Unveiling Russia's Unconventional Arsenal
A breakdown of how Russia's unconventional warfare strategy has evolved over the last two years
Welcome back, defense buffs.
This week, I have a compelling report to share with you all. The topic is:
How is Russia using unconventional warfare to expand its influence outside of Ukraine?
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The Threat from Russia’s Unconventional Warfare Beyond Ukraine, 2022–24
By Dr. Jack Watling, Oleksandr V. Danylyuk, and Nick Reynolds
Royal United Services Institute
Link to PDF; Link to Report Page
Focus: The report analyzes Russia's unconventional military activities beyond Ukraine during 2022-2024, including efforts in European destabilization, expeditionary operations in Africa for resource control, and influence operations in the Middle East.Analysis: The analysis employs a combination of primary documents from Russian special services, human intelligence reporting on activities in Moldova, Mali, Sudan, and beyond, and interviews with officials in Ukraine and some European states.Argument: Russia's unconventional warfare strategy is characterized by a sophisticated blend of information warfare, human intelligence operations, and, when advantageous, violence to instigate political instability across states. This strategy, consistent over decades, aims to polarize populations, capture elites, and undermine the governance structures of targeted states. Despite Russia's operational failures and the crude nature of its tactics, there is serious potential for these efforts to become increasingly coherent and mutually supportive if left unchecked.Insights: There has been an aggressive expansion of the GRU's partnerships in Africa, aimed at supplanting Western influence in the region. Moreover, the Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, has been utilized to construct influence networks among Chechen and Muslim populations in Europe and the Middle East. Recommendations: The report advises NATO members and European states to enhance counterintelligence and vigilance against Russian unconventional tactics. It suggests a focus on disrupting Russia's support networks and countering disinformation, alongside preparing for potential crises instigated by Russia to divert attention from Ukraine.This RUSI report on Russia's unconventional warfare tactics provides a critical examination of the evolving nature of Russian military activities beyond the conventional battlefield. Focusing on the period post-2022 Ukraine invasion, it highlights the strategic adaptation of the GRU, the integration of Wagner Group functions, and the exploitation of traditional values for influence operations. This analysis is pivotal for understanding the multifaceted threats posed by Russia, emphasizing the importance of a comprehensive response from NATO and Western allies.
Following significant operational exposures and the expulsion of its intelligence officers from Western Europe due to the invasion of Ukraine, the GRU has embarked on a strategic overhaul of its special forces' recruitment, training, and infiltration tactics. There has been a significant shift towards employing non-military recruits for operations to ensure they maintain a low profile. In the same fashion, training for special operations now occurs in distributed safe houses rather than a centralized facility. Also, Russia is targeting foreign students at Russian universities — its special forces training center has allocated some of its budget to providing stipends to students, specifically to students from the Balkans and Africa. These changes reflect a broader strategy to maintain Russian intelligence capabilities in Europe, despite increased Western vigilance and counterintelligence measures.
“Another important vector in the regeneration of a support apparatus is the Russian exile community. Some of those who led Russian mobilisation in September 2022 oppose the war in Ukraine. However, many others are loyal to the Russian state, albeit not to the extent that they were willing to be mobilised, and the low of people provided cover for special service personnel to enter third countries. Participation in Russian opposition media and other activities provides surface-level ‘ethical washing’ and thereafter creates a pathway to legalisation, since these individuals can then claim asylum. At the same time, it becomes possible for them to collect on other elements of the diaspora. More importantly, these individuals can be financed to gain influence within the community and to acquire assets that become useful for supporting unconventional operations. The usual method is for these individuals to receive money for selling a property – fictitious or otherwise – in a third country and then to use the money from the sale to engage in business interactions with other Russian entities where the costs are inflated in order to move money to the individual. Once they have established properties or other assets, this becomes a self-sustaining financial structure to keep the agent in place while drawing only from legally acquired funds, reducing the risk of detection through financial irregularities.”
