Skies, Seas, and Strategies
Achieving air superiority with collaborative combat aircraft, NATO's asymmetric advantage over Russia in the maritime domain, and how US policy toward Russia shapes the post-war future
Welcome back, zealous readers.
This week, I have three fascinating articles to share with you all. The topics are:
The urgent need to employ Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs) and how to do so.
How can NATO impose disproportionate costs on Russia through its maritime forces?
How does the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine War and US policy toward Russia shape post-war dynamics?
Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.
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The Need for Collaborative Combat Aircraft for Disruptive Air Warfare
By Col. Mark Gunzinger, Maj. Gen Lawrence Stutzriem, and Bill Sweetman
Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report evaluates the potential of uncrewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) to enhance US Air Force air superiority.Analysis: The methodology involves expert panels from the Air Force and defense industry and analysis of current air superiority challenges. Key data sources include insights from a 2023 Mitchell Institute wargame, historical air combat operations, and assessments of Chinese military advancements.Argument: The current US Air Force air superiority force structure is inadequate to counter the rapid modernization and expansion of China's air forces and anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. CCAs, by operating collaboratively with crewed fighters, offer a strategic advantage through increased lethality, survivability, and force multiplication, essential for deterring or defeating peer-level threats in the Pacific.Insights: CCAs can significantly enhance the combat effectiveness of existing air superiority forces by acting as lead forces, decoys, sensors, and weapon platforms. Moreover, the relatively lower cost of CCAs allows for their extensive deployment as expendable or attritable assets, enhancing the Air Force's numerical strength.Recommendations: The Air Force should expedite the development, testing, and deployment of CCAs to enhance near-term air superiority capabilities. Furthermore, it should conduct analyses to determine the optimal mix of CCAs within the force structure, balancing cost, capability, and operational requirements. Thirdly, the Air Force should prioritize advancements in autonomy and artificial intelligence to increase the operational effectiveness and decision-making speed of CCAs.This Mitchell Institute report on Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) underscores the pivotal role CCAs play in the contemporary national security environment, where maintaining air superiority is crucial. It articulates that the US Air Force must adopt CCAs to retain its competitive edge, especially given the evolving threat landscape. CCAs, as described, are uncrewed aerial vehicles designed to operate in conjunction with crewed aircraft, offering a cost-effective and versatile addition to the air combat arsenal.
The report starkly illustrates the challenges facing the US Air Force, marked by an aging fleet contrasted against China's rapidly advancing capabilities. It highlights the US reliance on older platforms such as the 44-year-old E-3 AWACS and the F-15C, designed in the 1970s, underscoring the fleet's diminishing lethality and survivability. Moreover, the Air Force's F-22s, capped at 187 units, fall significantly short of operational requirements. In a potential defense scenario of Taiwan against Chinese aggression, experts predict a shortfall in F-15C and F-22 inventories by at least half. Meanwhile, China has comprehensively enhanced its capabilities to challenge US air superiority. For instance, as part of its systems destruction warfare strategy, China has developed the PL-17 — an air-to-air missile with a range of 215nm — to target high-value US aircraft.
Considering this vulnerability, the report elaborates on the strategic advantages of deploying CCAs, detailing their potential to transform air warfare dynamics significantly. CCAs, as outlined, offer the US Air Force the ability to project air superiority "mass" at range, acting as force multipliers by enhancing the lethality and survivability of manned aircraft in contested spaces.
Moreover, CCAs expand the Air Force's counterair operating concepts by offering diverse, less homogeneous force packages that complicate adversary targeting and countermeasures. This flexibility allows for innovative deployment strategies, including the use of expendable CCAs in high-risk initial assaults to degrade enemy air defenses, followed by more survivable systems to maintain pressure.
Importantly, CCAs capable of utilizing short runways or operating independently of runways would facilitate a more distributed and robust forward posture. CCAs can also form interconnected kill webs, enhancing the range of sensing, communication, and weapon nodes around manned stealth aircraft.
“Developing this affordable, uncrewed force will require balancing the ranges, survivability, degree of autonomy, and other attributes of CCA with the missions they must perform. And “affordable” means designing CCA to perform their intended missions for a low enough cost that they can be expended to reduce risks to crewed aircraft if necessary. It does not mean the Air Force can afford to buy combat-credible CCA without additional resources. The service cannot continue to cannibalize its existing capabilities to acquire new systems. hat path would further expand the gap that already exists between the forces the Air Force can provide and its global operational requirements. The need is too great, and the risk is too high to forego taking full advantage of these and other game-changing capabilities.”
To further explore this analysis of CCAs and understand their implications, I highly recommend reading the full report.
