Supply and Innovate
Navigating the Nexus of Technology and Logistics
Welcome back, effusive readers.
Once again, I have two incisive reports to share with you all. Their topics are:
What are the challenges in the US Navy’s supply chains and how can DoD mitigate them?
What private sector innovations could play a role in defeating a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan?
Quick Tanks is a weekly collection and summary of the latest long-form analytic content on the topics of US defense, force structure, innovation, and policy considerations. We strive to aggregate all of the key sources of analysis and present brief, neutral summaries to help keep you informed. Should you feel inclined to learn more about any study, please reference the full report via the links provided.
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Naval Logistics in Contested Environments
Examination of Stockpiles and Industrial Base Issues
By Joslyn Fleming, Bradley Martin, Fabian Villalobos and Emily Yoder
RAND Corporation
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report aims to address the logistics and supply chain challenges faced by the US Navy under the Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept, with a focus on critical munitions and naval aviation repair parts.Analysis: The analysis involved reviewing DoD and Navy supply chain policies, military case studies, stakeholder interviews, and academic research. It aims to understand the challenges and limitations of current supply chains, examining production rates, inventory levels, and the defense industrial base's capacity to meet demands for major combat operations.Argument: Current Navy supply chain processes and logistics planning are inadequately structured to meet the demands of DMO in contested environments. Challenges span across acquisition, storage, transportation, and distribution, with a particular focus on the front end of the acquisition process.Insights: Shared production lines and sole-source suppliers create bottlenecks and vulnerabilities, especially for critical components shared across missile platforms. Moreover, existing models fail to accurately predict the munitions demand for DMO, necessitating the development of better forecasting methods and operational planning tools.Recommendations: See below for the full list of recommendations.The Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept necessitates that the US Navy orchestrates operations that are swift, far-reaching, and integrated to effectively neutralize opposing forces. In the context of a prospective confrontation with China, the vast expanse of the Western Pacific coupled with the formidable capabilities of a near-peer adversary significantly intensifies the sustainability of this strategy. Crucially, this report by RAND delves into the logistical and supply chain challenges confronting the US Navy within the DMO framework. Concentrating on critical munitions and naval aviation spare parts, the authors uncover and articulate a series of conspicuous deficiencies.
Critical Munitions
Considering the current budgeting and recertification rates of critical munitions like the Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) and long-range anti-ship missile (LRASM), the US Navy will be vastly undersupplied for a conflict in the Western Pacific during the coming years.
“If current budgeted quantities remain consistent, it is likely that the USN will only have 116 [Maritime Strike Tomahawks] in its inventory by 2025 and will not reach the estimated demand for a Western Pacific scenario (800 munitions)…
The total US Air Force demand for standoff munitions is 3,166. Based on our assumption of 1,200 LRASMs needed by the USN for anti-ship targeting and fires, and with 147 currently in the USN’s inventory, the total demand from both services is 4,219 munitions. Given the current production rates, it could take 5.4 years to 12.3 years to produce USAF precision-guided missiles (PGMs) alone, and 7.2 years to 16.4 years to produce all 4,219 munitions demanded by the two services. Given current budgeted quantities for LRASMs for the USN for FY 2022 to FY 2025, and the 147 LRASMs in the current inventory, the USN will only be able to inventory 309 LRASMs by 2025, well short of the estimated 1,200 needed for a Western Pacific scenario.”
However, bolstering the production of these munitions is difficult due to numerous manufacturing constraints.
Critically, because the LRASM and joint air-ship standoff missile extended range (JASSM-ER)—an essential munition for the US Air Force in a Taiwan scenario—are designed to have the same rocket body, they share components, production lines, and suppliers. This means it will be extremely difficult to produce enough munitions for both the Navy and Air Force, as they rely on the same parts and facilities.
Naval Aviation Repair Parts
The authors’ examination of current naval aviation Class IX (repair parts) supply chain dynamics reveals a predisposition towards enhancing short-term operational readiness, often at the detriment of long-term preparedness for high-intensity conflicts.
This inclination is evident in the Navy's forecasting for naval aviation repair parts which relies heavily on historical usage rates and peacetime operations data. For example, the reliance on past demand patterns to predict future needs does not accurately reflect the surge in demand for specific parts like engine components or avionics that would occur in a high-tempo conflict with a near-peer adversary.
Similarly, the incentive mechanisms in place for key stakeholders, such as contractors and suppliers, prioritize short-term gains and operational readiness. As a result, they overlook the strategic value of developing surge capabilities for large-scale conflicts and the strategic stockpiling of less frequently used, but mission-critical, parts.
