Quick Tanks: The Best of Long-Form Defense Analysis, Briefly
A weekly review of the long-form content from the national security policy, defense policy, and related technology analysis community.
Good morning, defense buffs.
I am once again thrilled to bring you another installment of Quick Tanks. This week’s edition is comprised of three compelling reports on divergent, yet equally intriguing, topics:
What does Huawei’s new smartphone chip mean for the future of US semiconductor export controls
The modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy and the shrinking capability gap with the US
Using persuasion research to analyze the effectiveness of Ukraine’s and Russia’s information campaigns
Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.
The sponsor of the newsletter is the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts + Technology.
Tank you for sharing and subscribing, and happy reading.
In Chip Race, China Gives Huawei the Steering Wheel
Huawei's New Smartphone and the Future of Semiconductor Export Controls
By Gregory C. Allen
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: Huawei's new 7nm smartphone chip made by SMIC, and implications for US semiconductor export controls on China.Analysis: The report employs a detailed technical analysis of Huawei's chip capabilities and supply chain, drawing on industry sources, Chinese customs data, corporate announcements, and government policies.Argument: China has made real progress in semiconductors despite US export controls, but the controls have not been totally ineffective. To truly constrain China's progress, a more expanded multilateral approach is needed.Insights: China may be engaged in significant legal and illegal workarounds to stockpile equipment. For example, SMIC may be deceiving US firms on its end-use declarations. Additionally, coordination with allies on export controls has been a major challenge. Recommendations: The US intelligence community needs to strengthen its collection on China's semiconductor industry to identify loopholes and violations. Secondly, the US government should increase resources for export control enforcement to uncover and blacklist the shell companies that Huawei, SMIC and other Chinese firms use to illegally acquire equipment and components. Lastly, the US must coordinate with Allied governments to ensure multilateral export controls are enforced and on-time.With the launch of its new Mate60 Pro smartphone, Huawei has signaled its return as a major player in 5G technology. The phone's 7nm chip, manufactured by China's Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), demonstrates glaring vulnerabilities in US export controls despite stated aims to restrict Huawei and SMIC to less advanced technology. This CSIS report dives into the strategic implications of Huawei’s breakthrough and delivers an urgent warning: China is rapidly mobilizing to achieve semiconductor self-reliance, and current US export controls are insufficient to meaningfully degrade its capabilities.
“The October 7 export controls—and especially the Dutch and Japanese restrictions—were too late to prevent SMIC from bringing online a facility that will likely soon achieve 35,000 WPM of 7 nm production capacity with decent, if not world-leading, yield. This is a genuine threat to U.S. and allied national security, not least because of what it likely means for the Chinese military’s access to domestically produced AI chips.”
Initially, the report details how loopholes in both Trump and Biden's export policies allowed SMIC to continue acquiring advanced equipment, materials and technical expertise needed for 7nm production. Furthermore, it highlights China's massive government subsidies and national initiatives to rapidly expand domestic production of semiconductor equipment, materials, and chip-design software.
“Some of the pre-October 2022 export controls and entity list restrictions on Huawei’s suppliers were not especially well designed for a goal of blocking SMIC from producing 7 nm chips, despite that being their explicit goal. For example, the entity list license review policy for SMIC established in December 2020 states that license applications to export to SMIC will be reviewed under a policy of ‘presumption of denial for items uniquely required for production of semiconductors at advanced technology nodes (10 nanometers and below, including extreme ultraviolet technology); Case by case for all other items.’
The problem with this standard is the ‘uniquely required’ phrase [in pre-October 2022 export legislation]. This is both vague and a poor fit for the reality of semiconductor manufacturing. Nearly all semiconductor manufacturing equipment that can be used to produce 10 nm and below chips can also be used to produce less advanced 14 nm and above chips and vice versa. This is known as ‘capex recycling’ by the semiconductor industry, and industry sources told CSIS that equipment reuse rates between these nodes are sometimes higher than 90 percent. Furthermore, the rules only applied to ‘U.S. origin items and technology’ which did not include a major portion of semiconductor capital equipment produced by U.S. firms outside of the United States in locations such as Singapore and Malaysia. In some cases, the companies did not even need to apply for a license, as their equipment was not technically U.S. origin and was therefore not even subject to the rules.”