An Asymmetric Approach to the Use of NATO’s Maritime Forces in Competing with Russia
By Dr. Sidharth Kaushal and René Balletta
Royal United Services Institute
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report examines the strategic utilization of Allied maritime power against Russia, emphasizing the maritime domain as a critical yet underexplored vector for deterring Russian aggression.Analysis: The analysis incorporates desk research on NATO and Russian naval capabilities, alongside a review of Russian military literature to identify perceived vulnerabilities within the maritime domain.Argument: The report suggests that by leveraging its maritime superiority, NATO can strategically compel Russia to commit resources to its naval defense, thereby constraining its power projection capabilities and ensuring a strategic advantage for the Alliance.Insights: Russia's maritime strategy heavily relies on deterring adversary strikes and protecting its strategic assets, with less emphasis on traditional naval dominance. However, the Russian navy faces substantial challenges in anti-submarine warfare and long-range precision strike defense, presenting opportunities for NATO.Recommendations: NATO should prioritize investments in maritime capabilities that exploit Russia's vulnerabilities, such as anti-submarine warfare and long-range precision strikes. It should also develop a cohesive maritime strategy focused on deterring Russian aggression and enhancing the Alliance's ability to project power and protect critical sea lines of communication. Additionally, the report calls for greater integration of naval assets among NATO members to ensure a unified and robust maritime posture capable of countering Russian threats effectively.This RUSI report provides an essential analysis of NATO's maritime forces in the context of competing with Russia, emphasizing the pivotal role of the maritime domain in shaping strategic balances and deterrence capabilities. It argues that Allied maritime power, through strategic employment and investment, can force Russia to divert resources into maritime defense capabilities, thereby creating a competitive advantage for NATO. This strategic approach not only seeks to counter but also shape adversary investments in the domain.
Russia's strategic calculus within the maritime domain is significantly influenced by a trio of perceived threats that underscore the geopolitical stakes in naval power and deterrence. First, Russia is wary of maritime avenues for long-range precision strikes, a concern rooted in the reach and versatility of naval platforms like the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) and in how precision strike capabilities have effectively paralyzed opponents' military responses in past conflicts. Secondly, as the polar ice caps melt, changes in salinity and increased merchant traffic can obscure Allied military movements and allow for Russia’s SSBN bastions to be penetrated. Finally, the specter of a distant blockade poses a third significant threat, given Russia's heavy reliance on maritime trade.
While these threats warrant substantial allocation of Russia’s defense budget, Russia faces significant conundrums when it comes to countering these maritime threats:
Substantial Investment Requirements: As its naval platforms are nearing obsolescence, Russia will have to invest in developing new systems. However, advanced maritime platforms for blue-water operations are capital-intensive.
Technological Weaknesses and Personnel Shortages from Emigration: Russia faces notable weaknesses in critical technological areas, coupled with a shortage of skilled personnel necessary for the operation and maintenance of sophisticated maritime platforms.
Dependency on Foreign Technologies: Russia requires many foreign inputs for machine tooling and microelectronics, which are essential to building advanced detection systems and long-range effectors.
Given these strategic threats and challenges in the maritime domain, the authors argue NATO has an asymmetric advantage in how it can invest in and employ new technologies and tactics to disproportionately burden Russian planning and budget allocation. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) presents one such opportunity for NATO. Indeed, while Russia possesses a significant number of both conventional and nuclear attack submarines, its defensive ASW capacity remains notably limited. For NATO, then, uncrewed solutions, including uncrewed underwater vehicles for mine emplacement in forward positions and forward surveillance, offer a promising avenue to circumvent traditional ASW constraints. Moreover, leveraging machine learning tools to enhance the efficacy of low-frequency active sonar — a technology once deemed impractical due to its propensity for false positives — could facilitate the use of distant platforms for detection. In addition to developing new tactics and capabilities, NATO could also impel a Russian response by holding training exercises near Russian sea zones that focus specifically on strike operations or increasing the forward activity of SSNs.
“Crucially, however, the question in each instance will be whether the capabilities developed can impose more costs than those required to develop them in the first place. In this, the Alliance will have the advantage of knowing that Russia will have to develop mitigations premised on a worst-case scenario. As illustrated by Russian literature that consistently overemphasizes the scale at which the Alliance can generate long-range strikes, and by both Russian and Soviet responses to prior changes in Alliance posture, it is conceivable that even marginal investments in the areas described will impose disproportionately costly adaptations on Russia.”
In this way, NATO can leverage Russia’s maritime vulnerabilities and invest accordingly to shift the strategic balance in its favor by influencing Russian leaders' pre-conflict perceptions, redirecting scarce resources toward expensive defenses, and shaping war termination conditions should deterrence falter.
I highly recommend reading the full report to dive deeper into the analysis.
