Quick Tanks: The Best of Long-Form Defense Analysis, Briefly
A weekly review of the long-form content from the national security policy, defense policy, and related technology analysis community.
Welcome back, security scholars.
This week, I’m thrilled to share two reports that I find especially compelling. The topics are:
Why a potential US-China conflict will be protracted, rather than quick and decisive
How small uncrewed aerial systems (sUAS) pose an increasing threat and the capabilities to counter them
Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.
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Rolling the Iron Dice
The Increasing Chance of Conflict Protraction
By Andrew Metrick
Center for a New American Security
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report examines the increasing likelihood of conflict protraction between the US and China in a hypothetical war over Taiwan.Analysis: The author employs a mix of historical examples, campaign analysis, and wargaming to structurally explore how a US-China war could become protracted. Also, the author draws on prospect theory to explain how cognitive biases shape decisions in war.Argument: Despite widespread assumptions that a US-China war would be short and sharp, the author argues four interrelated characteristics — the improbability of decisive conventional victories, prolonged periods of mutual munitions reconstitution, nuclear brinkmanship, and distorted situational awareness — point to the likelihood of protraction.Insights: The report highlights how an initial period of massive strikes aimed at decisive victory unintentionally creates the conditions for protraction by enabling sanctuary and reconstitution. In addition, the nature of a US-China war would limit the information available to leadership, preventing accurate situational awareness needed for conflict termination.Recommendations: The US defense community should expand thinking beyond just the initial denial of Chinese objectives to consider a protracted conflict. The industrial base should be scaled to enable sustained combat operations. Analysts should approach assessments of protracted war with humility, recognizing uncertainties and limitations. In addition, further research into areas like escalation risks and information warfare impacts is required.As the potential for conflict with China dominates strategic discussions, this CNAS report warns against overconfidence in a short, decisive war. The report argues that the United States has fallen victim to the alluring short war fallacy, abetted in recent decades by the perceived rapidity and decisiveness of precision strike warfare against inferior opponents. However, there are major differences between lopsided conflicts like the Gulf War and a potential war between nuclear-armed peer adversaries like the US and China. Through a methodical analysis of the combination of risks that could mire the US and China in a protracted conflict, the report provides a compelling reality check for the defense community.
For one, the quest for rapid victory through decisive strikes will likely fuel protraction. Both the American and Chinese military theories rely on swift triumph via precision weapons and devastating attacks to cripple their adversary's capacity for war. However, the vast maritime distances of such a conflict make sudden knockout implausible.
“Their respective warfighting approaches, empowered by the Precision Strike Revolution, are appropriate for limited wars against overawed opponents. They would not work against an adversary that can ‘take a punch’ and keep on going.
There is a ‘target-centric’ approach to the U.S. and the PRC military strategies. Advanced conventional arms make it easier than ever to precisely target the tactical and operational foundations of military power, which are highly appealing to policymakers seeking the apparent promises of a denial strategy. However, there is not a clear, traceable causal logic between striking these tactical and operational military capabilities and the defined strategic objectives of both sides. A target-centric approach does not address the strategic incompatibilities between the [US and China]. The application of precision warfare against terrorist networks over the past 20 years has shown that, while precision attacks slow and degrade these organizations, victory cannot be rendered through the exquisite targeting. Without political resolution, the conflict continues.”
Moreover, the depletion of advanced munitions inherent to PSR creates operational pauses for both sides — “Sanctuaries of Mutual Exhaustion” — which enable protraction. The immense expenditure of scarce long-range precision weapons central to early campaigns will quickly drain stockpiles. This allows both sides needed respites from intensive combat to methodically rebuild diminished forces, capacities, and arsenals. During these kinetic pauses, both sides would try to weaken the other using economic or cyber means, but these disruptive tactics could not permanently neutralize the opponent's capacity to militarily recuperate. Thus, the predictable pattern of exhaustion-imposed lulls and sanctuary-enabled recuperation permits the conflict to persist over an extended timeframe.