Furthermore, the funding models adopted by the Navy to acquire repair parts, like working capital funds, are predominantly structured to support ongoing operations rather than to build a reserve for future conflicts. This short-sighted approach to budgeting and procurement undermines the Navy's ability to swiftly transition to a wartime footing in the event of a conflict with a near-peer adversary, as the current procurement does not align with the anticipated needs of such a scenario.
Recommendations
To rectify the obstacles present in the supply chains of critical munitions and naval aviation repair parts, the authors propose a series of mitigation strategies organized by time horizon:
I highly recommend reading the full report to better understand the US Navy’s supply chain challenges and how they can be mitigated.
Harnessing the Power of Private Sector Innovation to Defeat a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan
Relighting Vulcan's Forge
By James Ryseff, Chia-Hsi Jessica Lin, D. Sean Barnett, Michael Bohnert, Caleb Lucas, Barry Wilson and Jim Mitre
RAND Corporation
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report aims to identify technological solutions that could significantly enhance the United States and Taiwan's ability to thwart a Chinese invasion by leveraging American private-sector innovation.Analysis: The study employed a blend of table-top exercises, involving defense experts and private sector technologists, and unclassified war games to simulate a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2027. These methods underscored the feasibility and strategic impact of the proposed technological solutions, highlighting their potential to significantly alter the dynamics of military engagement through enhanced communication, command and control, intelligence, logistics, and unmanned systems.Argument: Leveraging private sector innovation is crucial for revitalizing America's technological supremacy in defense. By aligning defense needs with the agility and innovative capacity of the private sector, the US and its allies can significantly improve their defense posture against a sophisticated adversary like China, particularly in the context of protecting Taiwan.Insights: Optimal technological solutions emerge when technologists can thoroughly grasp the issues they aim to address from the viewpoint of the ultimate users. Accordingly, it is better to frame defense challenges as problems needing innovative solutions rather than prescribing pre-determined requirements.Recommendations: DoD should deeply engage with the private sector through immersive, problem-focused collaborations that spur technological innovations, alongside urging the rapid adoption and development of identified solutions to enhance defense capabilities. These efforts should emphasize seamlessly integrating these technological solutions into existing defense operations, prioritizing user feedback and iterative improvements to ensure effectiveness and adaptability.This RAND report examines the critical importance of leveraging private-sector technological innovations to enhance the defense capabilities of the United States and Taiwan. Through a series of wargames, the authors describe 17 technologies that could be fielded and operationally impactful in a Taiwan scenario.
Space/Ground Laser Communication: This technology confronts the operational challenge of maintaining resilient communications in the face of sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities posed by the PRC. By integrating a network of satellites across various orbits and establishing mesh networks, it ensures robust, resistant communication links for command and control purposes. Currently at a mature stage of development, it requires further efforts towards seamless integration into existing defense frameworks. Its successful deployment is expected to significantly enhance communication efficacy and resilience on the battlefield, providing a strategic advantage in electronic warfare scenarios.
Integrated Warfighter Network (IWN): The IWN addresses the fragmentation of communication systems by proposing a unified, interoperable network framework that enhances connectivity and reliability across different systems. Although the technology is ready for deployment, the challenge lies in its integration into the diverse existing communication infrastructures. Upon successful integration, the IWN is anticipated to streamline command and control processes, facilitating efficient and effective operational coordination.
Edge Integration/Computing: This solution aims to solve the operational challenge of ensuring real-time data fusion and analysis at the forward edge of battle areas. Utilizing edge computing capabilities allows for immediate processing and decision-making support for frontline units. Despite its commercial viability, integrating this technology with military data standards remains a critical step. The anticipated impact includes improved situational awareness and accelerated decision-making processes, crucial for maintaining operational tempo in dynamic battlefield environments.
Joint Cross-domain Common Operating Picture (COP): This technology aims to overcome the lack of a shared battlespace view between the US and Taiwanese forces by facilitating an interoperable COP. While technically feasible, it faces significant policy and cultural integration challenges. Its successful implementation is vital for enhanced operational synchronization, offering a unified real-time view of the battlefield that supports informed decision-making and effective coordination.
Document/Voice Translation: Designed to bridge the language barriers for effective communication, this technology utilizes real-time translation tools for documents and voice communications, enhancing collaboration between the US and Taiwanese forces. While adaptation for military jargon remains a moderate development challenge, it presents low integration hurdles. The expected outcome is a significant enhancement in tactical and operational collaboration, fostering unity of effort among allied forces.
‘Uncommon’ Operating Picture: This innovative solution offers a mechanism for selective data-sharing to protect sensitive operational information. Although it involves complex development and integration, the strategic significance lies in its potential to safeguard critical strategic information, balancing operational utility with information security.