Planning for the Aftermath
Assessing Options for U.S. Strategy Toward Russia After the Ukraine War
By Samuel Charap and Miranda Priebe
RAND Corporation
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report aims to guide US policymakers in considering long-term strategic options toward Russia post-Ukraine war.Analysis: Utilizing an alternative futures analysis method, the report examines possible post-war scenarios by creating two ideal-type postwar worlds based on the outcome of the Ukraine war and the broader international environment.Argument: The US must start planning for its post-war strategy toward Russia, considering the potentially significant and lasting impact of its decisions. It suggests that strategic choices made in the aftermath of the Ukraine war will have profound consequences on the future US-Russia relationship, the stability of Europe, and the broader international order. The necessity of a nuanced approach that considers both hardline and less hardline strategies in different post-war contexts is emphasized.Insights: Hardline US strategies in post-war Europe could inadvertently increase the likelihood of conflict with Russia. Moreover, divisions within NATO over post-war strategy toward Russia could impact the alliance's cohesion and effectiveness.Recommendations: US policymakers should adopt a strategy that encompasses both deterrence and diplomatic engagement with Russia, with an emphasis on bolstering NATO unity and addressing divisions within the alliance regarding Russia. The report stresses the importance of proactive diplomacy to navigate the Russia-China relationship and mitigate its influence on American strategic interests. Additionally, the report advocates for supporting Ukraine's recovery and defense, urging a pragmatic stance on territorial conflicts with Russia.This RAND report underscores the imperative for US policymakers to proactively consider the long-term strategy toward Russia amidst the ongoing Ukraine conflict. Recognizing the enduring impact of great powers' post-war decisions, the report aims to guide strategic considerations by presenting a framework to evaluate different postwar scenarios. This effort is critical for navigating the complex post-war landscape, where choices made will significantly influence US national security interests.
The report delineates between less favorable and more favorable war outcomes, focusing on the duration of the war, China's support for Russia, the nature of the war's cessation, and territorial control. A less favorable outcome includes a prolonged conflict with significant support from China to Russia, culminating in a weak ceasefire, whereas a more favorable outcome envisages a near-term conflict resolution with minimal Chinese support to Russia and a robust ceasefire. Next, the report contrasts hardline and less hardline US strategies towards post-war Russia, reflecting on the spectrum of strategic options from confrontational to cooperative stances, tailored to the war's resolution and the broader international context.
Depending on the combination of the war’s outcome and US policy toward Russia, four potential futures are identified:
Future 1: Pervasive Instability
Context and Strategy: This future is characterized by a less favorable war outcome for Ukraine, leading the US to adopt a hardline approach towards Russia. The aim is to weaken Russia and deter future aggression by imposing sanctions and enhancing NATO's military capabilities.
Key Dynamics: The risk of NATO-Russia conflict and a nuclear standoff increases. Ukraine focuses on unconventional warfare and military rebuilding, aiming for NATO integration, which remains elusive. Russia responds with its imperialist agenda, increasing its military and informational operations to destabilize Ukraine and challenge US and NATO positions.
Implications: Economic and military support for Ukraine from some allies diminishes due to concerns about escalating conflict. The global economy trends towards fragmentation, with increased military spending by NATO countries in response to perceived threats from Russia and China.
Future 2: Localized Instability
Context and Strategy: After a less favorable war outcome, the US shifts to a less hardline approach towards Russia, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific region and addressing global governance issues. The focus is on deterring Russia through defensive support to Ukraine and seeking arms control agreements.
Key Dynamics: Ukraine adopts a defensive "porcupine strategy" with US support, focusing on economic recovery and democratic resilience. NATO allies are divided on Russia policy, but there's more military support for Ukraine compared to Future 1. Modest progress is made on nuclear arms control, while economic divisions globally do not accelerate.
Implications: Russia continues to pursue its interests in Ukraine and the broader region but faces strong resistance. The US reduces its military presence in Europe, reflecting a strategic recalibration towards Asia and a desire to stabilize relations with Russia.
Future 3: Cold War 2.0
Context and Strategy: This scenario unfolds after a more favorable outcome for Ukraine, leading the US to a triumphalist stance. A hardline approach towards Russia is adopted, aiming to capitalize on Moscow's weakness and deter aggression through military and economic pressure.
Key Dynamics: Ukraine commits to the ceasefire and adopts a forward defense posture, deepening integration with NATO. Economic aid bolsters Ukraine's recovery, but Russia-NATO tensions escalate, prompting increased gray zone activities by Moscow and a new arms race between the US and Russia.
Implications: The strategic rivalry intensifies, with NATO divisions over strategy towards Russia. Economic decoupling between the West and Russia, along with China, gains momentum, impacting global economic relations and security dynamics.
Future 4: Cold Peace
Context and Strategy: Following a more favorable war outcome, the US opts for a less hardline approach, seeking to stabilize Europe. The focus is on building a durable ceasefire and facilitating Ukraine's economic recovery and democratic processes through a defensive strategy.
Key Dynamics: Ukraine's commitment to the ceasefire and defensive rearming, supported by allies, leads to a stable but tense peace. Economic aid and EU integration prospects contribute to Ukraine's recovery. Strategic tensions between the US and Russia ease, and while Russia's influence efforts continue, they do so with less intensity.
Implications: Europe enters a period of "cold peace," with the new geopolitical division between Russia and the West solidified but stable. Russia and China maintain close relations, and the global economy experiences minimal fragmentation, reflecting a cautious optimism for peace and stability.
The analysis in the report suggests that the US must navigate the post-war period with a strategic foresight that accounts for the intricate balance between deterring Russian aggression and avoiding escalatory cycles that could lead to renewed conflicts. The authors highlight the importance of a nuanced approach that combines strength with diplomatic engagement, tailored to the evolving geopolitical landscape and the specific future scenario that unfolds. In any case, the US strategy must adapt to maintain its global leadership position while ensuring the security and prosperity of its allies and partners.
I urge you to look into the full report to better understand the analysis and insights therein.