“In a potential U.S.-PRC conflict, the economics of replenishment are significantly more taxing than those of the past. The scale of the production lines when compared to the consumption rates is staggering. For example, the long-range precision weapons industrial base can only manage to produce tens of rounds per month. These arms are the backbone of a conventional campaign in the Indo-Pacific. Their production complexity is such that while it may be possible to increase production rates, it is not possible to have production outputs match the consumption inputs…
While the popular imagination often focuses on cataclysmic battles, these moments make up a bare fraction of the duration of any conflict. War is long periods of boredom punctuated by moments of sheer terror. Combatants must recover their strength and rebuild their capabilities. As important as this always has been in the course of human history, victory or defeat in a U.S.-China conflict seems to be predicated on who is most effective in repairing, rebuilding, and augmenting its capabilities and capacities in the lulls between the fighting. This is due to the power of, yet relative scarcity of, the weapons that would be used to wage this war.”
Thirdly, given that both the US and China are nuclear powers, nuclear brinksmanship paradoxically constricts yet expands war. The countries must balance conventional military needs against risks of nuclear escalation through tacit bargaining over permissible targets. In other words, in order to avoid nuclear escalation, each side would refrain from striking vital command and control centers. However, this dynamic contrasts with military plans that rely on precise and critical degradation of the adversary’s communications. In this case, both sides will have to maneuver along the nuclear precipice — striking significant but not essential assets —, leading to a protracted conflict.
Lastly, the gap between military culmination and political termination may lengthen the war. The nature of precision strike warfare and the impacts of disruptive information warfare operations will distort perceptions of battlefield realities. Cognitive biases will further shape how leaders interpret and react to ambiguous information and military reversals. This situation prevents timely recognition of when meaningful offensive military options are functionally exhausted and delays warring parties from seeking negotiated solutions. In this fashion, fighting and attrition are likely to persist well beyond the point of diminishing operational returns.
“The rate at which belligerents gain new information plays a major impact on the political decisions to conclude the war. Information technologies, many key parts of the precision strike revolution, seemingly supercharge this process. Social media and cell phones transport the front lines to the living rooms around the world. This suggests that modern conflicts should end quickly as leaders rapidly and correctly understand the relative balance of power and then seek some negotiated resolution.
Experiences in Ukraine invalidate this suggestion given that conflict’s protracted state. This has critical implications for thinking about a U.S.-PRC conflict. Ukraine demonstrates the illusion of technological transparency. The perceptions of senior military and political leaders are not shaped by direct contact on the battlefield. Rather, tactical units gain information and pass it on to higher-level elements in a game of telephone. At each step, the information passed along is influenced by different perceptions, beliefs, and biases.”
To address these concerning dynamics, the report offers several pragmatic recommendations. The report calls for military plans to anticipate conflicts lasting past denial operations and for careful study of multiple protraction pathways. The report also advises prudently scaling industrial production capacity, aligning precision targeting with overarching political strategies, and instilling analytic humility given the inherent complexity of prolonged great power wars.
Overall, the report builds a compelling case that protraction is an increasingly likely outcome, not an improbable outlier, in potential US-China conflicts. Overconfidence in the ability to achieve a lightning victory was widespread prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, yet that conflict has descended into a vicious slog with no clear end in sight. US policymakers and strategists cannot depend on the assumption that precision strikes and technological overmatch will ensure a short, conclusive war with China. The full report provides extensive depth and nuance to properly understand this vital issue.