Blue-green Single System Aggregation: By achieving seamless system integration and information sharing through a unified computing architecture, this solution addresses the challenge of disparate information systems. Despite demanding significant integration efforts, its successful deployment would markedly improve operational coordination and decision-making processes across allied forces.
Secure Mobile Devices: This approach ensures the maintenance of secure and adaptable communication channels through robust mobile devices, addressing the need for mobile and secure command and control capabilities. Overcoming cybersecurity challenges is paramount for its success, which promises to significantly enhance command agility and operational responsiveness.
Situational Awareness Model: Utilizing AI to integrate and analyze multi-intelligence (multi-INT) data, this solution aims to enhance the understanding of PRC military operations and intentions. It requires complex development and thoughtful integration but offers strategic advantages in terms of enhanced foresight and preparation, aiding in the formulation of informed defense strategies.
Identifying AI-Generated Adversarial Disinformation: By employing AI to detect and mitigate disinformation campaigns orchestrated by the PRC, this technology addresses the challenge of information warfare. Developmental and integration challenges notwithstanding, it is deemed critical for maintaining morale and countering psychological operations, ensuring the integrity of operational intelligence.
Multidomain Drone Mimics: This solution leverages diverse, cost-effective drones to deceive enemy ISR efforts, necessitating convincing mimics for efficacy. It promises to significantly disrupt enemy operations and conserve allied resources by presenting false targets and confusing enemy surveillance and targeting systems.
Advanced Mines: Introducing smart, repositionable mines with AI capabilities to enhance minefield effectiveness against amphibious assaults, this solution requires breakthroughs in development for optimal effectiveness. It has the potential to drastically improve defensive measures, shaping enemy movement and increasing the cost of aggression.
Short-range Strike UAVs: Utilizing versatile UAVs prepositioned for the defense of key locations, this solution combats the threat of amphibious assaults and air incursions. While straightforward in development, logistical challenges in prepositioning these UAVs are anticipated. Upon overcoming these, the technology is expected to significantly bolster deterrence and defensive postures at critical points.
Medium-range ISR UAVs: Deploying adaptable UAVs for comprehensive ISR coverage, this solution addresses the need for continuous intelligence gathering. Manufacturing and software development challenges are noted, with the promise of providing persistent surveillance capabilities that enhance situational awareness and operational planning.
Commercial Combat Suite: Leveraging commercial software for operational efficiency, this solution integrates civilian elements into defense efforts, requiring cultural adaptation for maximum utility. It offers a potential boost to reserve force capabilities through the use of familiar and widely adopted technologies, enhancing the operational readiness and effectiveness of auxiliary forces.
Optimize Decoy Deployment and Deception Employment: Developing software to guide the optimal use of decoys and deception techniques, this solution faces complex integration challenges but could significantly impact operational dynamics by confusing adversary perceptions and plans, potentially decreasing enemy effectiveness and conserving allied resources.
Predictive and Prescriptive Logistics: Enhancing logistical efficiency through a data mesh that forecasts and optimizes supply chain operations, this technology confronts integration and cultural challenges within defense logistics frameworks. Its successful implementation promises to improve resource allocation, distribution efficiency, and operational readiness, supporting sustained combat operations and strategic flexibility.
By comparing the baseline wargame results with the wargame where the US and Taiwan players utilized these technologies, the authors determined certain technologies to be especially beneficial.
Synergized multi-domain drone mimics and optimized decoy and deception employment halved the US’s 5th generation fighter aircraft losses and increased Chinese fighter losses by 70% within the first five days of the conflict.
Additionally, these technologies, combined with smart mines and improved situational awareness, reduced the Chinese amphibious forces landing on Taiwan to about one-third of the forces in the baseline version, presenting unprecedented challenges to such operations.
Loitering munitions deployed by Taiwan's reservists also significantly reduced the Chinese helicopter assault force, potentially eliminating up to one hundred helicopters or nearly one-tenth of the invasion's allocated helicopters, further weakening their air mobility capabilities.
Despite the significant quantitative impact of these specific technologies in the wargame, the authors emphasize that technologies with less quantifiable effects remain crucial and worthy of further research.
To learn more about each of the mentioned technologies and their role in a potential Taiwan conflict, I highly suggest reading the full report.
Editorial note: To a significant extent, relevant commercial companies are aware of and have begun developing solutions for many of DoD’s operational problems. However, as these companies are pursuing their niche technological solutions (look no further than the wide variety of unmanned and uncrewed systems being developed), the question of how to address DoD’s operational and institutional problems remains. Indeed, unless DoD can develop an approach to solve these issues, DoD will struggle to sustain private-sector innovation and deploy the solutions that emerge from it. If you missed it, I urge you to look into this report on the concept of a “hedge force” which describes an overall approach for the DoD.