In addition, the formal absorption of the Wagner Group’s functions — now the Expeditionary Corps — by the GRU marks a pivotal shift in Russia’s strategy to extend its influence in Africa. This strategic move is characterized by an aggressive push to establish military and economic partnerships with African nations, offering a counter-narrative to Western influence. In its special operations strategy, Russia places a high emphasis on the strategic importance of influencing or controlling high-value individuals (termed elite capture), preferring this approach over a broader effort of manipulating general public opinion, to effect change within states. Specifically, Russia deploys what the authors refer to as the "regime survival package”:
“The logic of this offer is that Russia will provide elites in target countries with military support, economic and political protection from backlash via the UN or other international mechanisms, and the support of political technologists to sell their popularity domestically. A critical component of the package is the isolation of a target country’s leadership. For example, in Mali, the Expeditionary Corps – as occurred in the CAR – now provides presidential protection, since this proximity ensures sustained understanding and influence within Malian decision-making. Wagner has a long history of establishing domestic propaganda structures. One of the first successful examples was the creation of the Lengo Songo radio station, which quickly became one of the mouthpieces of Russian propaganda in the CAR and is consistently among the three most popular radio stations in the country. It is worth noting that the Russian political technologist and media manager Igor Mangushev (formerly a Russian navy officer who organised Russian paramilitary groups in the war against Ukraine in Crimea and Donbas in 2014) was heavily involved in establishing the programming.
However, the effect of this offer is to close off the relationships that a country has with the West. Very often, the conduct of massacres and other violations of international law will prevent Western partners from maintaining links with a partner military, the long-term effects of which may not be fully appreciated when cooperation is first agreed. Furthermore, in the medium term, the violent approach used by the Expeditionary Corps may secure a government and fulfill perceived short-term needs, but is unlikely to bring peace to the hinterlands of the recipient country. It is worth noting that the Russian approach is consistent with the tenets of Soviet anti-partisan warfare, involving the use of collective punishment, hostage-taking of local political figures and aggressive raids to kill insurgents. The effect is often the defeat of an insurgent group but an absence of stability or human security. The result is that Russian security partners initially gain a sovereign capability through Russia’s mercenaries and medium-term personal security. However, they also become dependent and begin to lose access to alternative security providers. In the medium to long term, the economic concessions Russia demands risk creating an extremely unequal relationship, in which Moscow extracts much more than it offers.”
The third chapter of the report meticulously examines the role of the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov in advancing Russia’s unconventional warfare strategy. It details Kadyrov’s efforts to cultivate a network of influence among Chechen and Muslim populations in Europe and the Middle East, aiming to subvert Western interests and promote Russia’s geopolitical agenda. This strategy involves leveraging ethno-religious solidarity to foster discord and destabilize regions, thereby complicating Western efforts to counter Russian influence.
“The combination of social status and access to a range of constituencies – both secular and religious – makes Kadyrov a valuable proxy diplomat of the Russian Federation; a unique capability for a regional governor in Russia that occasionally generates comment. In recent years, he has managed to establish effective working relationships with many leaders in the Middle East, including the president of the UAE, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, representatives of the royal family of Bahrain, and leaders of Jordan. It is indicative, for example, that during his visit to Russia in 2017, the king of Saudi Arabia spent more time with Kadyrov than with Putin. The refusal of several states to join the anti-Russian sanctions associated with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine is partly shaped by Kadyrov’s diplomatic efforts. It is not surprising that in July 2023, Putin appointed Kadyrov’s adviser Turko Daudov as a permanent representative to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Daudov was previously a key representative of Chechnya in Arab and Muslim countries. It is arguable that Russia places more importance on Kadyrov as a diplomat than his interlocutors, who are pursuing relationships with Russia for a range of reasons. Nevertheless, personal relationships matter in diplomacy, and Kadyrov has become the intermediary for a range of Russian efforts.”
Overall, Russia's unconventional warfare tactics present a persistent and evolving threat to NATO and the West, necessitating a multifaceted and sustained counter-strategy. The interplay of GRU operations, the Wagner Group's activities in Africa, and influence operations via the Kadyrovtsy underscores a coordinated effort to undermine Western security and interests. This complex threat landscape demands a comprehensive and proactive response from NATO and Western allies to mitigate Russia's unconventional warfare advances and safeguard international stability.
I highly recommend reading the full report to understand better how Russia’s unconventional warfare strategy is transforming.