Quick Tanks: The Best of Long-Form Defense Analysis, Briefly
A weekly review of the long-form content from the national security policy, defense policy, and related technology analysis community.
Welcome back, hearty readers.
Before I get into this week’s installment, I feel the need to acknowledge the recent world events on everyone’s mind. Since last’s week installment, Hamas’ acts of terror have engulfed Israel and Gaza in a war of an unspeakable amount of death, destruction and pain. To any readers who may be affected by this war or know someone who is, I hope you can find comfort and solace in this difficult time. As someone who has been fortunate enough to grow up in relatively peaceful era and place for most of their life, I still struggle to comprehend that there are now, not one, but two major wars raging as I write. Despite this harsh reality, I hope we can all strive to create a world where peace can be the norm, rather than the exception.
With that in mind, I have another slate of insightful reports to share with you today. The topics for this week’s newsletter are:
Addressing the deficiencies in America's maritime transportation capabilities and shipbuilding infrastructure to counter the military and economic security challenges posed by China
The need for more formal integration of the private sector in the DoD’s wartime operations
Exploring possible U.S. responses to Russia's threats of employing nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) in Ukraine through the analysis of game theory and the 1999 Kargil War
Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of U.S. defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.
The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.
Thank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.
Rewriting the Future of America’s Maritime Industry to Compete with China
by Michael G. Roberts
Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report focuses on the gaps in America's maritime sealift capacity and shipbuilding industrial base to meet military and economic security threats from ChinaAnalysis: The report employs a mix of qualitative and quantitative analysis, drawing on data from UN, US government, and industry sources to compare US and Chinese commercial shipping and shipbuilding capabilitiesArgument: Decades of US policy choices have left dangerous gaps in America's sealift capacity and its shipbuilding industrial base compared to China's. These risks require urgent changes to grow the US international commercial fleet to 250 ships and expand shipbuilding to meet national security needsInsights: A larger US commercial fleet confers major deterrence benefits beyond just meeting sealift requirements, including freedom of navigation presence, supply chain leverage, and a more resilient distribution network of military cargoRecommendations: Grow international US flag fleet to 250 ships; require ships to be added to the Maritime Security Program to be built in US yards; create a second US registry of 250 US-owned ships; preserve domestic shipping laws; update government maritime oversightMaritime shipping may not pique your interest as much as the hot topics of semiconductors or artificial intelligence, but it is no less deserving of your attention. While the US Navy and its top-class combatants have secured free and open maritime trade for decades, the US role in owning the actual ships and ports transporting materials has largely evaporated. This CDCT report stresses the crucial issue of America’s current sealift capacity:
“Today we have only a third of the minimum number of commercial vessels and civilian mariners we realistically need to support the Pentagon’s mobility requirements should a military confrontation take place in the Western Pacific.”
It does not help that amidst America’s disappearance from the maritime shipping industry, China has established a dominant position. American ships handle less than 1% of import-export commerce compared to China’s share of 18%. Moreover, China has ownership interests in all of the top 10 — and 23 of the top 25 — container ports in the world. And in terms of shipping equipment, China’s market share stands at 95% of shipping container production and 70% of container gantry crane production. It is hard to deny that China’s outsized position in maritime shipping poses substantial economic security risks. When 90% of global merchandise trade relies on maritime transit, China’s ability to disrupt critical US supply chains is a legitimate threat.
To explain the divergent trajectories of each country’s maritime shipping role, this report breaks down the maritime shipping policies in both the US and China. The author also discusses aspects of the global maritime shipping structure that may need reform, such as the flag of convenience system.
Ultimately, the report provides a series of recommendations to address these security risks:
Expand programs that support a US flag international fleet, growing it from 85 to 250 ships. This would close the military "sealift gap" and secure supply chains.
Establish a competitive bidding process for the expanded US flag fleet program, with contract awards based on best value to the government. Factors like vessel type, commercial viability, global reach, and use of advanced technologies should be emphasized.