In fact, the report warns that if SMIC builds out a 7nm production capacity of 50,000 wafers per month, it could supply advanced AI chips that outperform the degraded US chips still permitted for export. Such a situation would undermine a key goal of US export controls as China would achieve both a significant boost in chip quality but also a huge step in self-sufficiency.
Ultimately, the report strongly emphasizes the need for improved intelligence collection on China's semiconductor progress and potential violations of export controls. It argues the US must expand multilateral export controls with allies and increase enforcement resources to have a chance at degrading China's capabilities.
This summary only scratches the surface of the insightful analysis and alarming revelations contained in the full report. As China rapidly mobilizes to reshape the technological landscape in its favor, the report warns the clock is ticking for the US and its allies to strengthen export control regimes and dedicate the resources needed for vigorous enforcement. All those concerned about the geostrategic technology competition should absolutely read the report in its entirety.
China Naval Modernization
Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress
by Ron O’Rourke
Congressional Research Service
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report focuses on China's naval modernization efforts and implications for US Navy capabilities.Analysis: The report provides background information and analysis of China's naval capabilities, trends, and military strategy, drawing on US government reports, expert analyses, and open-source data. It provides specifics on numbers, types, and technological sophistication of China's submarines, surface combatants, aircraft carriers, aircraft, anti-ship weapons, and other naval capabilities.Argument: The report argues that China's rapid naval modernization poses a major threat to the US Navy's maritime dominance in the Western Pacific. It details China's anti-ship missiles, submarines, surface combatants, aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and other naval capabilities that challenge the US. The report warns the US risks losing its military superiority without concerted efforts to modernize and adapt.Insights: The report provides unique insights into vulnerabilities in China's capabilities, including relatively limited operational experience and integration issues with other PLA branches. It also analyzes specific US Navy countermeasures and defenses against Chinese anti-ship missiles and hypothesizes about potential classified capabilities.China's naval modernization effort has been underway for around three decades now, substantially transforming the capabilities of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). This Congressional Research Service report provides extensive research on how the PLAN has evolved from an antiquated force to a much more modern and capable fleet that is now the largest navy in the world by number of ships. The report notes that although China's navy has limitations in some areas, it is quickly closing the gap with the US as it acquires new technologies and gains operational experience.
The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has constructed numerous capable surface combatants including the Renhai (Type 055) cruiser. The PLAN has also built its first indigenous aircraft carrier, the Shandong (Type 002), and launched its next carrier, the larger Fujian (Type 003) equipped with electromagnetic catapults. A fourth carrier — in the Type 003 model — is supposedly on the way and may be nuclear-powered.
China's submarine force now includes Shang-class (Type 093) nuclear-powered attack submarines and the Jin-class (Type 096) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. Moreover, the Jin-class is equipped with JL-2 or JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles. In terms of statistics, intelligence estimates project the PLAN attack submarine fleet will grow to about 76 boats by 2030, compared to 66 in 2020.
The report outlines how in response, the US Navy is taking a number of actions to counter China's naval modernization. For one, the US Navy is moving a greater percentage of its ships to and basing its most advanced capabilities in the Pacific. Additionally, the Navy is expanding unmanned systems development and conceptualizing a more distributed fleet architecture.
