Agency model more broadly for rapidly fielding capabilities.
Modernize requirements: Establish a team to overhaul outdated defense requirements processes.
The authors acknowledge the DoD and Congress have made progress in implementing some of these recommendations. However, continued effort and commitment are essential to fully realize the potential of these recommendations. The successful implementation of all ten recommendations is pivotal for the US to swiftly deploy cutting-edge technology at scale, thereby ensuring a robust posture against evolving threats and maintaining global leadership in defense innovation.
I highly recommend reading the full report to better analyze the challenges and recommendations therein.
Amphibious Futures
The Royal Marines in Contested New Operating Environments
By Dr. Sidharth Kaushal and Brigadier Mark Totten
Royal United Services Institute
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report aims to identify key adaptations necessary for Western amphibious forces, particularly the UK's Royal Marines, to remain effective in future operational environments. Analysis: The analysis draws on historical literature, operations research, and insights from exercises and wargaming conducted under the Royal Marines' Future Commando Force program.Argument: Western maritime forces face undeniable challenges to maneuvering and maintaining a presence in littoral (coastal) spaces. However, rather than ceding control of these areas or allowing wider separation from joint forces, these challenges can be proactively addressed. Doing so requires rethinking both force design and military tactics and procedures at a fundamental level.Insights: Employing small, dispersed teams of marines across a wide littoral area can greatly expand the space an adversary must monitor and make it harder for them to concentrate sensors and defenses. Moreover, repurposing amphibious connectors as multifunctional strike platforms rather than just transport could enhance overall firepower.Recommendations: The report makes several key recommendations for the Royal Marines and wider UK defense establishment. They are outlined below.This RUSI report provides a compelling analysis of how amphibious forces can remain relevant in future operational environments increasingly shaped by anti-access/area denial capabilities. As the authors cogently argue, while amphibious forces have historically provided invaluable strategic flexibility and operational maneuverability, they will need to integrate with naval forces conceptually and equip themselves differently to retain their utility.
The report astutely identifies the undiminished significance of amphibious forces in modern military strategy, categorizing their roles into two primary functions crucial for UK national priorities: expeditionary power projection and sea control missions. These roles extend well beyond the NATO area of responsibility, underscoring the global reach and strategic importance of amphibious forces.
“Amphibious capabilities can play a role in deterrent signaling. By virtue of the visibility of their supporting vessels, they represent a visible diplomatic signal. However, amphibious forces are scalable – a portion of a force can be deployed ashore while the rest remains offshore, for example. They can also be withdrawn from a theatre as diplomatic circumstances dictate, meaning that their deployment need not represent a commitment that is difficult to reverse. Scalability is important, as a key dimension of deterrence is that it must be balanced against efforts to mitigate misperception – an opponent should be able to distinguish between a deterrent threat and preparations for an attack. Moreover, the coordination of military means with diplomacy also necessitates the ability to demonstrate that a threat can be withdrawn if an opponent complies.”
However, the paper doesn't shy away from addressing the burgeoning challenges these forces face. The authors note the mounting difficulties in theater entry, the implications of increasingly urbanized littorals, and the heightened resource burdens on fleets. These challenges are not only tactical but also pose significant strategic and logistical implications, necessitating a reevaluation of operational doctrines and resource allocation strategies.
“Once forces are disembarked, amphibious forces’ lodgements ashore will be at considerable risk, and the operational pauses needed to build up capabilities will likely prove fatal. A range of capabilities, including tactical ballistic missiles, artillery UAVs and glider-equipped unguided bombs, such as the Russian FAB-500, launched from fixed-wing aircraft, will threaten disembarked forces. Of course the risk posed by operational pauses has long been a persistent feature of amphibious campaigns. But the diversification of air and missile threats will make protecting a lodgement even more difficult than it has been previously.”
In response to the evolving threat landscape and operational challenges, the report proposes a suite of innovative approaches to ensure the continued relevance of amphibious forces. It advocates for a strategic shift in operations, focusing on the wide distribution of forces along the littoral front to sustain a high operational tempo and achieve strategic goals. Moreover, the report emphasizes the adoption of strike-centric concepts, which entail using distributed forces with long-range capabilities to create convergent effects.
Further recommendations include:
The Royal Marines should transition to a more specialized force optimized for strike and raiding functions. This includes adopting a distributed tactical model based around 12-person teams supported by long-range precision fires.
Core capabilities like communications, logistics, mobility, and deception measures should be upgraded to support dispersed operations. Specific technologies to explore include mesh networking, counter-electromagnetic warfare systems, modular connector vessels, and multispectral signature management.
Conceptually, amphibious operations should fall under naval strike and sea control missions, rather than be treated separately. Force generation and planning should align the Royal Marines with routine naval deployments and operations.
Institutionally, the UK Ministry of Defence needs to enable better integration of the Royal Marines into naval operations through changes to planning assumptions, budgets, and cross-component coordination.
To engage with the analysis more comprehensively, I urge you to read the full report.