Require ships entering the Maritime Security Program to be built in US shipyards. This would create steady demand for 10-15 commercial ships annually, strengthening the shipbuilding industrial base.
Establish a second, limited US ship registry allowing crews from allied nations. This registry would supplement the 250 US flag ships with 250 more under US control, further securing supply chains.
Preserve laws supporting domestic US shipping, which sustain a critical nucleus of maritime capacity.
Consider changes to the international regulatory regime governing shipping to enhance transparency and accountability.
“Stated differently, spending on security today needs to address the real security threats of today and tomorrow, not the perceived threats of 30 years ago. The threat of China has prompted major shifts in Pentagon spending and new investments in key industries that broadly affect the American economy. This should include America’s shipping and shipbuilding industries, important components of America’s military and economic security infra- structure. America should compete in this domain also and not rely solely on the capabilities of allies nor on American economic or military power in other domains. It should neither overreact nor underreact to the new risks but establish realistic policies to enable American shipping and shipbuilding companies to regain greater significance in global markets and to become more effective tools for improving the resilience of our supply chains and for projecting American power and deterrence.”
Overall, this report highlights the risks that complacent maritime shipping policy poses given China's strategic expansion. I urge you to carefully examine the analysis of US and Chinese maritime shipping trajectories and give due consideration to the recommendations in the full report.
The Sixth Domain
The Role of the Private Sector in Warfare
By Franklin D. Kramer
Atlantic Council
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The role of the private sector in US homeland security and defense during wartimeAnalysis: Qualitative analysis drawing lessons from the Ukraine-Russia warArgument: The private sector is an operational partner in wartime defense but current US frameworks do not account for this "sixth domain"Insights: Private sector roles in cybersecurity, cloud computing, space, AI, and communications have been and continue to be critical to Ukraine's defenseRecommendations: Expand the national framework to coordinate private sector roles in wartime; establish public-private councils and corps to plan and operate in wartime (further recommendations detailed below)As the war in Ukraine demonstrates, private companies are taking on critical operational roles in armed conflicts, constituting a "sixth domain" of warfare beyond the traditional land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains. Tech firms have helped secure Ukraine's critical software infrastructure and government data against Russian cyberattacks. Cloud providers like Amazon Web Services and Google rapidly migrated Ukrainian systems to their cloud platforms to provide extra security, maintaining continuity of key state functions. Commercial satellite companies such as SpaceX's Starlink have provided vital communications support to Ukraine's military in the face of destroyed cellular networks. And cybersecurity vendors have volunteered tools, services, and expertise to harden Ukraine's cyber defenses in collaboration with the Ukrainian government. Their successes reveal the untapped potential of public-private collaboration for defense.
However, the current US framework for critical infrastructure protection is structured around peacetime threats. Thus, this Atlantic Council report argues that the US and its allies must develop strategies to formally engage the private sector as a partner in wartime operations.
“In the event of a conflict with either Russia or China, US, allied, and partner critical infrastructures and information lows will ‘almost certainly’ be subject to attacks. But most of those critical infrastructures, including information and communications technology capabilities, are owned and operated by the private sector … those private-sector capabilities will be critical for military operations, continuity of government, and maintaining the performance of the economy in the event of conflict. Accordingly, a key issue for the United States and its allies and partners is how to effectively engage the private sector in wartime in order to offset the consequences of expected adversarial actions.”