Considering these facts, the report outlines the main issues that Congress must address as it evaluates the Biden Administration’s proposed US Navy plans:
Evaluating the current and projected future balance of US and Chinese naval power in the Western Pacific
Determining if the planned size and composition of the US Navy fleet will be sufficient to counter China's modernization efforts
Assessing the adequacy of the Navy’s efforts to develop new technologies and weapons (e.g. hypersonics, long-range missiles) to counter China’s A2/AD capabilities
Weighing the risks and benefits of the Navy’s “divest to invest” strategy for funding new capabilities
Reviewing whether a faster shift by the Navy to more distributed architecture with more unmanned systems is needed to maintain US advantages
Considering whether changes to acquisition policies and metrics could help accelerate development of systems needed to compete with China
As China's navy grows more powerful, the future direction of the US Navy will be of vital strategic importance. Those interested in Asia-Pacific security, military technology development, and the defense budget would benefit greatly from reading this CRS report in full. It provides crucial background information, insightful analysis, and a review of options as Congress evaluates the US Navy's plans and programs aimed at counterbalancing China's rising naval might.
The Nightingale Versus the Bear
What Persuasion Research Reveals About Ukraine’s and Russia’s Messaging on the War
By Alyssa Demus, Khrystyna Holynska, and Krystyna Marcinek
RAND Corporation
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report examines the persuasiveness of Russian and Ukrainian state messaging campaigns targeting domestic publics, militaries, and adversaries during two key incidents in 2022.Analysis: It applies an extensive body of persuasion research to analyze official communications from a variety of Russian and Ukrainian sources.Argument: Neither campaign was fully persuasive. Russia's attempts to exploit historical grievances and sow fear were likely ineffective due to preexisting negative attitudes toward Russia among Ukrainians. On the other hand, Ukraine's use of humor and appeals to national unity likely resonated more, but still faced challenges in reaching entrenched Russian audiences.Insights: Preexisting negative attitudes formed a major obstacle to persuasion, and cultural symbols and narratives served as heuristics but were often misused or misunderstood. Overall, emotional appeals drove messaging effectiveness, with humor and anger outperforming fear.Fighting between Ukraine and Russia takes on many forms. While barrages of missiles, lines of tanks, and swarms of drones embody the kinetic side of warfare taking place across the front, memes, tv broadcasts and real-time interviews are also munitions in the information war. This RAND report details the extensive information campaigns by both Ukraine and Russia, using persuasion research to analyze if and how their respective campaigns are succeeding.
Paying attention to two main time periods — Russia’s initial offensive and Russia’s announcement of partial mobilization —, the report focuses on official messaging from both countries aimed at their own populations and militaries, as well as those of their adversary.
The analysis finds that both sides have used a mix of appeals to emotions like fear, anger, and humor in their messaging. However, the content and style of Ukraine's campaigns have tended to align more closely with factors that research shows are associated with successful persuasion. For example, Ukraine has made greater use of appeals to humor which are often more persuasive than appeals to fear.
“Official government sources, such as the General Staff, frequently referenced popular culture, posted memes, and communicated in an informal tone—an approach that might be characterized as inappropriate for a government agency in another setting. The Ukrainian General Staff shared a video in which residents of Odesa can be seen shouting the same expletives at Russians that the now-infamous defenders of Snake Island used. On other occasions, official accounts have been used to mock Russia. For example, the National Agency on Corruption Prevention informed the Ukrainian public that the agency does not require citizens to declare captured Russian military equipment because it is worthless. The same agency also published a letter to Shoigu, thanking him for making the Ukrainian military’s job easier by embezzling funds earmarked for military modernization.”
On the other hand, Russia's campaign has relied heavily on historically resonant World War II narratives and attempts to portray parts of Ukraine's government and military as "Nazis." But while this tactic may have been persuasive during Russia’s 2014 invasion, since then Ukrainians have become more unified and resistant to these Russian narratives.
The report also notes how the method of dissemination also varied, as Russia primarily utilized TV broadcasts and Ukraine employed social media channels, daily live interviews with President Zelensky, and government websites to communicate its messaging.
Still, the analysis indicates both countries' campaigns have deficiencies. Russia has failed to grasp Ukrainian attitudes and has miscalculated Ukrainians’ willingness to fight. Conversely, Ukraine has underestimated the resilience of pro-Russian views among some segments of the Russian population.
While the report does not provide a conclusive answer to which side is winning the informational war, its insights and application of persuasion theory offer a useful perspective on each country’s wartime messaging. The full report is most definitely worth a read!