Countering Small Uncrewed Aerial Systems
Air Defense by and for the Joint Force
Report by Shaan Shaikh, Tom Karako, and Michelle McLoughlin
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report examines the threat posed by small uncrewed aerial systems (sUAS) and analyzes capabilities to counter them. Analysis: This report analyzes conflict case studies, capability assessments, and organizational frameworks, notably citing data sources including CSIS publications, Congressional Research Service reports, and official US military doctrine publications.Argument: sUAS have emerged as a significant threat to military forces due to their multi-mission capabilities comparable to manned aircraft, minimal signatures evading radar detection, wide proliferation from the commercial sector, and ground force utility for reconnaissance, targeting, and strikes. Countering sUAS is a critical part of modern air defense that requires joint force adaptation, necessitating that both air defense and non-air defense units be equipped and trained to counter this highly proliferated threat.Insights: The threat posed by small drones is here to stay due to their versatility, low cost, and widespread availability. There is no "silver bullet" solution for countering small drones — an effective defense requires diverse sensors, effectors, and command and control capabilities. Moreover, investments in left-of-launch operations, camouflage, and other passive means are still required despite improvements in active defenses.Recommendations: The Department of Defense should continue investing in training for both air defense and non-air defense personnel to counter sUAS (C-sUAS), as well as fund diverse C-sUAS capabilities tailored to force needs. The DoD should establish a clear doctrine on C-sUAS roles and responsibilities and empower central coordinating authorities to drive rapid development.The rapid proliferation of small uncrewed aerial systems poses an acute and growing threat to US national security interests. This CSIS report describes how sUAS are changing military dynamics and analyzes the current capabilities to counter them. Requiring minimal infrastructure, logistics, and personnel to operate, sUAS provide militaries with a multi-mission capability at a minimal cost and limited training burden. Their small size allows them to evade conventional air defenses and conduct intelligence gathering, targeting, or direct strikes that were previously only possible with manned aircraft.
“Modern air and missile defenses are ill-suited to counter low-lying, slow, and small UAS. Following U.S. divestment from short-range air defense in the 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. military has been challenged to respond to enemy sUAS. Other states have faced similar issues. In 2016, Israel fired two $3 million PAC-2 interceptors and scrambled a fighter aircraft in a failed attempt to shoot down a sUAS from Syria that had violated Israeli airspace. In its conflict with Yemen’s Houthis, Saudi Arabia used fighter aircraft to patrol the border and shoot down drones worth a few hundred dollars with $2 million air-to-air missiles. These responses are enormously costly and wasteful over longer military campaigns.”
While militaries have employed drones for over a decade, the commercial drone industry has fueled sUAS proliferation in recent years. For example, advancements in lithium battery capacities and cellular network control links have dramatically improved flight duration and range over the past decade. Higher-resolution sensors have turned these drones into potent ISR assets. Moreover, artificial intelligence technology has allowed sUAS to operate evermore autonomously. In Ukraine, both sides employ sUAS extensively for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting, and strikes against infrastructure and military assets. Importantly, the nuance of the commercial sUAS boom is that Chinese firm DJI holds a dominant 60% share of the global drone market, producing increasingly sophisticated drones at relatively low prices.
To counter the sUAS threat, the DoD is investing in kinetic, directed energy, and electronic warfare effectors, each with unique strengths and limitations. Kinetic interceptors like the Coyote reliably intercept individual drones but have a limited magazine depth. Directed energy weapons such as the Leonidas high-power microwave system can disable electronics on multiple drones simultaneously, but are constrained by weather and their line of sight. Radiofrequency (RF) jammers are useful against swarm attacks but less effective against pre-programmed autonomous drones. There are also trade-offs between mobile and fixed-site defense options. Overall, the report argues a a diverse toolkit is required to counter the evolving sUAS threat.
As the report explains, fully integrating C-sUAS capabilities across the US military will necessitate progress in areas like doctrine, organization, and personnel. While continuing to improve C-sUAS technologies is important for the long term, the immediate priority should be expanding capacity and training. In addition, a new C-sUAS doctrine can help clarify roles and responsibilities between air defense specialists and non-air defense personnel.
For anyone interested in the future of US defense, I highly recommend examining the full report.