Importantly, the author provides ten recommendations to help facilitate public-private collaboration in wartime:
Expand the existing national framework for effective private sector engagement in wartime
Establish a Critical Infrastructure Wartime Planning and Operations Council with both government and private-sector membership to oversee planning and coordination
Create regional resilience collaboratives in key locations to coordinate public and private wartime activities
Form an Integrated Cybersecurity Providers Corps to deliver high-end cybersecurity to critical infrastructures during conflicts
Set up Private-Sector Systemic Risk Analysis and Response Centers
Build a cybersecurity "surge capability" through a civilian reserve corps and expanded National Guard cyber units
Authorize Cyber Command to support critical US infrastructures under a "Hunt Forward" model if conflict arises
Develop an international Undersea Infrastructure Protection Corps to enhance the resilience of cables and pipelines
Expand utilization of commercial space capabilities through contractual arrangements to ensure availability in wartime
Provide the authorities and congressional resources needed to accomplish these public-private initiatives
This forward-looking report makes a compelling case that including the private sector in operational planning and response is vital to mobilize America's full capabilities for twenty-first century warfare. I highly encourage you to read the full report!
Building U.S. Responses to Russia's Threats to Use Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons
A Game Theoretic Analysis of Brinkmanship
By Krista Langeland, Anthony Vassalo, Clint Reach, Christopher Dictus, and Gabrielle Tarini
RAND Corporation
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: Examining potential US responses to Russia's threats to use nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) in Ukraine using game theory and a historical case studyAnalysis: This report leverages game theory models and analysis of the 1999 Kargil War between India and PakistanArgument: The game theory analysis indicates that deterrence of Russia's NSNW use requires shaping their perceptions, such as persuading Russia that costs would be higher for it than the US or that the US expects Russia to back down if facing further escalation. The historical analysis suggests tightly controlled escalation, international pressure, and not legitimizing an adversary’s nuclear threats could be effective responsesInsights: The game theory analysis provides a useful framework but limitations remain including uncertainties about Russian decision-making. The historical analysis also bears challenges, as unlike Pakistan, Russia holds the ability to use tactical nuclear weaponsWhile Ukraine’s sustained resistance to Russia’s invasion is considered a monumental success by most metrics, it has nonetheless opened the door to Russia’s potential use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). To be sure, there is no clear-cut way for the US to respond to this NSNW threat. However, this RAND report utilizes both game theory and a case study of the 1999 Kargil War to elicit several insights on how to address the nuclear threat.
The game theory-based analysis finds that emphasizing high stakes for the U.S., communicating asymmetric costs to Russia, and persuading Russia that backing down is preferable to escalation could all deter further aggression. However, these approaches face challenges in credibly shifting Russia's perceptions. Overall, the game theory perspective provides insights on possible deterrence levers but developing effective messaging and credibility is difficult given uncertainties in Russia's decision-making.
“The two-stage game essentially sets up a situation in which Russia could be deterred from employing NSNWs because it would expect that the United States would choose to further escalate in a manner that would be more costly to Russia than it would be to the United States. In this double chicken came, we see from the analysis that if Russia expects the United States to continue to escalate, Russia will end up at a less preferred outcome than it would if it foregoes escalation in the first place. Messaging here could focus on establishing that the United States perceives that Russia is not willing to further escalate, setting the expectation that the United States will escalate and that Russia will back down if facing an escalatory response from the United States.”
As for the historical case study, the report closely examines the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan, in which Pakistan seized Kashmiri territory and issued nuclear threats to deter an Indian response. However, India was able to use tightly controlled military escalation and international pressure to compel a Pakistani withdrawal. The report suggests the U.S. could employ controlled escalation, leverage allies to isolate Russia internationally, and refrain from responding directly to nuclear threats. The case study analysis has limitations, though, as unlike the Kargil War, Russia's invasion involves potential tactical nuclear use. Additionally, the analysis notes that international pressure may not sway Russia as it did Pakistan. Overall, the historical case provides insights but applying its lessons directly to the Russia-Ukraine war remains challenging.
While the report acknowledges the inherent difficulties in deterring Russian nuclear use, the game theory models and historical case study provide thought-provoking analysis and outline a suite of potential U.S. responses to Russia’s nuclear threats. The insights this report provides across game theory, historical lessons, and policy implications make it a worthwhile read for anyone seeking to understand this consequential issue.